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INTRODUCTION

Scope
The purpose of this article' is to survey, review, synthesize, and

* "I.Deviating from the expected or normal; strange. 2. Odd or unconventional in behavior;
eccentric. 3. Arousing suspicion. 4. Slang. Homosexual." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY
OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1070 (W. Morris ed. 1976).
** Associate Dean and Professor of Law, The Ohio State University College of Law. B.A.,
Douglass College (1959); M.P.A., Syracuse University (1960); J.D., Wayne State University
(1967). Member, Ohio and Michigan Bars. I wish to thank the following persons: research, Judith
Fisher and William Evans; footnote specialist, Charles Munnell, J.D. (OSU 1978); editor, Carol
Fey, J.D. (OSU 1984); typist, Carol Peirano.
I. This article is the third in a series. The previous two articles include Rivera, Our
Straight-LacedJudges: The Legal Position of Homosexual Persons in the United States, 30 HASTINGs LJ.799 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Rivera I], and Rivera, Recent Developments in Sexual
Preference Law, 30 DRAKE L. REv. 311 (1980-81) [hereinafter cited as Rivera Ill. This article
builds on those articles and continues the reporting begun there. The author strongly suggests that
the reader of this article review the introductions and conclusions of those articles before reading
this article; the author also suggests keeping those articles on hand for reference as one reads this
article.
Part II of this article will appear in Volume I I of the University of Dayton Law Review, and
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connect all the civil law matters, both cases and other legal materials,2
which affect the lives of citizens whose sexual orientation 3 is homosexual." Because over 22,000,000 Americans are gay,' because these gay

will cover military employment, security clearances, family issues, and other civil issues.
2. The material used is not limited to published appellate cases. Since 1975 I have been
engaged in research in this area. I attempt to locate and file any material relating to a legal
dispute which .involves the issue of a person's homosexuality. I subscribe to numerous gay newspapers and journals. Lawyers around the country send me materials. Because these materials are of
limited circulation, I take full responsibility for accuracy when I use them. All of these materials
will soon be made more accessible because the material will be stored in a computer. I wish to
thank The Ohio State University Seed Grant program for the funds to develop the program and to
input the data.
3. Our initial concern was whether or not sexual orientation was conceptually defined
in the research literature. It was defined in only a minority of the studies and with wide
variation in meaning as illustrated by these examples: "sex object choice;" "[piederasty
means anal intercourse with a boy;" "[s]exual orientation refers to the individual's physical
and affectional preference for individuals of the opposite or same sex;" and; "[t]rue homosexuality, like heterosexuality, is a lifelong process involving the initial development of
physiologic responses and the later expression of overt sexual behavior. The physiologic
component is an established pattern to visual, auditory, and tactile stimulation. The response is an emotional and sexual arousal culminating in fantasies, dreams, or sexual outlet
through masturbation or sexual involvement." As a research concept, sexual orientation
clearly has a perplexing array of meanings.
Although the studies in which sexual orientation was operationally defined were much
more numerous, a wide range of methods were used. In most instances, however, the methods of measurement were apparently operational only for the study at hand. Studies that
had conceptual definitions usually had operational definitions.
The conceptual jumble apparent in the research on sexual orientation cannot, we believe, be resolved with greater methodological rigor. It is symptomatic of an underlying
confusion. Sexual orientation was treated as if it were a palpable, unitary phenomenon
although it was conceived in divergent and sometimes contradictory ways.
The fact that respondents were selected on the basis of their putative sexual orientation implies that the researchers were in fact concerned with sexual identity. The idea of
sexual identity, however, provides no more stable focus of investigation than the amorphous
notion of sexual orientation. The single, constant attribute of the concepts of sexual orientation and sexual identity is the biological sex of partners in sexual relationships. Both
concepts, therefore, imply relationships. The array of conceptual and operational definitions
and the diverse methodologies suggest that the investigators may have had correspondingly
varied notions about what constituted a sexual relationship. These variations in approach
suggest that some conceived relationships as "physical" and "erotic," while others saw
them as "romantic," "affectional," and "afliliative."
Shively, Jones & DeCocco, Research on Sexual Orientation:Definition and Methods, 9 J. HoMOSEXUALITY 127, 134 (1983-84).
4. For the specific issues covered, see supra Table of Contents. Other topics, including family issues and other civil issues will be discussed in Part II of the article.
5. The Kinsey Institute estimates that 9.13% of the total population have had either extensive or more than incidental homosexual experience. Letter from Paul H. Gebhard of the Institute
for Sex Research to Rhonda R. Rivera (March 18, 1977). See A. KINSEY, W. POMEROY & C.
MARTIN, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE 650-51 (1948); A. KINSEY, W. POMEROY, C.
MARTIN & P. GEBHARD, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN FEMALE 473-74 (1953). The population of the United States in 1980 was 226, 545, 805. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS. STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1984 (104th ed. 1983). Therefore, nearly 23 million Americans are exclusively or predominately homosexual in their sexual orientation.
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people come from every socio-economic strata, because they are parents, children, spouses, widows, widowers, siblings, and because they
are soldiers, lawyers, construction workers, nurses, and candlestick
makers,7 the instances where the lives of gay persons can intersect with
the legal system are incredibly numerous. The common denominator in
these cases is that the sexual orientation of the individual involved has
become dispositive of the outcome of the legal dispute. A small section
on criminal matters pertaining to gay and lesbian 8 persons has been
included because criminalization of the sexual behavior of gay people
has influenced the outcome of many of the civil law cases.
B.

Purpose

This article is written, as were the two previous articles, for a special audience. The persons I most wish to reach are lawyers who represent gay citizens. Very few resources exist to furnish such lawyers
with the information they need to do a competent job for their clients.
Second, this article is written for gay law students who are invisible in
many instances (out of sound reasons demonstrated by all my writings)
and who need to know their law. These articles represent what sexbased discrimination law classes are for women, and what race discrimination law classes are for black students. Third, this article is written
for gay and lesbian laypersons; any lawyer worth his or her salt should
be able to explain the law to those who are affected by it. Lastly, this
article is intended for legal scholars and those who are interested in an
area of law that is rapidly changing.
C. Methodology
The scope and purpose of this article dictate an atypical methodology; thus, the facts underlying the cases discussed will be described in
detail. When the legal system deals a blow to a gay person, the ineqSee Rivera I, supra note I, at 802 n.18; see also J. BOSWELL, CHRISTIANITY, SOCIAL
43 (1980), where Boswell urges scholars to use the term
"gay." For Boswell, "gay" describes persons who are conscious of erotic preference
for their own
gender.
7. "Social diversity has been extremely well documented in the recent studies conducted for
the Kinsey Institute with research funds from the National Institute of Mental Health. Even these
researchers encountered problems in trying to assemble the most representative group." Paul &
Weinrich, Whom and What We Study: Definition and Scope of Sexual Orientation, reprinted in
6.

INTOLERANCE, AND HOMOSEXUALITY

W. PAUL, J. WEINRICH, V. GONSIOREK & V. HOTVEDT. HOMOSEXUALITY: SOCIAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL AND BIOLOGICAL ISSUES 27-29 (1982).
8. "A female homosexual." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LAN-

749 (W. Morris ed. 1976). "Lesbian: A woman who has sexual relationships with other
women, and who may or may not participate in her Gay culture. From the islands of Lesbos in
Greece, home of the poet Sappho who wrote love poems to women, among other subjects." J.
GRAHN. ANOTHER MOTHER TONGUE 307 (1984).
GUAGE
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uity and injustice are often hidden unless we understand the characteristics of the individual and his or her situation.' Second, quotations of
judges are used at some length in order to accomplish two objectives.
In the case of homophobic' ° quotations, the.oppression of the legal institution as an institution is illustrated. In the case of supportive quotations, material is supplied for the lawyer to use in supporting the position of his or her gay'client. 1'
Another stylistic anomaly is that the basic resource material for
the article is not limited to published appellate cases. A great deal of
gay law never reaches appellate courts. Appellate review is expensive
and public; gay clients are often resource-poor and publicity-averse.
Second, gay law is just on the edge of recognition as a legitimate scholarly endeavor; only very recently have legal indexes and periodicals referenced material in a discoverable manner. Difficulties along this line
are still evident. Third, some of the most significant cases are in lower
courts, administrative tribunals, and lawyers' files. Because gay persons
know that the likelihood of a fair shake in the court system is remote,
many disputes are handled at the lowest possible levels. As a consequence of these factors, much information is discovered in gay newspapers and magazines,' 2 through the auspices of gay legal defense
funds,1 3 through lawyer networks,'14 and from civil rights organiza-

9. For example, does it not matter that Admiral Hooper, who was convicted of homosexual
activity, was a decorated World War II veteran who had been retired for 10 years at the time of
his military conviction? See United States v. Hooper, 26 C.M.R. 417 (1958). Is it not relevant
that Leonard Matlovich, who was discharged from the Air Force because of his homosexuality,
was described by Judge Gesell as follows: "He has had a most commendable, highly useful service
in the military over a long period of time, starting with the Air Force in 1963 . . . . Here is a
man who volunteered for assignment to Viet Nam, who served in Viet Nam with distinction, who
was awarded the Bronze Star while only an Airman First Class, engaged in hazardous duty on a
volunteer basis on more than one occasion, wounded in a mine explosion, re-volunteered, has excelled in the Service . . . and has at all times been rated at the highest possible rating by his
superiors in all aspects of his performance, receiving in addition to the Bronze Star, and the
Purple Heart, two Air Force Commendation Medals and a Meritorious Service Medal."
Matlovich v. Secretary of the Air Force, 591 F.2d 852, 854 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1978). James Gaylord,
who lost his teaching job, was a teacher who for 12 years had received excellent evaluations.
Gaylord v. Tacoma School District No. 10, 88 Wash. 2d 286, 559 P.2d 1340, cert. denied, 434
U.S. 879 (1977).
10. Homophobia is the irrational fear of homosexual persons or homosexuality. Hudson &
Ricketts, A Strategy for the Measurement of Homophobia, 5 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 357 (1980).
II. One excellent source for lawyers is D. HITCHENS, LESBIAN MOTHER LITIGATION MANUAL (Lesbian Rights Project) (1982).
12. See, e.g., The Advocate, 1730 South Amphlett, Suite 225, P.O. Box 5847, San Mateo,
California 94402; Gay Community News, 22 Bromfield St., Boston, Massachusetts 02108.
13. Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund [hereinafter cited as Lambda LDEF], 132
West 43rd Street,' New York, New York 10036 (special thanks to Abby R. Rubenfeld, Esq., for
her help in locating case materials); Lesbian Rights Project, 1370 Mission St., 4th Fl., San Francisco, California 94103 (special thanks to Roberta Achtenberg, Esq. and Donna Hitchens, Esq.);
Gay Rights Advocates, 540 Castro .Street, San Francisco, California 94114; Gay and Lesbian
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tions. 15 Wherever possible, the footnotes give as much information as is
available, in as precise a manner as possible, along with suggestions as
to possible leads for exploration. Some footnotes also contain material
of a rather broad nature. Legal attitudes and rules governing gay behavior are neither set in a vacuum nor created solely by legal reasoning. Therefore, when possible, relevant nonlegal sources are cited.
Lastly, this article does not analyze in depth the issues or the cases
discussed. Rigorous, deep, substantive analysis of all the issues is not
the goal of this article. However, other scholars have written excellent
analytical pieces about some of the areas surveyed here.
D. Language
Choice of language to describe a subject can and does affect the
substantive message. I would ask the reader to refer to my first article
for precise clinical definitions of homosexuality, heterosexuality, transsexuality, transvestism, sexual identity, gender identity, and others. 6
Along a broader line, please note that my own use of language has
changed. I no longer discuss "homosexual persons" because I have become convinced that this pseudo-medical term is clinically incorrect
and socially harmful. By focusing on the sexual, one treats gay citizens
as one-dimensional, erotic persons and also invests the term with
pathological undertones. I no longer use the phrase "sexual preference"
because .1 have become convinced that the term is also misleading (sexual orientation should not be equated with one's preference for margarine over butter). Moreover, the use of preference allows a justification
to bigots in which I will no longer participate. 18 I shall, in most cases,
use the term "gay" to describe both men and women whose sexual orientation is toward persons of the same sex. Gay is the preferred word.

Advocates and Defenders, 100 Boylston Street, Suite 900, Boston, Massachusetts 02116.
14. These networks include: The Bar Association for Human Rights of Greater New York,
P.O. Box 1899, Grand Central Station, New York, New York 10163; The American Association
of Law Schools Section on Gay and Lesbian Legal Issues; and The National Lesbian and Gay
Attorneys Referral Directory, (GLAD). Thanks also to Lyle, Pam, Robert, Katherine, Doug,
Mary D., and Betsy.
15. Particularly helpful is the American Civil Liberties Union-National Gay Rights Project,
633 S. Shatto St., Suite 207, Los Angeles, CA 90048. See also E. BOGGAN, M. HAFT, C. LISTER,
J. Rupp & T. STODDARD, AN ACLU HANDBOOK: THE RIGHTS OF GAY PEOPLE (rev. ed 1983);
The National Lawyers Guild-National Gay Rights Task Force, 853 Broadway, Room 1705, New
York, New York 10003; National Organization of Women's Lesbian Rights Project, 1400 New
York Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005-2102.
16. See Rivera 1, supra note 1.
17. See A. MOSES & R. HAWKINS, COUNSELING LESBIAN WOMEN AND GAY MEN: A LIFE
ISSUES APPROACH xi (1982).
18. But see an excellent study of the origins of a person's homosexuality in A. BELL, M.
WEINBERG & S. HAMMERSMITH, SEXUAL PREFERENCE (1981).
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Certainly, if respect for differences demands that persons of the Negro
race be called blacks and that female persons be called women, gay
people deserve no less. The last issue is one few writers can avoid, that
is, gender specific language. This issue takes on a particular sensitivity
in the gay community because there is a technical, nonpejorative label
which exists solely for gay women, i.e., lesbians; however, the word
"gay" covers both men and women. No comparable, nonpejorative
term exists solely to describe gay men. The politically correct method is
to use "gay men and lesbians," a cumbersome approach for an author.
I shall use the term "gay" as a generic term and hope for the best.
Values

E.

One of the pitfalls of doing research in this area is that the scholar
to be gay, otherwise he or she would not write in this area.
presumed
is
Holders of such a view (especially if the scholar is discovered indeed to
be gay) tend to discount the information presented and the conclusions
drawn. On the other hand, an honest scholar must inform the readers
of his or her value system so that judgments are seen as objective and
not as propaganda. The first level of inquiry should not be the sexual
orientation of the writer, but rather should be his or her demonstrated
track record for objective reporting and sound, unbiased judgments.
Second, the author must be honest about underlying values. I believe
passionately in the equality of all persons before the law, including, and
especially, gay persons. Most of the information about how gay people
have been treated by legal institutions I find repugnant, unjust, and
antithetical to my moral system. 19 Third, I regard myself as an honest
and competent legal scholar who believes in academic freedom and the
duty of the scholar to be academically honest in his or her research.

II.
A.

EMPLOYMENT AND RELATED OCCUPATIONAL DISCRIMINATION

Private Employment

The basic premise at common law with regard to hiring and firing
was that a private employer could hire and fire "at will."120 This axiom
of employment relationships permitted arbitrary and capricious decisions unrelated to merit or competency, .but was regarded as a fundamental premise of a free enterprise society. An exception to this principle was enacted at the federal level with the passage of Title VII of the
19. See Rivera, They All Know, II PLUMBLINE, Nov. 1983, at 10 (published by the Episcopal Society of Ministry in Higher Education).
20. An early characterization of the employment at will doctrine recognized the employer's
traditional right to discharge employees "for good cause, for no cause or even for cause morally
wrong." Payne v. Western & Ati. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom. Hutton v. Watters, 132 Tenn. 527, 179 S.W. 134 (1915).
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1964 Civil Rights Act.2 1 That legislation prohibited employment discrimination by private employers and the federal government on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin.2" Subsequently,
discrimination has also been forbidden by federal statute on the basis
of age2 3 and handicap. 2' However, sexual orientation was not one of the
enumerated employee characteristics protected under either Title VII
or other legislation.
Gay employees have sought unsuccessfully to bring sexual orientation under the ambit of Title VII. The courts have denied this protection on many occasions. 25 The reasons cited have included: (1) that
only the enumerated classes were legislatively intended to be protected,
and hence, any broader protection encompassing additional classes
must be added by legislative action; 26 and (2) that the term "sex" does
not encompass sexual orientation, i.e., discrimination based on the gender of the employee's loved one is not prohibited by a prohibition based
on "sex."2 7 Gay advocates have unsuccessfully argued that when a man
may not choose another man for a life partner, but a woman may, such
a distinction does discriminate on the basis of the gender of the employee.2 8 Similarly, gay advocates have contended that allowing discrimination on the basis of the gender of the employee's life partner is,
in effect, sex discrimination because the basis of the discrimination lies
in outdated and irrational stereotypes about the proper behavior of the
sexes. The eradication of such stereotypes was one of the underlying
purposes of Title VII. 29 However, none of these arguments has prevailed and Title VII protection is unavailable for employees discriminated against on the basis of their sexual orientation. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), charged with the
enforcement of Title VII, has followed a similar path and has refused
to take jurisdiction over sexual orientation discrimination charges.3 0
One case presents a slight twist on the usual factual situation. In

21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-17 (1982).
22. To be regulated by Title VII, an employer must have at least 15 regular employees. Id.
§ 2000e.
23. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1982).
24. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-960 (1982).
25. DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979); Smith v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1978); Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659
(9th Cir. 1977); Parfitt v. D.L. Auld Co., No. 74-437 (S.D. Ohio July 20, 1975) (dismissed for
failure to state a claim).
26. See DeSantis, 608 F.2d at 333; Holloway, 566 F.2d at 663.
27. See DeSantis, 608 F.2d at 331; Liberty Mut., 569 F.2d at 326-27; Parfitt, No. 74-437.
28. See DeSantis, 608 F.2d at 330.
29. See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 545 (1971) (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
30. [1976] 2 Empl. Prac. Guide (CCH) 1 6493, 6495.
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Valdes v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co.,31 a Florida district court
held that a female employee would be entitled to Title VII relief if she
could show that an employer's policy against employing gay persons
was not applied uniformly. The employee claimed that her employer,
erroneously believing her to be a lesbian, fired her, but that the same
employer did not fire gay men. Thus, the court held that if the female
employee could successfully show that gay men were not fired, the
court could conclude that firing the plaintiff for being a lesbian was
only a pretext for firing her because she was a women."2 Presumably,
the employer could remedy this situation by proceeding to fire all males
thought to be gay, an illustration of equal nonprotection.3 3 The futility
of this disparate treatment argument, with its difficult burden of proof,
is clearly revealed in an EEOC decision from 1977. The commission
held that when no evidence existed that the employer would not have
discharged the lesbian employee if she had been a male homosexual,
Title VII was not violated."
While both the courts and the EEOC have categorically refused to
take jurisdiction over sexual orientation discrimination complaints
against private employers, both institutions have found that claims of
sexual harassment of a same-sex nature are covered by Title VII.-3 For
example, in Wright v. Methodist Youth Services, Inc.,36 the court held
that the discharge of a male employee for rejecting advances allegedly
made by his male supervisor constituted a violation of Title VII. Sexual
harassment of a female employee by a male supervisor has been characterized in Title VII language as a "demand made of a female employee that would not be made of a male employee" and, hence, actionable sex discrimination."7 In Wright, the court characterized the male
employee's complaint as "the obverse of that coin": a demand of a
male employee that would not be directed to a female employee."8 For
the court, in each case, the problem is identical: "the exaction of a
condition which, but for his or her sex, the employee would not have

31. 507 F. Supp. 10 (S.D. Fla. 1980).
32. Id. at 13.
33. The dysfunctional nature of attempting a disparate impact argument in gay employment cases-that is, that discrimination against gays adversely impacts males, who make up a
greater percentage of the homosexual population-was cited in Rivera 1, supra note 1,at 809.
Such a litigation strategy is advocated in Siniscalco, Homosexual Discriminationin Employment,
16 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 498, 506-11 (1976), and in Rivera & Galvan, Homosexuals and Title
VII, 3 TEX. S.U.L. REV. 126, 136-38 (1975). The argument was attempted in DeSantis, but was
rejected by the court. DeSantis, 608 F.2d at 330.
34. [1977] 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1789.
35. See, e.g., [1981] 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1789.
36. 511 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
37. Id. at 310.
38. Id.
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This recognition of same sex harassment as covered by Title VII
has been supported by other courts 40 and by the EEOC.4 1 One is
tempted to comment that being fired for loving someone of the same
sex could also be characterized as "the exaction of a condition which,
but for his or her sex, the employee would not have faced." 42
One recent Title VII case, Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.,'43 came
close to creating a broader, judicially recognized concept of sex and
gender. Ulane involved a transsexual airline pilot who had been fired
after'sexual reassignment surgery, which left Ulane somatically a woman, congruent with her psychosexual identity. In at least one prior
Title VII case, a court erroneously lumped homosexual persons and
transsexual persons together 44 and concluded that the total group had
no recourse. In Ulane, the trial court recognized that precedent precluded Title VII protection of homosexual persons but sought to use
modern psychological and medical information to distinguish transsexual persons. The court took judicial notice of the difference between
psychosexual identity and sexual orientation.45 The court held that, by
firing Ulane, Eastern violated Title VII prohibitions against sex discrimination. The trial judge, Judge Grady, reasoned that the firing was
"in effect, a statement that a condition of plaintiff's continued employment was that she remain a male."'46 Grady concluded that if such
were the case, "clearly the allegations of the complaint show that the
discharge was because of sex."' 7 Grady admittedly took a broad view
of sexual discrimination, stating that the discharge "need only have
some causal connection to a sexual consideration in order to be prohib48
ited by the statute.'

The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court decision, taking a
traditional view of Title VII application. 9 Since the court could not
find "sexual identity disorder" among the enumerated protected clas-

39. Id.
40. See Zalewski v. M.A.R.S. Enters., Ltd., 561 F. Supp. 601 (D. Del. 1982); Wright, 511
F. Supp. 307; Hodges v. John Morrel Co., No. 78-2258 (W.D. Tenn. 1978).
41. [1981] 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1789.
42. Wright, 511 F. Supp. at 310.
43. 581 F. Supp. 821 (N.D. Ill.
1982), rev'd, 742 F.2d'1081 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 2033 (1985).
44. Voyles v. Ralph K. Davies Medical Center, 403 F. Supp. 456, 457 (N.D. Cal. 1975),
aff'd mem., 570 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1978).
45. Ulane, 581 F. Supp. at 821.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Ulane (1), 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2033 (1985).
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ses, the judges concluded that Title VII did not apply. 0 Ironically, the
court sententiously began by stating that "we do not condone discrimination in any form." 5 1 Again, in the traditional mode, the court of appeals looked at the legislative history of Title VII and found no support
for protecting transsexual employees from employment discrimination.
Another make-weight in the court's mind was Congress' continued rejection of amendments to add new enumerated classes to Title VII 2
Such a position once again indicates a judicial failure to differentiate
between transsexual persons and gay persons. The legislation consistently rejected in Congress deals only with sexual orientation and not
sexual identity discrimination. 53 Ulane thus joins a long line of cases
signifying for litigators the futility of attempting to include sexual orientation under sex in Title VII. Consequently, other approaches currently underlie the more significant cases in the private employment
sphere.
In 1981, Sam Dorr" was the manager of the Bardstown Branch of
the First National Bank of Louisville, Kentucky. He had worked for
the bank for nineteen years, and had compiled an outstanding work
record. In November, 1981, Dorr became president of Integrity/Louisville, Inc. and Dignity/Louisville, Inc.5 5 The bank, through Dorr's supervisors, issued an ultimatum: resign from the organization, move to a
lesser job at lesser pay, and avoid any public connection with the gay
religious group: Plaintiff, an active member of the Episcopal church for
39 years, was intensely committed to his lay ministry in the group. He
felt forced to "involuntarily resign" from the bank.
Dorr subsequently filed a civil suit with claims that illustrate a
creative approach in both the use of Title VII and other remedies. Dorr
did claim a Title VII violation, but not sex discrimination; rather, Dorr
claimed discrimination on the basis of religion. The claim was
processed first through the EEOC, which refused jurisdiction on the
grounds that no religious discrimination occurred. Dorr also sought to

50. Id. at 1086.
51. Id. at 1084.
52. Id. at 1085.
53. See, e.g., S. 2081, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 17,854 (1979). For a good
general discussion of transsexuality and the law, see Haag & Sullinger, Is He or Isn't She?
Transsexualism: Legal Impediments to Integratinga Product of Medical Definition and Technology, 21 WASHBURN L.J. 342 (1982).
54. Dorr v. First Ky. Nat'l Corp., No. 83-0118-L(G) (W.D. Ky. Feb. 1, 1983), appeal
docketed, No. 84-5607 (6th Cir. Apr. 1984).
55. Integrity is a lay organization of the Episcopal Church of America which ministers to,
among others, the church's gay members. Integrity, Inc. is a tax-exempt § 501(c)(3) corporation,
its stated corporate purposes being religious, educational, charitable, and literary. Dignity is a
similar group in the Roman Catholic Church. Often the two groups meet together to share
resources.
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use a section 1983 action," claiming that the bank and its employees
sought to deprive him of his first and fourteenth amendment rights. To
support this claim, Dorr had to show "state action" and used an interesting argument. Namely, he contended that because the bank was
highly regulated under Kentucky law, the bank was a quasi-public institution and hence subject to the fourteenth amendment. Using a similar argument, Dorr also claimed that the bank officers were also acting
"under the color of law." These arguments parallel the successful arguments made in Gay Law Students Association v. Pacific Telephone &
Telegraph Co.,67 in which the California Supreme Court found the
telephone company to be a quasi-public institution because of the
highly regulated nature of its monopoly position. In that case, discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation was prohibited for the telephone company because of state constitutional limitations on state action.58 Lastly, Dorr also raised a section 1985(3) 59 claim.
The strategy chosen by the attorneys in the Dorr case was to cast
the discrimination in religious terms. Dorr saw his work in Integrity
and in Dignity as part of the lay ministry enjoined by Episcopal teachings. At trial, considerable supportive testimony was elicited from Episcopal clergy in support of Dorr's position. The trial court found against
Dorr despite the judge's conclusion that Samuel Dorr was a "deeply
religious man who was well-informed about the doctrines of the Episcopal church." 6 0 At trial, the bank conceded the sincerity of Dorr's religious beliefs, but defended its actions on the basis that Dorr had insufficiently communicated the religious basis of his intended activities
with Integrity to the bank. The trial court was much harsher, holding
that Dorr's beliefs were not truly religious. This conclusion arose from
a statement in Dorr's pretrial deposition that the doctrines of the Episcopal church did not "require" him to be a member or an officer of
Integrity nor did they require him to be a homosexual person."' Thus,

56. Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory . . .subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
57. 24 Cal. 3d 458, 595 P.2d 592, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1979).
58. The Supreme Court of California held that the California constitutional equal protection guarantee is violated when a privately owned public utility, which enjoys a state-protected
monopoly or quasi-monopoly, utilizes its authority arbitrarily to exclude gay people from employment opportunities. Id. at 474-75, 595 P.2d at 602, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 24.
59. 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1982) (conspiracy to interfere with civil rights).
60. It is particularly interesting to note that the trial judge himself was an Episcopalian.
61. Plaintiff's deposition, Dorr, No. 83-0118-L(G).
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in the judge's eyes, since no dogma required Dorr's actions, Dorr's beliefs were not "sincerely held." 2
The trial court also held that the bank's dismissal of Dorr was not

based on religious animus since the bank did not consider Dorr's activities to be religious. Dorr had presented his supervisor with written material describing in detail the religious nature of Integrity. However,
the supervisor himself admitted at trial that he saw "homosexualism"
(sic) and religion as "mutually exclusive." 6 The court constantly referred sua sponte to Dorr's work as "gay rights advocacy" rather than
participation in a lay ministry in a gay group. 6 The case is now on
appeal in the Sixth Circuit.15 Interestingly, a joint amicus curiae brief
was filed on Dorr's behalf by the Presbyterian Church and the Episcopal Bishop of New York.
A somewhat similar case arose in California; however, sexual orientation protective law is more developed there and the result may be
dissimilar.6 6 Leland Larsen, 7 a fifty-four year old senior bank vice
president, was fired after working for Fidelity Savings and Loan Association for over thirty years. Larsen alleged his termination was because the bank discovered he was gay. 68 Originally, Larsen sued under
three causes of action: breach of an implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing leading to wrongful termination, fraudulent concealment,

62. Dorr, No. 83-0118-L(G).
63. Record, Dorr, No. 83-0118-L(G).
64. In Haring v. Blumenthal, 471 F. Supp. 1172 (D.D.C. 1979), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 939
(1981), the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia discussed an employer's obligation to
make reasonable accommodation to the religious beliefs of their employees under Title VII. The
court stated "The Constitution is designed to shield robust and seemingly eccentric expression and
conduct no less than those which are more mildly conventional . . . and the Civil Rights Act's
religious discrimination provisions incorporate that constitutional standard." Id. at 1183-84.
65. Dorr, No. 83-0118-L(G). Lambda Legal Defense also submitted an amicus brief.
66. Gay Law Students, 24 Cal. 3d 458, 595 P.2d 592, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14, is certainly the
most favorable case. In my Drake Law Review article, I did not make clear the full import of the
decision. See Rivera i, supra note I, at 315-16. (Thank you Richard Gayer, esq., for pointing
this out.) Gay Law Students not only treated a public utility as a quasi-public employer and hence
subject to the state's equal protection clause, but the case went much further. Gay Law Students,
24 Cal. 3d at 472, 595 P.2d at 600, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 22. The court also found that discrimination
against openly gay persons or their supporters violated the California Labor Code by interfering
with employees' political freedoms. Id. at 489, 595 P.2d at 611, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 33 (citing CAL.
LAB. CODE §§ 1101, 1102 (1980)). This holding meant that all private employers covered by the
Labor Code are prohibited from discriminating against openly gay employees. For a discussion of
what constitutes "openly gay" see R. Gayer, Employment Discrimination-Only the "Identified"
Lesbian or Gay Man Is Protected (Feb. 1982) (unpublished manuscript).
67. Larsen v. Fidelity Say. & Loan Ass'n, No. 0377981 (Sup. Ct. Cal. Aug. I1, 1981).
68. About the same time, the governor of California vetoed a civil rights bill which would
have protected gay persons from discrimination in employment. Governor Deukmejian stated that
the bill was simply unnecessary, because there is no such discrimination. N.Y. Times, Sept. 2,
1984, § I, at 26, col. I.
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and breach of contract. After a summary judgment for defendants on
breach of contract and breach of an implied covenant, only fraudulent
9
concealment remains. The trial date is set for mid-1985.,
Another case similar to Dorr is Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp.,7 0 which
attempted to use religious discrimination to protect a gay employee.
Blum alleged he was fired not only because he was gay, but also because he was Jewish; he brought his suit on traditional Title VII
grounds and under section 1981." The court dismissed the sexual orientation claim in one sentence: "Discharge for homosexuality is not
prohibited by Title VII or Section 1981. ' 1 In addition, the religious
grounds were rejected because the employer had articulated a legitimate reason for the dismissal, which the employee admitted to, namely,
use of the employer's telephone for personal business reasons. 3 Blum
claimed the given reason was a pretext, and, had he been granted adequate discovery, he could have shown that other employees behaved in
a similar fashion without retribution. He failed to convince the court in
any respect.74 Where some fault can be found with an employee, a
showing that the reason articulated for termination is pretextual is difficult. However, as the human rights commissioner of New York City
said, speaking of equal opportunity for women: "[W]e won't have equal
rights when a female Einstein is made an assistant professor of mathematics; rather we will have equal rights when a female shlemiel can go
as far as a male shlemiel. ' '7 Equal employment protection for gay people requires a similar rubric.
Three recent cases still before the courts indicate an attempt to go
beyond the generally unsuccessful Title VII, section 1981, and section
1983 dead end routes in private employment discrimination cases. Two

69. The bank was able to have the two other claims dismissed by invoking the Federal
Reserve Act. Since California has a well-developed exception to employment at will, Larsen's case
has been significantly weakened by the applicability of the Federal Reserve Act. Although the

original complaint had other plaintiffs, Larsen is currently the only plaintiff. The bank has deposed Larsen's doctors and his roommate, and has involved his ex-wife in the litigation. Telephone
interview with Marlene Thomason, attorney for Larsen (Nov. 29, 1984).
70.

597 F.2d 936 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).

71. Id. at 937. Section 1981 provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every
State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to
the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982).
72. Blum, 597 F.2d at 938.
73. Id. at 937.
74. Id. at 938.
75. This quote appeared in The New York Times many years ago; the author regrets the

absence of an exact cite.
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of the cases involve suits against the ChristianScience Monitor, a Boston, Massachusetts-based newspaper which, although operated by the
Christian Science Church, is a well-known national newspaper with
high quality, secular news reporting. In the first case, Jim Ogan, a
nine-year employee, was fired in March of 1982.76 At the time of his
dismissal he was a business and cost analyst in the building and
grounds division. Ogan did not bring an action under federal law, but
rather sued for breach of contract and for violation of a Massachusetts
statute which gives Massachusetts citizens a remedy against "unreasonable, substantial or serious interference with . . . privacy. ' 77 Originally Ogan also claimed emotional stress and wrongful termination as
causes of action, but these claims were also dismissed. However, the
other claims withstood a motion to dismiss 78 and the case now awaits
trial.
Meanwhile, an almost parallel action developed. In December of
1982, the Monitor dismissed Christine Madsen after seven years of
highly successful reporting. 79 After discovering that Madsen was a lesbian, the paper fired her because she refused to "heal" herself as ordered by the church. As was Ogan, Madsen was a church member at
the time of her termination.8" The Madsen case also did not rely on
federal laws to protect employment rights; rather, Madsen charged bad
faith termination of employment, breach of contract, defamation, infliction of emotional distress, failure of the employer to follow its own internal procedures and bylaws, violation of the Massachusetts constitution, violation of the Massachusetts statute prohibiting invasion of
privacy, the public policy of the state, and, last but not least, sexual
preference discrimination. 8 1 In August of 1983, Madsen's suit withstood the defendant's motion to dismiss and motion for a summary
judgment.8 2 On April 20, 1984, Massachusetts' highest court, the Su83
preme Judicial Court, agreed to take the case on direct review.
The most interesting and potentially the most useful ground
claimed in Madisen's suit lies in the argument that a termination on
the basis of sexual orientation violated both the public policy and the

76. Gay Community News, Apr. 3, 1982, at i, 3; see also id., Nov. 27, 1982, at 1, 3. The
author has been unable to obtain original materials on this case.
77. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 214, § IB (West Supp. 1984).
78. Gay Community News, Apr. 3, 1982, at i, 3.
79. In fact, shortly after her dismissal, Madsen won first place honors in the Best Sportswriter's category of the New England Women's Press Association awards.
80. Gay Community News, Nov. 27, 1982, at 1,3.
81. Madsen v. Trustees, Christian Science Publishing Co., No. 58-574 (Super. Ct. Mass.
Dec. I, 1982).
82. Gay Community News, May 19, 1984, at 2.
83. The oral argument took place on October 4, 1984.
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common law of the State of Massachusetts. Although violations of the
United States Constitution were claimed, the emphasis was on Massachusetts' statute prohibiting an invasion of privacy and on the state's
public policy. Such a tactic seems a wise litigation strategy because the
United States Supreme Court and federal courts either avoid gay employment issues14 or are, in many cases, hostile. Especially in the coming years under the Reagan administration, a resort to progressive state
courts may prove much more fruitful for gay advocates. 85
The right of privacy claim which underlies both the Madsen and
Ogan cases is somewhat unique because they are based on state statute.
As the right is statutory, new, and extremely broad, these gay cases
may create very significant results.8"
The second significant claim arising from the Christian Science
Monitor cases that may create new law is the claim that employment
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is against the public
policy of the state of Massachusetts. One authority cited in Madsen's
complaint is the June 19, 1982, executive order on nondiscrimination of
the city of Boston.87 Madsen also asserts that the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts has a public policy that employees who perform their
duties in a satisfactory manner shall be entitled to job security and not
summarily discharged for unfair or bad faith reasons. 8 The latter
claim is consistent with an increasing trend to attack the common-law
doctrine of employment at will. The doctrine has already been abolished in a number of states, which provides a new method of attack for
gay employees. The Madsen case challenges the doctrine in a state
where the employment at will doctrine has already been undermined.
Massachusetts courts recognize an implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing in employment contracts, and have held that a termination
84. See In re Longstaff, 716 F.2d 1439 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2668
(1984); Van Ooteghem v. Gray, 628 F.2d 488 (5th Cir. 1980), af'd en banc, 654 F.2d 304 (5th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 909 (1982); Gay Lib v. University of Mo., 558 F.2d 848 (8th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1080 (1978); Mississippi Gay Alliance v. Goudelock, 536 F.2d
1073 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 982 (1977); Burton v. Cascade Dist., 512 F.2d 850
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 839 (1975); Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 491 F.2d 498 (4th
Cir.), pert. denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974); Schlegel v. United States, 416 F.2d 1372 (Ct. Cl. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1039 (1970); Anonymous v. Macy, 398 F.2d 317 (5th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1041 (1969); People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d
947 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981); Gaylord v. Tacoma School Dist. No. 10, 88 Wash.
2d 286, 559 P.2d 1340, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977).
85. However, a really adverse Supreme Court decision could chill state advances as well.
86. See generally Note, The Massachusetts Right of Privacy Statute: Decoy or Ugly Duckling?, 9 SUFFOLK UL. REV. 1248 (1975).
87. Complaint, Madsen, No. 58-574.
88. Madsen relies on Massachusetts statutes which provide both public and private causes
of action for impairment of civil rights. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 12, §§ I H, 111 (West Supp.
1984).
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not made in good faith can constitute a breach of contract.8 9
Even if the court will recognize such a cause of action, the real
issue is whether the court will recognize the cause against the particular employer, the Christian Science Monitor. Does a religious denomination have a different standard of behavior? Madsen's lawyer, Katherine Triantafillou, has argued that even if a lower standard applies to
religious bodies, the lower standard does not apply to the Monitor.
Madsen's argument is that the Monitor, which is published not by the
church but by an independent publishing company, is in essence a secular employer. 90 The public image of the Monitor, as reflected in its
advertisements, certainly plays up the newspaper's secular nature. This
case, like Dorr, uses religious interests to advance the cause of one of
the litigants. However, Dorr, the gay litigant, was refused the shield of
his faith. In contrast, in Gay Rights Coalition v. Georgetown University,9 1 the university relied on the Roman Catholic religion as a shield
against prohibitions imposed by the Washington, D.C. Human Rights
Ordinance. The clash of religious rights with other rights will be seen
again when we examine the battle pitting a New York City mayor's
executive order against the Archdiocese of New York and the Salvation Army. 92
A similar doctrinal approach in which a gay invoked an accepted
category of discrimination is seen in Trueman v. Advanced Underwriters Insurance Agency, Inc."3 The employer in that case, upon learning
that Trueman had Kaposi's sarcoma, a part of the AIDS syndrome,
terminated his employment in advance of the contract's two-year termination date and without the thirty-day required notice. Plaintiff
Trueman sued, alleging discrimination not on the basis of sexual orientation, but on the basis of handicap under Michigan law.' 4 He also
claimed that his employer's conduct constituted sexual harassment
under the Michigan civil rights statute. Under Michigan law, an employee has the right to be free from sexual harassment, which is defined
to include "verbal or physical conduct or communication of a sexual
nature" when "such conduct has the purpose or effect of substantially

89. See Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977); see
also Annot., 12 A.L.R. 4th 544 (1982); R. Bienstock, Exceptions to At Will Employment: Applications to Gay Related Employment Discrimination (July 7, 1983) (unpublished paper for the
Lambda LDEF).
90. Telephone interview with Katherine Triantafillou, Madsen's attorney (Jan. 5, 1985).
91. Gay Rights Coalition v. Georgetown Univ., CA-5863-80 (Super. Ct. D.C. Apr. 30,
1980).
92. See infra text accompanying notes 137-51.
93. No. 84-415382 NO (Cir. Ct. Mich. May 31, 1984). See also the discussion of this case
in Part II's section on discrimination against AIDS victims.
94. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 37.1101-.1209 (West Supp. 1984).

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol10/iss3/3

1985]

SEXUAL ORIENTATION LAW

475

interfering with the employee's employment . . . or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive employment . . . environment." 9 5 According to Trueman's complaint, the employer inquired at length about the
employee's sexual life and made disparaging remarks based on the discovery of Kaposi's sarcoma and, ultimately, fired the employee based
on the presence of a supposedly sexually transmitted disease. This use
of the sexual harassment claim by gays has grown out of the loophole
created when courts recognized same-sex sexual harassment as a Title
VII claim while rejecting sexual orientation discrimination itself as
prohibited.96
Like Madsen and Ogan, Trueman also alleged a common-law
breach of contract, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and tortious interference with a potentially advantageous economic relationship. In addition, a statutory allegation of a special nature rounded out
his attack: Trueman charged a violation of the Detroit Human Rights
Ordinance. 97 Detroit is one of the few cities in the nation to have a civil
rights ordinance that forbids sexual orientation discrimination in private employment.98
As indicated above, the employment at will doctrine is being assailed throughout the nation. In Satori v. Society of American Military
Engineers," the doctrine is directly challenged on behalf of a gay employee. Joseph Satori had worked for the Society of American Military
Engineers for over eight years when he was fired. His abrupt termination came about after he discussed, with a group of other gay persons,
gay culture and politics with a newspaper reporter. The subsequent article disclosed Satori's employer's name; Satori was told he had
"breached a sacred trust" by revealing for whom he worked and was
consequently fired. 100 Satori applied for unemployment benefits, which
the Virginia Employment Commission awarded him over the society's
objection. 10 1
The circumstances under which Satori spoke to the newspaper reporter dramatically illustrated his belief that the society had impliedly
agreed to terminate employees only for cause and not for sexual orientation. The 1979 bylaws of the society specifically stated that sexual
orientation was a prohibited reason for firing an employee.102 Relying
95. Id. § 37.2103(h)(iii).
96. See, e.g., Wright, 511 F. Supp. 307.
97. Detroit City Charter § 7-1004.
98. For a list of such cities, which is updated quarterly, contact the National Gay Task
Force, 80 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York, 10011.
99. No. 9008 (Cir. Ct. Alexandria, Va. June 6, 1984).
100. The Advocate, Dec. 8, 1983, at 14.
101. Id.

102. The bylaws stated in relevant part:
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on this statement, Satori for the first time publicly discussed his orientation. After his termination, Satori brought suit against the society on
the following grounds: wrongful discharge in tort, wrongful discharge
in contract, estoppel, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
defamation.1" 3 The society in its answer denied the existence of the bylaw statement.1 0 ' In Satori's motion for judgment, he alleged that the
society had changed the bylaw immediately after firing him. 10 5 The society moved for a summary judgment alleging that Virginia did not
recognize an exception to the employment at will doctrine nor a claim
based on wrongful discharge in tort. Interestingly, in its motion the society admitted the existence of its policy against discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation but said "the representation does not not rise
to a high enough level, as a matter of law, to rebut the presumption
that the employment . . . was terminable at will."' ' Satori's motion in
opposition pointed out that there were issues of fact that were only resolvable by a jury and, hence, a summary judgment was improvident.
The plaintiff also made a strong argument that the trend in Virginia
law was to recognize exceptions to the employment at will doctrine. 107
Notwithstanding these claims and others, Judge Grenadier of the Circuit Court for the City of Alexandria found for the society on all points
and granted a motion for dismissal. 10 8 The judge's order is bereft of
legal discussion of the issues and is wholly conclusory. The dismissal
will be appealed to the Virginia Supreme Court.' 0 9
The cases cited in this review of private employment discrimination litigation reveal the creative energies utilized to find a method to
remedy sexual orientation employment discrimination when all the
standard statutory and constitutional remedies have failed. As in the
area of gay domestic law, attorneys are utilizing traditional concepts in
a nontraditional area.
Another approach to protecting the employment rights of gay employees is through the use of labor laws and labor unions." 0 Under the

Nondiscrimination Policy: The Society fully supports the policy of equal opportunity
and will not discriminate or knowingly participate in any activity that discriminates on the
basis or [sic] race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation,or national origin. Likewise, The
Society will take no official action which is or appears to be detrimental or discriminatory
to any class or group of persons.
Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment, Satori, No. 9008 (emphasis added).
103. Id.
104. Answer and Grounds for Defense, At Law, Satori, No. 9008.
105. Motion for Judgment, Satori, No. 9008.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Order, Satori, No. 9008.
109. Letter from Calvin Steinmetz, Satori's attorney, to Rhonda R. Rivera (Nov. 13, 1984).
110. See Note, Challenging Sexual Preference Discrimination in Private Employment, 41
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National Labor Relations Act, unions owe a duty of fair representation
to their members."1 Certainly, such a duty would encompass the representation of a gay employee should he or she be fired or discriminated
against in some other manner. Little material is available to indicate
whether unions are undertaking such representation or whether gay
union members are aware of such a potential remedy.
The case of Michael Frorillo" 2 indicates that some activity exists
and demonstrates the protection a collective bargaining agreement may
give gays. Frorillo was an employee of the Human Resources Institute,
a private psychiatric hospital in Brookline, Massachusetts. An openly
gay therapist, Frorillo also was the union steward for Local 285 of the
Service Employees International Union. Frorillo 'was accused of molesting several psychiatric patients and was disciplined despite the hospital's admission that they were "unable to make a definitive determination as to the truth of the allegations." 1 13 The issue, as stated before
the state labor arbitration board, was whether the hospital had violated
the collective bargaining agreement between the union and itself. The
hospital subsequently characterized its actions as "not discipline," but
just "managerial judgment."'" 4 The arbitrator found against the hospital and ordered the hospital to make Frorillo whole for the economic
losses sustained by him through its unwarranted action. The union
seems to have thoroughly met its responsibilities to its gay member.
Frorillo's sexual orientation was not mentioned once in the arbitrator's
decision. Moreover, the testimony of Frorillo's peers indicated that they
at least were sensitive to the possibility that he was made a "scapegoat" or was "set up" by the patients because he was gay.1 15
That unions are becoming increasingly aware and supportive of
the employment rights of gay people is illustrated by the increasing
number of unions which are issuing statements in support of gay employment and civil rights. In 1983, the AFL-CIO formally endorsed
civil rights legislation prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation as "consistent with trade unionism." The AFL-CIO also by

OHIO ST. L.J. 501 (1980).

Il1. Under § 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act, the representative selected by the
majority of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit is the exclusive representative of all
unit employees. National Labor Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982).
The union's right of exclusivity has been judicially determined to carry with it a correlative duty
to fairly represent all unit employees. For more information on the duty of fair representation, see
L. MODJESKA, HANDLING EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES § 7.5 (1980).
112. Service Employees Int'l Union Local 285 v. Human Resources Inst., Am. Arb. Ass'n
No. 1130-1028-82 (1983) (Golick, arb.).
113. Id., slip op. at 9.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 20.
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resolution protested personnel actions taken against workers merely on
the basis of sexual orientation.11 6 Other unions taking similar stands
include the International Ladies Garment Workers Union (ILGWU),
The American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees
(AFSCME), Service Employees International Union (SEIU), Communication Workers of America (CWA), and the Newspaper Guild. " 7
Whether such resolutions will be translated into tangible employment protections for gay union-members remains to be seen. An attempt by the CWA to include sexual orientation protection in its contract with the state of New Jersey was refused by the state
government. 18 The Associated Press refused a similar clause in its contract with the Wire Services Guild while the United Press International
accepted the clause." 9 SEIU has nondiscrimination clauses in some of
its contracts, and a recent strike against a Massachusetts telephone
company involved an alleged discriminatory firing of a gay person. 20
On still another front, Local 2 of the Hotel and Restaurant Employees
and Bartenders Union of San Francisco negotiated a new paid holiday:
Lesbian/Gay Freedom Day.' 2 ' In Los Angeles, Hospital and Service
Workers Local 299 (SEIU) accepted its first all gay and lesbian bargaining unit, the staff of the Gay and Lesbian Services Center of Los
Angeles. 2 2 These various union activities, ranging from resolutions of
support to strikes in support of gay employees, indicate a new awareline
ness on the part of American trade unionism and provide 12another
3
of attack for the lawyer seeking to protect gay employees.

116. See The AFL-CIO and Civil Rights: Report of the AFL-CIO Executive Council and
Resolutions Adopted by the Fifteenth Constitutional Convention of the AFL-CIO (Oct. 6, 1983)
(unpublished manuscript).
117. The ILGWU adopted its resolution without controversy at its 38th convention held
May 30, 1983. The Advocate, Aug. 4, 1983, at 12. The AFSCME resolution was adopted at its
convention on June 23, 1982. Gay Community News, Apr. 30, 1983, at 2. The SEIU accepted a
unit of employees of the Gay and Lesbian Community Services Center on January 31, 1984. Id.,
Feb. II, 1984, at 1. The CWA attempted to negotiate a sexual preference nondiscrimination
clause in its contract with the state of-New Jersey, but was unsuccessful. Id., June 25, 1983, at 2.
The Newspaper Guild, the nation's largest union of editorial employees, passed a resolution in
support of nondiscrimination on the basis of sexual orientation at its convention in Cleveland,
Ohio, on June 27, 1983. Id., July 23, 1983, at 1.
118. Gay Community News, June 25, 1983, at 2.
119. The Wire Services Guild, representing 1,245 editorial employees at Associated Press,
demanded a sexual preference nondiscrimination clause in contract negotiations that began November 3, 1982, but the Associated Press's final offer did not include the clause. Id., Mar. 12,
1983, at 1.
120. Id., June 12, 1982, at 1.
121. The Advocate, Jan. 24, 1984, at 16. The employer is a gay-owfied restaurant serving
one of the districts in San Francisco that has a large gay populace.
122. Service Employees Int'l Union, No. 1130-1028-82.
123. Other unions who support gay rights include the American Postal Workers Union, the
International Longshoreman's and Warehousemen's Union, the Screen Actors Guild, the United
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Another development is contributing to the ultimate demise of the
employment at will doctrine and may also be useful in gay cases. The
National Gay Task Force (NGTF), 1 4 between 1976 and 1981, surveyed over 850 major firms in the United States: the "Fortune 500"
and 350 leading nonindustrial firms. The purpose was to ascertain the
corporations' current policies with regard to gay employees and to encourage the adoption of nondiscriminatory policies. To date, 238 companies have responded. All of the top ten "Fortune 500" responded favorably with policy statements that sexual orientation was not a factor
in hiring or firing, while over fifty-one percent of the top 100 "Fortune
500" companies also responded favorably.1"
Some of the statements of companies were contained only in the
letters to the NGTF while others were found in official company handbooks and statements. The latter type of statements raise the question
whether an employee could rely on such statements to the extent that
the company would be estopped from taking any negative action based
on the employee's sexual orientation. The Satori case126 raised the estoppel issue, but the court did not deal with it seriously. The published
statements also raise the possibility that such statements form an, express or implied contract with the gay employee and abrogate the employment at will doctrine. For example, the Western Electric Company
publishes a pamphlet, distributed to new employees, entitled "Equal
Opportunity Policy and Affirmative Action Policies." In the pamphlet,
in a section entitled "Sexual Preference," the company publishes the
following statement:
Western Electric's policy is that an individual's sexual preferences are
not criteria either for becoming an employee or remaining an employee.
Job retention and promotability are based on demonstrated job performance and general conduct. An individual's sexual tendencies or preferences are strictly personal, and information about these matters should

Auto and Aerospace Workers Union of California (AFL-CIO), the Department Store Employees
Union of California, Local 715 of the SEIU, the Chicago Teachers Union, the Union of Boston
Public School Teachers, the Massachusetts Restaurant and Hotel Workers Union, the Joint Councilof Teamsters No. 28 of Washington, the Black Coalition of Building Trades of Rhode Island,
the Central Labor Council of Santa Clara County, California, the Massachusetts Amalgamated
Meatcutters Union, and the AFSCME Locals 22, 1164, 1902 & 2083. The Advocate, June 26,
1984, at 42.
124. The National Gay Task Force is a gay civil rights and public education organization
whose purposes are to educate the public about same-sex relationships; to work for civil rights for
gays in the areas of employment, housing, and public accommodations; and to combat all forms of
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. The National Gay Task Force has a nationwide
membership and serves as an information clearinghouse for more than 3,000 lesbian and gay
organizations around the United States.
125. The National Gay Task Force Corporate Survey.
126. Motion for Judgment at Law, Satori, No. 9008.
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not be sought out by Company personnel.1"7
The Satori case also raises this issue. However, at least at the trial
level, the published statement did not protect the fired gay employee. 28
In the private employment sector, one further method of protection for the gay employee lies in legislation. As already indicated, federal legislation providing such protection does not exist. However, state
and local protective legislation does exist in some locales. The most
comprehensive legislation is in Wisconsin, the first state to pass a comprehensive "gay rights bill."' 12 9 The bill, passed in 1982, adds the words
"sexual orientation" to an existing law prohibiting racial, sexual, and
other forms of discrimination. The statute outlaws discrimination in
many areas, most importantly for our consideration, in private
employment.
Unlike some other legislation protecting gays that sat on the books
unused, 30 the Wisconsin law is being litigated. As of April, 1984,
twenty-three cases based on sexual orientation had been filed with the
Wisconsin Equal Rights Division. 31 Moreover, on March 20, 1984,
Jim Taylor became the first gay employee in Wisconsin to successfully
pursue a discrimination charge under the law.' 32 Taylor was fired as a
chef at a country club after appearing on a television show dealing with
not to
gay issues. Taylor was awarded $1,000 in backpay, but chose
33
elsewhere.
job
better
a
found
he
because
reinstatement
seek
While the Wisconsin law provides the most comprehensive protection in the country, as of this writing forty-four cities and twelve counties have some type of gay rights ordinance. However, most of these
ordinances do not cover private sector employment. 3 " Rather, much of
that legislation protects municipal employees or deals with public ac-

127. Western Electric, Equal Opportunity Policy and Affirmative Action Programs (Nov.
1981).
128. Another possible legal approach generated by such statements may be a third-party
beneficiary argument. However, this author has not found cases using that approach and the argument has many inherent weaknesses.
129. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.31 (West Supp. 1984).
130. In the first six months after the Anchorage, Alaska antidiscrimination ordinance
passed, the municipal clerk's office had received no complaints. In Ann Arbor, Michigan, only
four complaints of discrimination against gays were made during the first year of its antidiscrimination ordinance. In Seattle, Washington, the city clerk could recall only two cases involving
gays since the ordinance's inception, both of which were won by the complainant. S. Berlin, Private Employment Discrimination Based upon Sexual Preference (Sept. 26, 1976) (unpublished
manuscript).
131. Gay Community News, Apr. 21, 1984, at 2.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See NATIONAL GAS TASK FORCE, GAY RIGHTS PROTECTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
AND CANADA (1985).
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commodations or housing. Philadelphia and Detroit are notable exceptions where the legislation includes private employment within its
scope. 1 5
Four states have executive orders prohibiting sexual orientation
discrimination that have been issued by governors, but such orders
cover state employment, not private employment. 3 None of these executive orders extend the coverage to private employers who contract
with the state. A number of mayors have issued executive orders protecting the rights of gay municipal employees. But again, such orders
do not usually apply to persons contracting with the city. New York
City's Executive Order No. 50 was an exception-the city attempted to
require all contracting agencies to agree not to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation.1 3 7 The city first met resistance from the Salvation Army and then from the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of New
York. Both groups were told they would lose their contracts with the
city, mostly social service contracts, unless they would agree in writing
to abide by the executive order. The Salvation Army lost four million
dollars in contracts by refusing to sign. The archdiocese brought pressure to bear on Mayor Koch, who exempted religious organizations
from the order until its legality could be tested in the courts.
Subsequently, however, the archdiocese, joined by the Salvation
Army and some Orthodox Jewish groups, brought suit challenging the
executive order. On September 5, 1984, a Manhattan State Supreme
Court Judge held the executive order unconstitutional.'3 8 Judge Klein
ruled that the mayor had "usurped the power of City Council and...
impermissably invaded the legislative domain." '3 9 Klein's rationale was
that since neither the New York City Administrative Code nor state or
federal law contained sexual orientation as a protected class, the executive order went beyond implementing existing employment discrimination laws. Thus, according to the judge, the mayor wascreating new
social policy without legislative basis. 4 0 The case has been appealed.
However, the rationale has serious implications for all executive orders
at both the city and state levels that prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Under the reasoning of Judge Klein, all such
orders would become null because neither federal nor state legislation

135. Id.
136. The four states are California, New York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. N.Y. Times, Sept.
2, 1984, §'I, col. I.
137. Id., Nov. 27, 1984, at B3, col. 1.
138. Under 21 v. The City of New York, Index No. 15046/84 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 5,
1984).
139. Id., slip op. at 4-5.
140. Id. at 3-4.
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lists gay people as a protected, enumerated class.
While the executive order wended its way through the New York
court system, the Board of Estimate of the City of New York took the
matter into its own hands. The board, a legislative body, adopted a
resolution refusing to approve city contracts unless the contractor for
141 The
city services agreed to sign a gay antidiscrimination clause.
Archdiocese of New York and others challenged the board's action, but
State Supreme Court Judge Saxe upheld the board of estimate on two
grounds. 14 2 First, the judge ruled that the resolution in question was a
proper exercise of the board's power. The judge found that "limiting
the award of service contracts to agencies who will refrain from discriminatory practice serves the City's best financial interests." The resolution ensures that "contract costs are not artificially and unnecessarily inflated as a result of a construction of a labor pool that is
produced by discrimination.""'4 The second reason given by Judge
Saxe was broader and more controversial. He found that discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation violated the equal protection clause of
the United States Constitution through the fourteenth amendment and
violated article 1, section 11 of the New York State Constitution as
well. 4 4 The judge reviewed almost all the favorable gay cases,145 most
of which require a "rational nexus, ' 46 and concluded that "the right of
individuals to be free of arbitrary and disparate treatment in their employment solely on the basis of sex preference is one of constitutional
magnitude both under the Fourteenth Amendment and under the New
York State Constitution.' 147 Judge Saxe went further: "I hold that homosexuality is a protected category under both the State and Federal
constitutions. '"148 This conclusion is one which gay rights advocates
would like to see adopted at higher judicial levels.

141. N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1984, at B4, col. 6.
142. Under 21 v. The City of New York, Index No. 24895/1984. (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 15,
1984). See also N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1984, at B3, col. 1.
143. Under 21, Index No. 24895/1984, slip op. at 9.
144. Id. at 10.
145. Van Ooteghem, 628 F.2d 488; Gay Students Org. v. Bonner, 509 F.2d 652 (1st Cir.
1974); Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Society for Individual Rights, Inc. v.
Hampton, 63 F.R.D. 399 (N.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd on other grounds, 528 F.2d 905 (9th Cir. 1975);
Gay Law Students, 24 Cal. 3d 458, 595 P.2d 592, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14; Morrison v. State Bd. of
Educ., I Cal. 3d 214, 461 P.2d 375, 82 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1969); M.P. v. S.P., 169 N.J. Super. 425,
404 A.2d 1256 (Super. Ct., App. Div. 1979); Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434
N.Y.S.2d 947, cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987; In re Kimball, 40 A.D.2d 252, 339 N.Y.S.2d 302, rev'd
per curiam, 33 N.Y.2d 586, 301 N.E.2d 436, 347 N.Y.S.2d 453 (1973); Doe v. Doe, 222 Va. 736,
284 S.E.2d 799 (1981).
146. Norton, 417 F.2d 1161.
147. Under 21, Index No. 24895/1984.
148. Id., slip op. at 16.
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In addition, Judge Saxe specifically found that his decision upholding the board of estimate's resolution was not barred by principles of
res judicata, holding that the board's resolution was different from the
executive order and the implementing resolution examined in Judge
Klein's case. 14 9 The result of this ruling was that the archdiocese and
the Salvation Army were required to sign the nondiscrimination clause
if those organizations wanted to furnish city services.1 5 Until a higher
court decides the issue, the New York City situation remains murky
and the rights of gay employees tenuous.
In the most recent development, the archdiocese on cross-appeal
has expanded its attack and claimed that Executive Order No. 50 is
also void as to the enumerated classes, e.g., women and blacks.1 51 This
new move has done something no other event has. Lamda, a gay legal
defense and education fund (LDEF), has now been joined in its amicus
brief by NAACP LDEF, Puerto Rican LDEF, the Asian American
LDEF, New York Civil Liberties Union, and the Center for Constitutional Rights-the old line traditional civil rights organizations.1 52 As
of this writing, only the Klein opinion is under appeal. The final New
York decision on executive orders will no doubt effect other such
orders.
B.

Federal Employment

Since the late 1970's, no published cases nor other developments
have occurred in the area of federal government employment . 53 However, the reader should be warned that the area of employment covered
in this section speaks solely to federal civil service employment. Federal
employment that requires a security clearance is covered subsequently,
as is employment in the military.154
Based on Norton v. Macy,155 a federal employee cannot be dis-

149. Under 21, Index No. 15046/84, slip op. at 2-5.
150. N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1984, at B3, col. 1.
151. Id.
152. Gay Community News, Jan. 5, 1984, at 2.
153. See Rivera I, supra note I, at 813-25; Rivera 11,supra note 1,at 317-19. See also
Baker v. Hampton, 6 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) V 9043 (D. D.C. 1973) (holding that questions
asked of a federal employee about his homosexual conduct which he refused to answer would not,
even if answered, establish a relationship between homosexuality and the ability to perform the
job in question (clerk-typist) and were, therefore, improper); Williams v. Hampton, 7 Empl. Prac.
Dec. (CCH)
9266 (D. Ill. 1974) (holding that "administrative was not improperly vague"'and
"gave adequate notice that homosexuality was prohibited conduct falling within the
regulation's
coverage."). In Williams the employee involved was a housekeeping aide at a Veteran's Hospital.
Id. See generally Levine, Legal Rights of Homosexuals in Public Employment, in 1978 SURVEY
OF AMERICAN LAW 455 (1978).
154. See Part II of this article.
155. 417 F.2d 1161, 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1969). For a full discussion of Norton, see Rivera i,
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charged solely because the employee is gay. Promoting the "efficiency
of the service" is still, as it was at the time of Norton, the basic stan156
dard against which a civil service employee is judged. Norton established that to discharge a federal civil service employee a "rational
nexus" had to exist between the proscribed conduct of the employee,
'
such as gay conduct, and the "efficiency of the service. " The Norton
case coupled with the case of Society for Individual Rights, Inc. v.
Hampton,158 forced the civil service to change various guidelines and
regulations that were clearly antigay. The Federal Personnel Manual
now reads:
Accordingly, you may not find a person unsuitable for Federal employment merely because that person is a homosexual or has engaged in homosexual acts, nor may such an exclusion be based on a conclusion that
a homosexual person might bring the public service into contempt. You
are however, permitted to dismiss a person or find him unsuitable for
Federal employment where the evidence establishes that such person's
homosexual conduct affects job fitness--excluding from such consideration, however, unsubstantiated conclusions concerning possible embarrassment to the Federal Service.' 59
Among the "specific factors" enumerated in federal regulations which
might hurt the efficiency of the service is "[c]riminal, dishonest, infamous or notoriously disgraceful conduct."'6 0 Although the word "immoral" was removed from this list in 1975,161 it had been the most
popular designation used to remove gay people from the federal government.162 However, "immoral" as an effective category against gay people was undermined by Scott v. Macy"6" in 1965. The guideline, as
written, still poses potential problems for gay persons in federal government. First, gay sexual acts between consenting adults in private are
still criminal in a minority of states."6 Moreover, "infamous or notori-

supra note 1, at 818-20. See also Note, Dismissal of Homosexuals from Government Employment: The Developing Role of Due Process in Administrative Adjudications, 58 GEo. L.J. 632
(1970).
156. 5 C.F.R. § 731.201 (1984).
157. Norton, 417 F.2d at 1164.
158. 63 F.R.D. 399 (N.D. Cal. 1973), affid on other grounds, 528 F.2d 905 (9th Cir.
1975). For a full discussion of Hampton, see Rivera I, supra note 1,at 821-22.
159. S3-2a.(3)(c), Subchapter 53. Guidelines for Applying Specific Factors, United States
Civil Service Commission, Federal Personnel Manual Systems, FPM Supplement 731-1, Inst. 2,
July 31, 1979, at 8 [hereinafter cited as Guidelines]. See Singer v. United States Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 530 F.2d 247, 254 n.14 (9th Cir. 1976), vacated, 429 U.S. 1034 (1977).
160. 5 C.F.R. § 731.202(b)(2) (1980).
161. A. LARSEN & L. LARSEN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 109.12 (1984).
162. Id.
163. 349 F.2d 182, 184-85 (D.C. Cir. 1965). See also Rivera 1, supra note 1, at 816.

164. The minority states are: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kan-
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ously disgraceful conduct" is hardly a precise term and is obviously
open to judgmental and subjective interpretation. However, the guidelines for these terms currently reads:
[b]ased upon court decision and outstanding injunction, while a person
may not be found unsuitable based on unsubstantiated conclusions concerning possible embarassment to the Federal service, a person may be
dismissed or found unsuitable for Federal employment where the evidence establishes that such person's sexual conduct affects job fitness.1 65
Arguably, such a guideline left open the possibility that a homosexual
employee who "flaunted" 1 6 his sexual orientation could be fired.
Singer v. United States Civil Service Commission'67 focused precisely
on this issue. Singer's case began under the old regulations. The case
was, at the request of the solicitor general, remanded back to the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals for consideration under the changed regulations. 6 8 The Ninth Circuit, in turn, remanded the case back to the
administrative labyrinth of the civil service. The ultimate result was
that Singer's alleged behavior, which some might arguably describe as
"flaunting," was found not to have diminished the "efficiency" of the
service.' 69 The problem with Singer as a precedent is that the conclusion was reached administratively by a part of the civil service administration rather than by a court.
The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 prohibits discrimination
"for or against any employee or applicant for employment on the basis
of conduct which does not adversely affect the performance of the employee or applicant or the performance of others."'7 0 This section provided the foundation for an interpretative memorandum issued by the
Office of Personnel Management on May 12, 1980,'17 which specifically mentioned for the first time the phrase "sexual orientation" as
opposed to "homosexuality" and which used the phrase in a protective
manner. The memorandum, still in effect at this writing, provides that
sas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, and Virginia.
1985 Survey prepared by the National Gay Task Force, 80 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York
10011.
165. See Guidelines, supra note 159; Singer, 530 F.2d at 255 n.15.
166. See infra note 272.
167. Singer, 530 F.2d at 255. For a full discussion of the conclusion of Singer, see Rivera
II, supra note I, at 317-19.
168. Singer, 429 U.S. 1034.
169. See Rivera I, supra note I, at 823-24 n.139.
170. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(10) (1982).
171. Memorandum, Policy Statement on Discrimination on the Basis of Conduct Which
Does Not Adversely Affect the Performance of Employees or Applicants for Employment (OPM
May 12, 1980) (emphasis added).
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"the privacy rights and constitutional rights of applicants and employees are to be protected against inquiries into, or actions based upon
non-job related conduct, such as religious, community or social affilia7 2 While seemingly definitive, the memotions, or sexual orientation."'
randum is only issued by a department of the government and could be
revoked. Moreover, as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
recently pointed out, albeit in dicta, the privacy rights and constitucitizens might not include actions based on
tional rights of American
"sexual orientation.' 7 3
The quiescence in the litigation in the federal employment area
may indicate an acceptance of the new regulations and at least a tolerance for gay employees. This seeming lack of discrimination could end
should a court decision override the Federal Employee Appeals Author7
Nevertheless,
ity in Singer or the Office of Personnel Management.
for a gay
place
safest
the whole, the
the federal civil service may be, on
75
1985.1
in
person to be employed
C. State and Local Government Employment
Unlike the federal employment area, the state and local areas have
seen a great deal of litigation in the last five years. Before turning to a
discussion of these cases, the growth of state executive orders must be
considered. Four states now have executive orders which prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in state employment. The
oldest of these orders is the Pennsylvania executive order issued by
Governor Milton Shapp in 1975.171 Shortly after the governor issued
this order, a court challenge was brought to enjoin its enforcement. In
Robinson v. Shapp,7 7 the court found the issue nonjusticiable. Interestingly, at the time of the executive order, homosexual conduct was
still criminal in Pennsylvania. 7 8 The criminality of the conduct was the

172. Id.
173. See Dronenberg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, 1396 (D.C. Cir. 1984). See generally, Developments in the Law-Public Employment, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1611, 1738-80 (1984).
174. If federal regulations, as interpreted by the courts, fail to protect the gay employee, he
or she may well wish to consider another potential remedy. See Clark, Homosexual Public Employees: Utilizing Section 1983 to Remedy Discrimination, 8 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 255 (1981).
175. For practice guides, see E. BussEY, FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE LAW AND PROCEDURES:
A BASIC GUIDE (1984); Broida, Representing Federal Civilian Employees in Discrimination
Cases, PRAC. LAW., Jan. 15, 1983, at 57.
176. Pa. Exec. Order No. 1975-5 (Sept. 19, 1978) (Commitment toward Equal Rights).
177. 23 Pa. Commw. 153, 350 A.2d 464 (1976), affd, 473 Pa. 315, 374 A.2d 533 (1977).
178. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3124 (Purdon 1973). This statute is still on the books. Id. §
3124 (Purdon 1983). See also United States v. Brewer, 363 F. Supp. 606 (M.D. Pa.), aff'd mem.,
491 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1973) (holding the statute constitutional as applied to prisoners), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 990 (1974). But see Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 490 Pa. 91, 415 A.2d 47 (1980)
(holding the statute unconstitutional).
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basis of the challenge to the executive order. The court avoided the
issue by declaring that "it is not illegal to have an 'affectional or sexual
preference' ",179 and, thus, the executive order in effect applied only to
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of status.
The next state to issue an executive order was California, when
Governor Jerry Brown issued a nondiscrimination order in 1979.180 In
1980, a California state senator requested an attorney general opinion
on the legitimacy of the order. The then attorney general, George
Deukmejian," 8 issued an opinion upholding the order. 182 The attorney
general's opinion indicated that the governor had a right under the California Constitution to supervise the official conduct of the members of
the executive branch. Therefore, the opinion stated, the executive order
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation was proper
as long as the order did not amend existing legislation. 183 The opinion
examined California's Civil Service Act to determine if the order conflicted with the statute. The attorney general's opinion concluded that,
because the thrust of the civil service legislation was to base civil service appointment and retention on merit and fitness, the executive order
was "wholly consistent" with the civil service legislation.' The opinion
declared, additionally, that the executive order effectuated protections
that emanated from both the federal and'state constitutions, 185 citing
the duty found in the California Constitution to ensure merit in the
civil service, 86 and, the right of equal protection guaranteed by both
the United States and the California Constitutions. 87

179. Robinson, 23 Pa. Commw. at 156, 350 A.2d at 466.
180. Cal. Exec. Order No. B-54-79 (Apr. 4, 1979).
181. Governor George Deukmejian vetoed on March 13, 1984, legislation that would have
prohibited discrimination against gays in employment. He stated that he was not persuaded that
such discrimination existed and cited a lack of "compelling evidence" to justify the creation of an
additional "special protected class." The governor did sign on September 26, 1984, an amendment
to the Unruh Civil Rights Act that authorized gay victims of violent attacks to sue their attackers.
Presumably the documentation of antigay violence ("queer bashing") was sufficient. NATIONAL
NOW TIMES, Mar.-Apr. 1984, at 2; Gay Community News, Sept. 22, 1984, at 1; id., Oct. 20,
1984, at 1.
182. 63 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 583 (1980).
183. Id. at 584-85.
184. Id. at 586.
185. Id.
186. CAL. CONST. art. VII, § I(b).
187. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; CAL. CONST. art. i, § 7. Deukmejian's successor as attorney
general, John Van De Kamp, issued a ruling on discriminatory employment practices by local
public agencies. After reviewing state and federal equal protection holdings, the opinion discussed
the constitutional dimensions of the right to privacy. While noting that a vaguely defined right of
privacy existed in the United States Constitution, the opinion relied principally on the inalienable
right to privacy found in article I, section one of the California Constitution. According to the
opinion, "it is not lawful for a local public agency to discriminate in its employment practices on
the basis of sexual orientation." 66 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 486 (1983). This opinion is being chal-
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The California State Personnel Board, on February 9, 1984, issued
an official memo to all state agencies and employee organizations "reiterating the continuing responsibilities of departments to provide a work
' 8 The memo
environment free of sexual orientation discrimination."'
spelled out the legal bases for the policy and cited not only the governor's executive order and California Constitution, but also the California Labor Code. The memo pointed out the now famous Gay Law Stu89
dents Association v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co.' case in
which the California Supreme Court held that the "struggle of the homosexual community for equal rights" must be recognized as "political
90
activities" protected under California law.' Therefore, the State Personnel Board warned that "state agencies are . . . prohibited from
pressuring employees to remain" in the closet or from discriminating
against those gay persons who participate in gay rights activities."
The two most recent executive orders were issued in late 1983 by
the then newly-elected governors of Ohio and New York. On December
30, 1983, Governor Richard Celeste of Ohio issued Executive Order
No. 64-83, which bans discrimination in state employment on the basis
of "sexual orientation.' 92 Governor Mario Cuomo of New York issued
New York Executive Order No. 28 on November 18, 1983, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in state employ93
ment and in the rendering of state services.' Neither executive order

lenged by the San Bernardino United School District, which was sued by a former school administrator who claimed that her demotion was based on her sexual orientation. Gay Community
News, Sept. 22, 1984, at 2.
188. Memorandum from the California State Personnel Board to state agencies and employee organizations (Feb. 9, 1984).
189. 24 Cal. 3d 458, 595 P.2d 592, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1979).
190. Id. at 485, 595 P.2d at 610, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 32.
191. On October 9, 1980, Governor Brown issued a second executive order which established a Commission on Personal Privacy with members appointed in part by the governor and in
part by certain legislative leaders. The commission was to study the problems of discrimination
based upon sexual orientation, note existing remedies, and make recommendations for legislative,
administrative, and other actions. In December, 1982, the commission issued a report to the outgoing Brown administration that addressed the areas of information* practices and reports, criminal justice, public and private sector employment, housing, consumer issues, family law, medical
and mental health, and immigration.
On February 9, 1984, the California State Personnel Board issued further guidance on the
subject of state employment discrimination based on sexual orientation. In addition to a discussion
of the current legal environment, the memorandum outlined the scope of departmental affirmative
action requirements and listed services made available to administrators responsible for implementing the law.
192. Ohio Exec. Order No. 64-83 (Dec. 30, 1983).
193. N.Y. Exec. Order No. 28 (Nov. 18, 1983). The New York executive order had antecedents in the Carey administration. On February 17, 1982, Meyer S. Frucher, director of the
State Office of Employment Relations, wrote a memorandum to all state agency heads asking
them to adopt "equal employment policies banning discrimination on the basis of sexual prefer-
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extended the ban on employment discrimination to contractors with the
state, a provision sought by gay rights activists in both states. The Ohio
order set up a seven-member Governor's Advisory Committee in the
Department of Administrative Services; however, the committee had no
clear cut powers and the method of implementation of the order was
left uncertain. 9 4 The New York order created a large task force and
seemingly provided for implementation through the Office of .Employee
Relations.1 95 Effective mechanisms for implementing the orders are not
in place at this time in either state, and as a result, implementation has
proceeded slowly.' 9
In some instances, municipal or county employees are protected by
either executive orders or by municipal or county ordinances that specifically ban discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. As of
January 1, 1985, sixty-seven cities and counties and eight states have
some form of protection,' 9 7 although the scope of that protection varies
widely. When gay state and local employees do not have an executive
order or statute upon which to rely, discrimination is fought in the
courts rather than in administrative hearings and tribunals. Constitutional rights to freedom of expression and association, and to privacy
are all potentially available to state employees through the due process
and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment. Past state
and local cases have relied on the "rational nexus" test enunciated in
Norton v. Macy, 98 which is applied to federal employees. Moreover,
some evidence exists that reliance on the Norton "rational nexus" test
ence." Although the memorandum was without force of law, Frucher said it represented a "moral
commitment" to end "professionally intolerable" discrimination. The memorandum was in response to a commitment made to the Civil Service Employees Association during contract negotiations. The Advocate, Apr. 1, 1982.
194. The Department of Administrative Services works in collaboration with the Governor's
Advisory Committee and is undertaking a series of briefings for personnel officers in state agencies
in which the practical consequences of this policy will be explored. The author is a member and
cochairperson of the Governor's Advisory Committee.
195. The Office of Employee Relations was charged with the promulgation of clear and
consistent guidelines, the maintenance of an environment where only job-related criteria were used
to assess employees or prospective employees, and the implementation of procedures for the investigation of complaints. N.Y. Exec. Order No. 28 (Nov. 18, 1983), Statement of Policy, 1 3.
196. As a member of the Ohio Governor's Advisory Committee, the author is in constant
contact with Abby Rubenfield of Lambda, who is on the New York task force for the implementation of the New York executive order. Both groups have found the implementation slow and
confused.
In Ohio, the Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) department officers were first designated
to take grievances. This designation was discovered to be improper because the EEO was limited
to "enumerated groups." Another grievance system is being developed.
197. See NATIONAL GAY TASK FORCE, supra note 134.
198. 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969). The court held that a reviewing court must be able to
discern some reasonably foreseeable, specific connection between an employee's conduct and the
efficiency of the service. Id. at 1167.
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is perceived by state governments as the appropriate limit on their
powers.
In 1982, the attorney general of Ohio issued an opinion in response
to the question: "May sexual preference be a determining factor, or be
considered at all, in the hiring or discharge of employees on the Ohio
Youth Commission?" 19 9 Opinion 78 concluded that sexual preference
could be considered, but stated that in considering homosexuality as a
factor the employer must show a "rational relation to the employee's
ability" to perform his or her job before the sexual orientation, could be
used in a determinative way.200 The unfortunate part of the opinion is
that the question was asked in the context of whether the Department
of Youth Services could consider the sexual preference of a staff counselor because "a youth's knowledge" of the employee's sexual orientation might cause "homosexual panic" '' in the youth. The opinion
leaves the impression that "homosexual panic" could provide a "rational nexus."
Interestingly, after the issuance of the executive order in Ohio, the
Ohio Advisory Committee requested the attorney general for an opin-

199. 82 Ohio Op. Att'y Gen. 78 (1982).
200. Id. The opinion applied to departmental employees and applicants for employment as
well as to private contractors performing services for the agency. Id.
201. The term "homosexual panic" refers to
an adjustment disorder of adult life characterized by delusions and hallucinations that accuse the patient, in derisive and contemptuous terms, of a variety of homosexual practices.
The panic typically occurs in patients with schizoid personality disorders who have successfully protected themselves in the past from physical intimacy. Breakdown occurs in a setting of enforced intimacy, such as a college dormitory or a military barracks.
H. KAPLAN & B. SADOCK, MODERN SYNOPSIS OF PSYCHIATRY 11I714 (3d ed. 1980).
In Freudian theory it is widely assumed that the syndrome of homosexual panic . . . is due
to life situations that have unduly stimulated the "latent homosexuality" of a person to the
point at which his ego has become overwhelmed by fear that these homosexual impulses
may emerge. It is true that in occasional instances this kind of mechanism may be operative, but it would be more correct to consider this a manifestation of repressed homosexuality rather than latent homosexuality ....
In most cases of homosexual panic, however, the issue is not one of homosexual anxiety but rather of what Ovesey (1955) has called "pseudohomosexual anxiety." In cultures
such as ours, where homosexuality is identified with weakness and effeminacy in men,
many men who are insecure about their masculinity express this insecurity in the form of
fears that they are really homosexual or will be so regarded by others. Most often it will be
found that such anxieties are not related to repressed homoerotic tendencies but rather to
profound feelings of masculine inadequacy. Psychotherapeutic interpretations along these
lines will prove to be more fruitful and effective.
Marmor, Overview: The Multiple Roots of Homosexual Behavior, in HOMOSEXUAL BEHAVIOR 15
(J. Marmor ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as J. MARMOR]. The American Psychiatric Association's
Diagnostic and StatisticalManual of Mental Disorders (DSM-1II) does not list homosexual panic
as a mental disorder. See also Comment, Burdens on Gay Litigants and Bias in the Court System: Homosexual Panic, Child Custody, and Anonymous Parties, 19 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
497 (1984) (discussing the use of homosexual panic as a legal defense to murder).
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ion on whether Opinion 78 was moot. While no official attorney general
opinion was issued, the attorney general's office did reply by letter, stating that there was no conflict between the prior opinion and the new
executive order; they could both stand. The letter stated that since the
executive order did not define "discriminate," the office presumed that
the meaning was that sexual orientation could not be used against an
employee in an "arbitrary, capricious or otherwise constitutionally impermissible way. '"202 Thus, the executive order was interpreted not to
prohibit the use of sexual orientation as an employment consideration,
but rather to limit the use of sexual orientation as a permissible standard when a rational nexus existed. This is comparable to sex as a bona
fide occupational qualification, but much broader in scope. Presumably,
even a discredited concept such as "homosexual panic" could, under
the executive order, be a permissible reason to fire or to not hire in
Ohio.
The most popular method used recently by gay employees to litigate discrimination claims is to utilize section 1983 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1871. O° Since state and local government discrimination is
"under color of law" as required by the statute, section 1983
has
proved a remarkably vital litigation mechanism. The statute provides a
remedy to any persons who, as a result of state action, suffer "deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws. 20° 4 Moreover, the injured party may pursue both legal and
equitable remedies. Most importantly, interpretations have not limited
the application of the section to members of a suspect class, 20 5 which
makes the statute available to gays who, like women, have not been
held to be members of a suspect class.2 °
One interesting application of section 1983 was Doe v. University
of Utah Hospital.20 7 The plaintiff had worked for about a year and a
half as a children's play coordinator for hospitalized, terminally ill chil-

202. Letter from Attorney General Anthony Celebreeze to Mr. William Denihan, assistant
director, Ohio Department of Administrative Services (Sept. 27, 1984).
203. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). For an excellent comprehensive discussion of this area, see
Clark, supra note 174.
204. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
205. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980); Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600 (1979).
206. Lower California courts have come to conflicting interpretations of Gay Law Students,
24 Cal. 3d 458, 595 P.2d 592, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14. In In re Kreps, N-14221 (Civil Serv. Comm'n,
Contra Costa County, Cal. Mar. 3, 1980), the administrative law judge stated that Gay Law
Students held that gay people were a suspect class. Report and Recommendations at 15, Kreps,
N-14221. The superior court reversed on this point in Rainez v. Contra Costa Civil Serv.
Comm'n, No. 212332, slip op. at 2 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 13, 1980). See also Chaitin & Lefcourt,

Is Gay Suspect?, 8
207.

LINCOLN

L.

REV.

24 (1973).

No. C-81-0394J (D. Utah May 28, 1981).
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dren. He had received numerous complimentary letters from patients
and parents of patients. Moreover, the plaintiff was the subject of a
complimentary newspaper article and of three complimentary articles
in the hospital's own newsletter. In short, he was a good employee and
the hospital never maintained otherwise. The plaintiff was asked by a
local television station to appear in a documentary about gay persons
and the Mormon church; he consented. He informed his supervisor in
advance. The hospital administration immediately decided that the
plaintiff could not continue as children's play coordinator.
Doe filed suit under section 1983, alleging that "acting under color
of law" the hospital had violated his right of free speech, deprived him
of a property interest without due process, denied him equal protection
of the law, and denied his right of privacy. The allegations made for a
classic section 1983 suit. However, neither the factual nor the legal
issues were ever resolved because the hospital settled out of court. The
settlement included $15,000 in compensation and the promise of a permanent, full-time position at the hospital at a salary comparable to his
prior salary as children's play coordinator. However, the plaintiff consented to a job that Was in a "nonsensitive" area outside the pediatrics
unit. In return, the hospital agreed that plaintiff could discuss homosexuality and express his opinions about homosexuality in private or in
public. But the plaintiff's freedom was limited in that he was not supposed to disclose or discuss his employment in such speech. Moreover,
the settlement agreement also limited his speech to "expressions
[which] do not adversely affect plaintiff's ability to perform his duties."
The settlement is a mixed bag. By preventing the plaintiff from working in the pediatrics unit, the settlement caters to the myth of gay persons as child molesters.10 8 Moreover, it seems highly unlikely that the
speech limitation could ever be constitutionally applied to the speech of

208. While 56% of a population sample agreed that homosexuals should have equal rights
in terms of job opportunities, 65% of the sample felt homosexuals should not be hired as elementary school teachers. N.Y. Times, July 17, 1977, at 34, col. 1.See also LaMorte, LegalRights
and Responsibilities in Public Education, 4 J.L. & EDUC. 449 (1975). Much of the objection to
homosexuals as teachers is based on a popular, though mistaken, belief that homosexual individuals are child molesters. Child molestation is not a homosexual phenomenon.
Pedophilia, a sexual preference for children, is distinct from homosexuality. See D. WEST,
HOMOSEXUALITY REEXAMINED 212-17 (1977); D. WEST, HOMOSEXUALITY 118-19 (1967); Comment, Private Consensual Homosexual Behavior: The Crime and Its Enforcement, 70 YALE L.J.
623, 629 (1961). Homosexual men primarily prefer men of their own age rather than children.
INSTITUTE FOR SEX RESEARCH. SEX OFFENDERS 639 (1965); M. SCHOLFIELD, SOCIOLOGICAL As147-55 (1965), cited in W. BARNETT, SEXUAL FREEDOM AND THE

PECTS OF HOMOSEXUALITY

CONSTITUTION 129 n.51 (1973). In fact, child molesters tend to be heterosexual in orientation.
INSTITUTE FOR SEX RESEARCH, supra at 277-79, 303-04, 332-343. Moreover, child molesters are
almost never female, either heterosexual or homosexual. Id. at 9; D. WEST, HOMOSEXUALITY,
supra, at 115.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol10/iss3/3

19851

SEXUAL ORIENTATION LAW

nongay persons. The fact of settlement itself, however, does lend
credence to the efficacy of section 1983 as a vehicle for redress. Moreover, when individual job rights, and hence, survival needs are part of
individual gay rights cases, criticism of settlements from the broader
view of gay legal rights is particularly unwarranted." 9
In another case involving a hospital, Bruce La Flamme was fired
from his job with Boston City Hospital. La Flamme, however, never
had to resort to formal suit. First, he was supported by his union, Service Employees International Union Local 285, which filed a formal
grievance on his behalf. The union's contract with the hospital included
a nondiscrimination clause with regard to sexual orientation. Moreover,
the hospital was covered by the executive order issued by the mayor of
Boston prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination in municipal employment.210 The arbitrator determined that La Flamme had been
wrongfully terminated and the hospital settled by awarding La Flamme
backpay for the period of his termination.2 11 During his termination,
La Flamme successfully sought unemployment compensation, thus convincing the unemployment compensation officials that his termination
212
was not just.

A classic use of section 1983 occurred in Van Ooteghem v.
Gray. 1 3 Van Ooteghem was an assistant county treasurer for a county
in Texas. It was undisputed that he was a good employee. Consequently, he was treated as a professional and allowed to regulate his
working hours. Van Ooteghem informed his employer, the treasurer of
the county, Hartsell Gray, that he intended to testify before the county
209. Two cases involving homosexuals in the military-Berg v. Claytor, 436 F. Supp. 76
(D.D.C. 1977), vacated, 591 F.2d 849 (D.C. Cir. 1978) and Matlovich v. Secretary of the Air
Force, 414 F. Supp. 690 (D.D.C. 1976), vacated, 591 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1978)-resulted in
cash settlements after extensive litigation. Sergeant Matlovich received $160,000 from the Air
Force. Ensign Berg agreed not to make public the amount he received from the Navy. For a
discussion of these cases, see Rivera I, supra note I, at 849-52; Rivera 11,supra note 1, at
319-21.
210. Boston Exec. Order No. 2 (Jan. 9, 1984). The executive order of the new Flynn administration is similar to previous executive orders of Mayor White and prohibits discrimination in
the delivery of municipal services as well as in municipal employment. On July 11, 1984, shortly
after the La Flamme settlement, the mayor signed into law a revised human rights ordinance that
had been introduced by City Councilman David Scondras and had passed the city council by a
vote of 12 to one. The ordinance, which applies to both the public and private sectors, protects
citizens from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in, inter alia, the areas of employment, labor organization, credit transactions, bonding and insurance, education, and public accommodations and services. In addition, the ordinance established a City Human Rights Commission, with an executive director and staff.
211. Gay Community News, June 16, 1984, at 1.
212. Id.
213. 628 F.2d 488 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. dismissed, 451 U.S. 935, rehg granted, 640 F.2d
12 (5th Cir.), affid in part and remanded per curiam, 654 F.2d 304 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 909 (1982); on remand, 584 F. Supp. 897 (S.D. Tex. 1984).
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commissioners on the subject of the civil rights of gay persons. Three
days later, Gray by letter informed Van Ooteghem that- he was restricted to the office from 8 a.m. to 12 noon and from 1 p.m. to 5 p.m.,
Monday through Friday, which coincidently coincided with hours when
citizens were permitted to address the county commissioners. Van
Ooteghem was instructed to sign the letter to indicate his acquiescence
to these new rules. He refused and was fired, allegedly for insubordination.2 14 Van Ooteghem filed suit based on section 1983 and alleging a
violation of his right to free speech. The district court agreed with the
plaintiff, ordered him reinstated, and awarded backpay and attorney's
fees.

21 5

On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed. 216 Admittedly, Van
Ooteghem was an at-will employee and could have been fired for any
reason. However, under Mount Healthy City School District v.
Doyle, 217 even an untenured employee cannot be fired for a constitutionally infirm reason. Treasurer Gray maintained that he fired his assistant for insubordination. However, the Fifth Circuit accepted the
district court's finding that Van Ooteghem's proposed speech to the
county commissioners was a substantial or motivating factor in his dismissal. The Fifth Circuit then applied the balancing test mandated by
2"' that is, that the state cannot prevent the speech of its citiPickering,
zens absent a compelling need. The trial court had found that the
speech by Van Ooteghem did "not significantly interfere with the oper21 9
ation of the treasury nor impede his performance of his duties.
Thus, no compelling state interest was found. Judge Goldberg summed
up:
It may be true that some treasury workers, or Gray himself, found
the prospect of an employee addressing the Commissioners Court on homosexual rights to be distressing. However, the ability of a member of a
disfavored class to express his views on civil rights publicly and without
hesitation-no matter how personally offensive to his employer or majorat the core of the Free Speech Clause of the
ity of his co-employees-lies
220
First Amendment.
Three state university teacher cases must be compared. The ultimate result in the first, Korf v. Ball State University,22 1 seems one

214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

Van Ooteghem, 628 F.2d at 490.
Id. at 493, 496.
Id. at 488.
429 U.S. 274 (1977).
Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
Van Ooteghem, 628 F.2d at 492.
Id. at 492-93 (emphasis added).
726 F.2d 1222 (7th Cir. 1984).
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upon which most persons, regardless of their beliefs about homosexuality, could agree. However, procedurally the case does raise a nagging
suspicion that a double standard exists when dealing with a gay university teacher as opposed to a nongay university teacher. In Korf, the
university fired a male teacher for making sexual advances to male students. The sexual advances were coupled with promises of good grades
if the sexual conduct that was solicited occurred. Dr. Korf admitted a
sexual involvement with a seventeen-year old student, but denied the
other allegations. Eight witnesses testified against him. The university
committee found Korf guilty of unethical conduct under the American
Association of University Professors (AAUP) regulations on profes2 22
sional ethics.
Korf attacked his discharge on a number of grounds. He claimed
that he had not received adequate notice of the standard of conduct to
which he was being held. The Seventh Circuit found that the university's interpretation of the AAUP standards was entirely reasonable
and rationally related to the duty of the university to provide a proper
academic atmosphere. 3 Korf also argued that he was being denied the
equal protection of the law because nongay professors were not being
held to the same standard. The Seventh Circuit held against him on
this issue as well. The court held that Korf was not fired because of his
sexual orientation, but because of unethical conduct which exploited
students; sexual orientation was irrelevant and thus equal protection
issues were not raised. 2
The third issue raised by Korf casts some doubt on the court's
resolution of the other issues. Korf claimed that the district court
abused its discretion in denying his motion for further discovery. The
district court denied this motion before ruling by summary judgment
on his equal protection claim. The information Korf sought was the
university's practices with respect to the university's inquiry into private sexual relationships of the faculty and treatment of faculty members having heterosexual relationships with students. 2 5 The Seventh
Circuit said such information, even if discovered, would be irrelevant
because the university did not fire Korf because of his private sexual
conduct or because of his sexual relationship with the student. Rather,
according to the court, he was fired for his unethical and exploitative
conduct with students. Hence, according to the appellate court, Korf's

222. Id. at 1224.
223. Id. at 1229. Compare this with the court's treatment of this issue in Naragon v. Wharton, 572 F. Supp. 1117 (M.D. La. 1983), affid, 737 F.2d 1403 (5th Cir. 1984), where the university claimed the existence of an unwritten rule. See infra note 230 and accompanying text.
224. Korf, 726 F.2d at 1229.
225. Id. at 1230.
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request for discovery was a mere "fishing expedition. 22 6 While Korf's
behavior as described in the court's opinion seems beyond the pale regardless of his sexual orientation, one cannot but wonder if the university engaged in selective enforcement. 2 7
Naragon v. Wharton228 involves university teaching, allegations of
unethical sexual conduct, and the use of section 1983 as the basis of
litigation, without the disturbing elements found in Korf. In her complaint, Kristine Naragon alleged that the change in the terms of her
employment by Louisiana State University was based on her sexual or i entation. She claimed that the conduct of the university violated her
right to freedom of belief, association, and speech, and denied her due
process, equal protection and all rights cognizable under section 1983.
Naragon had been a graduate teaching assistant in the university's
school of music for five semesters when the problem began. In late
1982, the parents of an undergraduate student complained to the
provost about Naragon's sexual relationship with their daughter. They
said Naragon was an agent of the devil and was exercising unnatural
influence over their daughter. Naragon admitted her involvement with
the student, who at the time of the relationship was an adult. The student was not, and had not been, in any of Naragon's classes.
The provost informed the music department that Naragon should
not be given a graduate assistantship which involved contact with students. At that time, no other type of assistantship existed. The issue
was presented three times to the music faculty, which three times voted
overwhelmingly to renew Naragon's teaching assistantship. In a meeting with the dean, Naragon was told that no questions existed about
her academic performance (she had a 4.0 average), teaching ability, or
ethical conduct. According to Naragon's complaint, the dean said the
sole issue was "whether a gay person should be allowed to hold a teaching position which involved contact with undergraduates. 21 29 As a consequence of Naragon's situation, the dean fashioned a special research
assistantship in music which involved no student contact. But the
provost refused to meet with Naragon and her major professor of mu-

226. Id.
227. In accordance with established university procedures in these matters, an ad hoc university senate committee was given the responsibility of investigating the charges and making
recommendations. The committee found Korf guilty of unethical conduct, but found the evidence
insufficient to support the allegation that he encouraged dishonest academic conduct and accordingly recommended a three-year probation. The trustees of the university refused to accept the
recommendations and returned them to the committee for reconsideration. The committee then
reversed itself and recommended discharge. Based on this recommendation, the trustees voted to
terminate Dr. Korf's employment. Id. at 1224-25.
228. 572 F. Supp. 1117, aftd, 737 F.2d 1403.
229. Complaint at 4, Naragon, 572 F. Supp. 1117.
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sic, and denied the internal grievance Naragon had filed with the
university.
Naragon sought a preliminary injunction from the U.S. District
Court of Louisiana claiming irreparable harm in that the teaching
assistantship would be given to someone else and that removal from a
teaching assistantship would have a direct impact on her future ability
to secure teaching employment. The district court issued a temporary
restraining order on August 23, 1983, ordering Naragon's reinstatement. The court simultaneously set a trial date for August 29, 1983.
But on September 30, 1983, the court lifted the order and ruled that
the university was justified in terminating her teaching assignment because she was not a "positive role model" as the university regulations
required. 230 At trial, the university contended that Naragon had violated an unwritten rule banning any "close personal relationship" between a faculty member and a student. However, music faculty members with twenty to thirty years experience testified that they had never
heard of the policy. Judge West held that Naragon was not discriminated against because of her sexual orientation, although acknowledging that the university had not taken action against several heterosexual faculty members who had had sexual relationships with their
students. The difference, he maintained, was that in Naragon's case the
parents had complained and Naragon had twice been involved in public
confrontations with the parents. 23 1 Seemingly contradicting his position
that Naragon was not a victim of sexual orientation discrimination, the
judge addressed the question whether Naragon would have been removed notwithstanding her sexual orientation, and concluded: "It is obvious that had the plaintiff been heterosexual, and not homosexual, a
relationship between her and Miss Doe as described during the trial
would be most unlikely. 2 32
Thus, according to the lower court decision, Naragon's sexual orientation was not a substantial and motivating factor 23 3 of the university's action, and moreover, the university had a compelling state interest. The trial court held that the university had successfully carried the
burden of showing that the plaintiff's conduct constituted a material
and substantial interference with the mission of the university. As de-

230. Naragon, 572 F. Supp. at !121.
231. Id.at 1123.
232. Id.at 1124.
233. Id.The court applied the test created by the United States Supreme Court in Mount
Healthy, 429 U.S. 274, to determine whether an employment action involving a gay teacher was a
constitutional violation. The Mount Healthy test requires that the plaintiff show that his or her
exercise of a protected activity was a "substantial" or "motivating" factor in the adverse action
taken. Id. at 287.

Published by eCommons, 1984

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 10:3

lineated by the court, the "University has a right, and indeed a duty, to
take all reasonable and lawful measures to prevent activities which adversely intrude into the teaching process or which might adversely intrude into the teaching process or which might adversely affect the
2 84
University's image and reputation."
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that it was Naragon's intimate
relationship with Doe and not her "homosexual tendencies" that was
the motivating factor for the decision to change her assignment. Thus,
since the decision was unrelated to Naragon's sexual orientation, there
was no need to discuss her constitutional arguments. 3 5 The appellate
decision should be read carefully to note how the choice of words indicates the underlying homophobia of the writer. For example, the Fifth
Circuit referred to the "undue influence" that Naragon exercised over
the student. 3 6 The phrase is not found in the lower court opinion nor
was any evidence presented that Naragon had any undue influence over
the student in question. The inference could be that mere homosexuality was "undue influence." Do male teachers who live with and sleep
with their female students exercise undue influence? Another interesting word used in the appellate opinion was that Naragon "controlled
Doe's participation" in an interview with the dean of students. 37 Apparently, Naragon irritated the court, which commented "Naragon
persists" at the beginning of the paragraph which ends with the words:
"none of the arguments about Naragon's constitutional rights need be
discussed. 2 38 Later the Fifth Circuit concluded, "it appeared that Doe
was confused and not thinking independently, and the breach with her
parents was a serious problem."2 3 9 Doe was living with Naragon during
the whole trial and continued to do so afterwards. The use of the anonymous title Doe was not at the student's request, but at the request of
her parents.
Judge Goldberg dissented from the two to one decision, finding
that the "trial judge below was clearly erroneous in his finding that Ms.
Naragon's sexual preference was not a motivating factor in her reassignment." 4 ' Moreover, Judge Goldberg accused his colleagues of not
241
facing up to the "unavoidable equal protection concern in this case.
The judge stated:

234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

Naragon, 572 F. Supp. at 1121.
Naragon, 737 F.2d at 1405.
Id. at 1404.
Id.
Id. at 1404-05.
Id. at 1405.
Id. at 1408 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
Id.
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The extent to which the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits or circumscribes discrimination based upon an individual's sexual preference is a largely unresolved, yet immensely important legal issue of our day. But the obvious role of private biases in
the University's action does not ring loudly enough in the majority's ears
to attract their attention. I will not put a maxim silencer on the validated
cries of discrimination and the calls to this Court for constitutional
2 42
justice.
In Korf, the university utilized nationally recognized AAUP standards, albeit with new interpretations, while in Naragon the alleged
unwritten regulations seemed to exist only in the innermost recesses of
the administrators' minds. In Korf, the teacher had direct control over
the students allegedly solicited; in Naragon, no academic contact existed. In Korf, all but one of the alleged solicitations were supposedly
unwelcome and coupled with promises of grades. In Naragon, the relationship was consensual, private, adult, and involved no possible favors.
The results for the gay teachers, however, were similar.
Merle Woo, a gay university teacher in California, achieved a different result. Woo, who was "nonrenewed" as of June, 1982, attacked
the actions of the University of California on two levels. Woo first challenged the university's claim that Woo could be nonrenewed under a
system-wide rule that allowed administrators to terminate lecturers after four years of employment. An action was filed with the State Public
Employees Relations Board on behalf of Woo by the American Federation of Teachers. An administrative judge ruled that the university had
expressly misapplied the rule in Woo's case. Moreover, the judge found
the university guilty of an unfair labor practice and ordered the university to reinstate the former four-year rule and rehire all the lecturers
who were affected by the university's action. 24 3 The university appealed
this decision.
In addition to this favorable administrative decision, Woo also
filed suit 244 alleging sexual orientation discrimination and other forms
of discrimination, interference with her first amendment, equal protection, and due process rights, and loss of property and liberty interests.
The basis of her suit was the ever-popular section 1983.245 The university moved to dismiss, but the motion was denied by the federal district

242. Id.
243. Gay Community News, Mar. 3, 1984, at 6.
244. Woo v. University of Cal., No. C-83-1505 S.C. (N.D. Cal.).
245. Woo alleged violations of her rights to freedom of speech, freedom of association, equal
protection, and due process based upon § 1983. Her right to privacy and other California lawbased claims were brought into federal court by virtue of pendent jurisdiction. Finally, Woo also
claimed race and sex discrimination based on Title V11.
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court on June 3, 1983. The university also tried to have the case stayed
on the grounds that the administrative appeal was still pending before
the Public Relations Board. The court denied the stay as well. Shortly
after this double loss, the university settled. On February 16, 1984, the
Board of Regents of the University of California approved a settlement
reinstating Woo with a two-year contract as a visiting lecturer, a cash
award of $48,584, and attorney fees of $25,000."
The Woo case must be viewed with two caveats. First, Woo was
more than an open lesbian; she was a highly political, student-oriented
teacher fighting not only for her status as a lesbian, but also for her
rights as an Asian-American woman and as a teacher who believed in a
special kind of education. The fact that Woo's sexual orientation claim
was accompanied by a traditional Title VII claim on race discrimination made settlement more likely. Second, the Woo case took place in
California, a state which is certainly more receptive to sexual orientation claims than other states.
When one looks at the teacher cases, one is struck by the idiosyncratic effect of geography on outcomes. The same rules applied by
judges in different states produce different results. The results also
seem to hinge on how judges structure the facts. For both gay students2 4 7 and teachers,"" universities have been safer places than other
institutions. However, the safety has often been found in the protection
of first amendment freedom of speech rights; gay persons speaking have
more protection that gay persons acting. The transition from protecting
speech to protecting private sexual acts will come about only when the
equal protection issue is faced squarely. Either gay teachers will be accorded the same protection as nongay teachers on campus, or nongay
teachers who engage in sexual relationships with students will have to
be equally sanctioned. The whole issue of sexual harassment by teachers (predominantly male) of students (predominantly female) in the
university setting has barely been faced. Until that issue is resolved,
gay teachers will probably continue to be scapegoats and be treated
differently. The real issue in the teaching world is not one of homosexuality or heterosexuality, but one of power and professionalism. What
are the proper limits when one person is in a position of authority over
another? Can sexual relations ever be consensual in that context?
The state and local arena has seen a significant number of cases
arising from charges of discrimination by police forces. As gay persons

246. In theory, the settlement is confidential. This information was obtained from a newspaper and not from the plaintiff or her attorney. Gay Community News, Mar. 3, 1984, at 6.
247. For numerous cases in this area, see Rivera I, supra note 1, at 924-30; see also Rivera
II, supra note 1, at 336.
248. Aumiller v. University of Del., 434 F. Supp. 1273 (D. Del. 1977).
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have obtained equal civil rights in some cities, either gay police officers
have "come out" or gays have tried to join the police as openly gay
persons. New York City now actually has an organization of gay police
officers called Gay Officers Action League (GOAL). The Police
Group's Brotherhood in Action, a coalition of police groups, has refused to allow the organization of gay officers to join. 49 For many
years no one would admit that anyone on any police force was gay.
Sergeant Charles Ochrane, Jr., broke tradition when, as an openly gay
police officer in New York City, he testified in favor of the gay rights
bill before the New York City Council.2 50 San Francisco now actively
recruits gay officers.2" 1 Since police organizations are typically regarded and treated as paramilitary organizations, one might expect a
response to gay members similar to the response of the American military. Few persons expecting this response have been disappointed.
Childers v. Dallas Police Department"' provides an appropriate
prototype. Childers was first employed by the city of Dallas in May of
1969. Subsequently, after examination, he became part of the classified
service as Storekeeper #5. In May 1973, he took the examination for
Storekeeper #7 and achieved the highest score of anyone taking the
examination. His personal records indicate that in 1972, 1973, and
1974, Childers was a satisfactory and, in some respects, "a superior
employee. '26 3 Based on the examination results, Childers became eligible for a position with the property division of the Dallas Police Department. Childers applied for the position.
During the interview for the position, the police sergeant who conducted the interview became aware that Childers was gay. The exact
content of the conversation is in dispute. Both agree that Childers did
discuss his membership in the gay-oriented Metropolitan Community
Church. 2 " The sergeant testified that upon ascertaining to his satisfac-

249. The Advocate, Sept. 17, 1984, at 19.
250. Id. See also Officer Almsteld-On the Force and Openly Gay, id., June 23, 1983, at
30 (regarding a Washington, D.C., police officer).
251. Id., June 12, 1984, at 15.
252. 513 F. Supp. 134 (N.D. Tex. 1981), affid mem., 669 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1982).
253. Id. at 137.
254. Id. The Universal Fellowship of Metropolitan Community Churches (MCC) was
founded in 1968 by Reverand Troy Perry, a former Baptist and Pentecostal. MCC now has approximately 26,000 members and 170 congregations. The doctrine of the church is described as
"somewhat conservative Protestant." The denomination was supposedly founded as a haven for
homosexual Christians. However, the church's constitution does not mention homosexuality. The
church's matrimonial rite is described as "a spiritual joining of two persons in a manner fitting
and proper by a duly authorized minister of the church." N.Y. Times, July 26, 1981, § I, at 34,
col. I. The request of MCC to join the National Council of Churches was "postponed indefinitely"
on November 9, 1983. Id., Nov. 10, 1983, at A14, col. 1.See also id., May 24, 1984, at All, col.
I; Gay Community News, Nov. 26, 1983, at 1,14.
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tion that Childers was gay, he disqualified him. The grounds for disqualification, in the mind of the police official, were that since Childers
was gay he was therefore a habitual lawbreaker and a potential security risk. The potential security risk existed, the officer assumed, because
Childers would have sexual paraphernalia as contraband in the property room and because he would warn homosexuals of impending raids.
The sergeant admitted that he disqualified Childers without checking
his work or arrest records." 5
On April 4, 1974, Childers again took the Storekeeper #7 examination and passed with an ever higher score. He was again interviewed
by the same police officer and they again allegedly discussed Childers'
membership and activities in the Metropolitan Community Church.
Childers maintained they also discussed his participation in a Gay
Pride Parade. Childers claimed that the police officer told him he
256
would not be hired because of the emotional strain "it" would cause.
The police officer testified that he told Childers that he would not be
hired because he would be a security risk and his sexual activities were
257
in violation of state law.
Childers sued the police department under sections 1983, 1985,
and 1986, under the first, ninth, and fourteenth amendments of the
United States Constitution, and under a section of the Texas Revised
Code."
The gist of his complaint was that he was discriminated
against because of his religion and related first amendment activities,
and because of his sexual orientation. The religion claim was dismissed
as "frivolous." 25 9 The court reasoned that Childers' membership and
activities in the Metropolitan Community Church did not raise a first
amendment claim because the church did not "require" Childers to be
a homosexual and because some members of the church were not
260
gay.
The court did admit that the freedom of expression and association

255. Childers, 513 F. Supp. at 138.
256. Id.
257. Id. In 1982 the same court that ruled in Childers held that the Texas sodomy statute
was unconstitutional. See Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Tex. 1982), appeal dismissed,
743 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1984), reh'g granted 743 F.2d 236 (Jan. 25, 1985).
258. Childers, 53 F. Supp. at 136. The Texas statute the plaintiff invoked prohibits discrimination in state employment. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-16 (Vernon Supp.
1980).
259. Childers, 513 F. Supp. at 138.
260. Id. at 139. The court's position is similar to that taken by the court in Dorr v. First
Ky. Nat'l Bank Corp., No. 01 18-L-(G) (W.D. Ky. Feb. 1, 1983), appeal docketed, (6th Cir. Apr.,
1984). In Dorr, the court held that the gay plaintiff's religious beliefs were not "seriously held"
because the Episcopal Church did not require Dorr to join Integrity or to be gay. See supra text
accompanying note 62. The religious views of nongay persons seem to be sacrosanct while gays'
religious views are frivolous or insincere.
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claims in Childers were "more troublesome. ' 261 It found that "Steven
Childers' efforts to organize the homosexual minority, to educate the
public as to its plight and to obtain for that minority better treatment
or a change in the laws respecting homosexuality represented a clear
example of the associational activity singled out for protection under
the First Amendment. 2 6 2 However, the court said, the real issue was
not the protected nature of Childers' speech and association, but to
what extent a police department might burden such activity. The court
then purported to use the Pickering balancing test 2 3 and found the
action of the police department justified. The denial of a job to
Childers was necessary to "prevent the material and substantial interference with Childers' performance of his duties and the efficient operation of government."' 2 " How would hiring Childers hurt his own performance and the efficiency of the government? The court first stated
that a police department must be "beyond reproach" and "reflect the
values of a majority of society. '"' 2 5 Apparently, employment of Childers
would not allow the department to be "beyond reproach" because he
"was in no way inclined to be discreet about his homosexuality or his
homosexual activities. 26 6 His lack of "discretion" was illustrated by
the court's reference to his public advocacy of homosexuality and his
admission of cohabitation with his life partner.26 7 Only a few short
paragraphs before, Childers' speech had been characterized as protected. Subsequently, the same speech was used by the court as an illustration of his lack of discretion. Childers' admission of cohabitation
with his life partner was simply telling the truth; other gay public employees have been fired for fraud for omitting salient facts from employment forms and interviews.26 8 Also, Childers had no choice but to
cohabit since he and his lover could not marry.
To support the lack of discretion argument, the court cited the
federal case of Singer v. United States Civil Service Commission26 9
which, by the court's analysis, turned on "flaunting" as unacceptable
gay behavior.2 70 The Childers court, however, used incomplete information about the outcome of Singer, failing to discuss the remand and

261. Childers, 513 F. Supp. at 139.
262. Id.
263. Pickering, 391 U.S. 563.
264. Childers, 513 F. Supp. at 140.
265. Id. at 141.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. See, e.g., Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 359 F. Supp. 843 (D. Md. 1973), aff'd on other
grounds, 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir.) cert. denied., 419 U.S. 836 (1974).
269. 530 F.2d 247 (9th Cir. 1976), vacated and remanded, 429 U.S. 1034 (1977).
270. Childers, 513 F. Supp. at 141.
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its rather different outcome. 71 The often implicit rule that gay people
can have jobs as long as they are properly quiet about "it" has long
been a theme in gay rights cases. The concept of what is "flaunting" in
a gay relationship and what is "flaunting" elsewhere has always been a
double standard.27 2 Whatever one may feel about proper public behavior becomes irrelevant, however, because the Childers court clearly included "participating in homosexual demonstrations" as "flaunting. "273
Certainly, civil rights demonstrations have traditionally been specially
protected free speech. Are women in an Equal Rights Amendment
march or blacks in a civil rights march "flaunting"?
The court's second line of reasoning was that Childers' activities
were "inconsistent with and substantially deleterious to the efficient operation of government. 2 74 Why? Well, first of all homosexuality is an
issue "charged with emotion and anxiety. 2 175 Moreover, the court
opines it is "controversial" and plaintiff's view is quite likely a "minor-

271. See Rivera II, supra note 1, at 317-18.
272. One of the charges against Singer was that he "flaunted" his homosexuality. Consider
the following discussions on flaunting: "Even a mundane expression of Gay social identity is perceived as a form of provocative sexual display or 'flaunting.' Gagnon and Simon (1967, p. 137)
were indeed right when they wrote:
We have allowed the homosexual's sexual object choice to dominate and control our imagery of him. We have let this single aspect of his total life experience appear to determine
all his products, concerns and activities. The mere presence of unconventional sexuality
seems to give the sexual content of his life overwhelming significance. [Yet] homosexuals
. . . vary profoundly in the degree to which their homosexual commitment and its facilitation becomes the organizing principle of their lives.
Paul, A Taxonomy of Categoriesand Themes in Anti-Gay Argument, in HOMOSEXUALITY 40 (W.
Paul, J. Weinrich, V. Gonsiorek & V. Hotvedt eds. 1982).
With respect to gay teachers, it has been observed: "Anyone raised in American culture
'knows' that heterosexuals never flaunt their lifestyle in class--only homosexuals do. The word
'flaunt' is a code work or euphemism, with hidden meanings. Consider the comparable anti-Semitic usage of the word 'pushy' as a euphemism for 'Jewish.' " Id. at 51-52. The same author
comments that:
Openly Gay people are often described in a media with the adjective "admitted" or
"self-confessed." For example, when an Eagle Scout was dismissed from Scouting for Gay
civil rights activities, the press described him as "an admitted homosexual" . . . . But he
had not "admitted" anything, nor had he described himself as "homosexual"; rather, he
had affirmed his identity, which he defined as Gay. Linking "admitted" or "confessed"
with "Gay" implies guilt or shame. It is insinuated in a way that makes this guilt or shame
appear self-evident.
Id. at 52.
Today, assertions that Gay people only bring it on themselves by "flaunting" or disclosing their sexual orientation are contradicted by studies which demonstrate official efforts to detect and punish homosexuality . . . . Intrusions on privacy and threats of public
exposure are a constant fact of life for the millions of conventional homosexuals who are
forced to develop covert protective strategies in the closet . ...
Paul, Minority Status for Gay People, in HOMOSEXUALITY, supra, at 359.
273. Childers, 513 F. Supp. 141 n.10 (citing Aumiller, 434 F. Supp. at 1293).
274. Id. at 141.
275. Id.
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ity view." ' 27 6 The court then indicated that, while it "appreciated that
the primary purpose of the first amendment is to protect minority
views," nevertheless, the "activity of the sort in which Childers was
involved" is public and thus, "undermines the legitimate needs for obedience and discipline within the police department." 2 " According to
the court, Childers' activities were deleterious because'they would foment controversy and conflict in the department. The police department, the court maintained, had the right to protect its public image
and avoid ridicule and embarrassment. 78 These goals alone, the court
27 9
held, were sufficient to overcome Childers' first amendment rights.
Surely anyone reading these justications must remember that the same
reasons were historically used to deny blacks and women positions with
the police and military. The court went on to say that Childers' views
would subject him to harassment, and his gay activities would promote
unrest and disharmony among fellow workers.2 80 Surely black workers
are sometimes harassed by their racist fellow workers, which creates
unrest and disharmony; the same may be said for women with sexist
coworkers.
The court, in a footnote, could not resist engaging in a rather oldfashioned sterotyping of gay people, which has long been discredited:
The court said that the "stress" of the situation might interfere with
Childers' ability to perform his job.2 81 A psychologist testified that
many gays feel left out of society, feel inferior because of societal attitudes, and even feel persecuted. Can one deduce why? The psychologist
testified that, therefore, a homosexual worker might feel stress and
anxiety especially in relationship to his or her fellow officers. 8 2 In conclusion, according to the court, the "peculiar conditions inherent in the
police department" overcame first amendment considerations.2 88 The
court also dismissed all of Childers' other claims.2 8" The case was appealed to the Fifth Circuit, which affirmed without a published

opinion

285

276. Id. The court never explained its remark about a police force reflecting majoritarian
views. If that remark was based on a legitimate rule, the court would be hard pressed to explain
the presence of blacks on the police force in Dallas, Texas.
277. Id. at 142.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 142 n.12.
282. Id. But see A. BELL & M. WEINBERG, HOMOSEXUALITIES 197 (1982): "Numerous investigations have failed to show any consistent or clear-cut differences between homosexuals and
heterosexuals in terms of their psychological adjustment."
283. Childers, 513 F. Supp. at 142.
284. Id. at 143-48.
285. Childers, 669 F.2d 732.
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Steven Horn had been a police officer in Mesa, Arizona for four
years before being fired for being gay. 8 6 Prior to his police service,
Officer Horn had been Sergeant Horn, a member of the First Division
of the U.S. Marines, and had received the bronze star for his heroism
in Vietnam. When Steve Horn told his superiors at the police department that he was gay, he was fired.2 87 The Horn case is not, strictly
speaking, a state and local government employment discrimination
case. Horn chose to challenge the Arizona statute that criminalized homosexual conduct, rather than fight his dismissal directly. The case becomes interesting in the state and local area because the trial court
judge made errors of law in his opinion and went beyond the scope of
the argument about the constitutionality of the Arizona statute. The
judge announced that despite the pleadings, the constitutionality of the
Arizona law was not the issue before the court. In a rather unique approach, the judge announced that the Mesa Police Department "may
treat them [the laws] as constitutional. 21 88 The judge then granted
summary judgment on the basis that the police department had not
acted arbitrarily or unjustly in firing Steve Horn. The judge found that
the police department has "unique needs." The police department, he
said, had to have officers who would enforce the law and not selectively
enforce the law based on their conscientious objections.2 89 Nowhere in
the pleadings were any allegations that Horn had not in the past enforced the law. Moreover, among the unique needs of the department
was its need to "maintain a law abiding image." Not content with
these determinations, the judge went on to find that Horn was not discharged because of his status, i.e., "being a homosexual," but rather
because he announced that he would continue to do acts proscribed by
the Arizona statute. The judge drove the final nail in the coffin by relying on the department's contention, alleged in the pleadings but never
proven at trial, that Horn had been untruthful. This finding, according
to the court, Would "rationally" support the department's discharge of
Horn. 90 Interestingly, the department's finding of untruthfulness was
made at a hearing that was unrecorded and was not before the

286. Horn v. City of Mesa, No. C427557 (Super. Ct. Ariz. Sept. 18, 1981), af'd mem., ICA-CIV 6514 (Ariz. Ct. App. July 19, 1984), No. 176697-PR (Ariz. Sup. Ct. Oct. I, 1984).
287. Just prior to Horn's dismissal, the police chief ordered Horn to take a polygraph test.
Horn was asked if he had ever used his position to gain homosexual favors. Horn answered that he
had not. The chief then asked Horn if other Mesa police officers were homosexuals. Again, Horn
replied in the negative. Only after Horn's cooperation with the chief's questioning was he fired.
The Advocate, Oct. 30, 1980, at 12.
288. Judgment Dismissing Action at I, Horn, No. C427557.
289. Id. at 3.
290. Id.
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judge.291

In Horn's appeal, 292 the Arizona Court of Appeals seemingly recognized that the lower court's homophobic zeal had resulted in an egregious legal error. Nonetheless, the court of appeals affirmed the lower
court in an unpublished memorandum decision.2 93 The court stated
that the Arizona Supreme Court had recently found the statutes
criminalizing homosexual conduct constitutional and noted that an appeals court could not "reject" this holding. The court admitted that a
material issue of fact existed when the lower court granted the motion
for summary judgment, 294 but held that the lower court's decision was
not arbitrary or an abuse of discretion. Moreover, the court stated "it is
virtually certain that were the department required to review the matter again the result would be the same.
29
zona Supreme Court was denied. 6

'295

Horn's appeal to the Ari-

Two other cases involving police officers occurred in California,
with results significantly different from the Texas and Arizona cases. In
fact, one case never made it to the courtroom. Tom Cady graduated at
the top of his class at the Kentucky Policy Academy. Subsequently, he
became a police chief in a small town in Kentucky. When Cady
learned that the city of San Francisco would hire openly gay officers,
he moved to San Francisco and applied for a position with the police
department. 9 7 Admitted into the Police Academy in May of 1981,
Cady successfully completed the course of study. He then entered
"field training," but only made it through twelve weeks of the fourteenweek program. Allegedly, Cady was told that if he did not resign, he
would be terminated and that if he were terminated he could never
work for the city. The police department cited poor performance as the
reason for Cady's termination. 9 8
Cady appealed to the Civil Service Commission of the city and
county of San Francisco. At a hearing before the Civil Service Hearing
Panel, Cady alleged that during both his academy stay and his field

291. Motion of Petitioner for Rehearing, Horn, No. C427557.
292. Gay Rights Advocates was denied permission to file an amicus curiae brief in this case.
Letter from Craig Mehrens, attorney for Steven Horn, to Rhonda R. Rivera (Nov. 4, 1983).
293. Horn, I-CA-CIV 6514.
294. "We acknowledge appellant's argument that a material issue of fact existed as to
whether or not he lied to Chief . . . . In our minds, this is a makeweight consideration . .

Id., slip op. at 6.
295. Id.
296. Horn, No. 17697-PR. Horn may now take his case to federal court. Letter from Craig
Mehrens, attorney for Steven Horn, to Rhonda R. Rivera (Oct. 23, 1984).
297. The Advocate, July 7, 1983, at 6.
298. Cady v. San Francisco Police Dep't, slip op. at 1-2 (San Francisco Civil Serv. Hearing
Panel, Feb. II, 1983).
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training placement he was constantly verbally harassed by being called
"girl," "fag," and "faggot," and that his sexual orientation was mocked
by officers, including senior officers. Moreover, he maintained that his
field training placement was marked by discriminatory actions, including failing to be instructed in certain areas and by certain officers, being given evaluations inconsistent with department practice, and being
subjected to additional tests and evaluations that other recruits were
not given. At the hearing, the police department refused to furnish
comparative data on other recruits. The department also refused to allow the Civil Service Commission staff to review the daily observation
reports of other recruits to compare those evaluations with Cady's. 99
The hearing panel made two findings. Initially, a discriminatory
work environment was found. Evidence of homophobia was found at
both the police academy and at the field training station.3 00 However,
the panel held that there was insufficient evidence to support Cady's
claim that the police department had conspired to eliminate him on the
basis of his sexual orientation.30 1 Cady appealed to the full commission.
The commission found that the facts were in dispute, but "resolved the
doubts in favor of Mr. Cady." Under its "power to fashion a remedy in
cases which allege prohibited discrimination contained in the Charter
of the City," the commission reinstated Cady in the police department. 02 This case represents the first instance that the San Francisco
Civil Service Commission ordered a city employee reinstated because
30 3
of sexual orientation discrimination.
A second California case involved a lesbian who wanted to become
a deputy sheriff in Contra Costa County, California. 0 4 Denise Kreps
applied for the position of deputy sheriff in February, 1979. After written and oral examinations and an agility test, Kreps ranked eighteenth

299. While the opinion of the Hearing Panel is fully written, the decision of the Civil Service Commission is not. Rather, the commission issued only a Minute Order reinstating Cady. The
facts are drawn from three sources: the panel's opinion, Cady's sworn statements, and a letter
from Matthew Cole, Mr. Cady's attorney, to Rhonda R. Rivera (Dec. 18, 1984) [hereinafter cited
as Cole letter].
300. Cady, No. 2018-81, slip op. at 4. The discriminatory work environment was in violation of San Francisco Administrative Code § 16.9-25 (prohibiting sexual harassment), Civil Service Rule 1.03 (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation), as well as state law.
301. Cady, No. 2018-81, slip op. at 4.
302. Notice of Action Taken by the Civil Service Commission (July 12, 1983). It is unclear
whether the commission accepted the proposed findings of fact submitted by either party.
303. Cole letter, supra note 299. Mr. Cole believes the case to also be important on the
issue of comparative data. Cady did not contest the police department's charges that he was deficient in some areas; rather, he pointed out that he was treated differently than other employees.
Since the police refused to supply comparative data, the issue was resolved in Cady's favor. Id.
304. The Kreps case was reported extensively in the gay press. See High Gear, July, 1981,
at 3; National NOW Times, Oct.-Nov. 1980, at 6; The Advocate, June 25, 1981, at I1; id., Feb.
19, 1981, at 10.
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out of 800 applicants. For two and one-half years prior to her application, she had been a dispatcher with the sheriff's department. Moreover, for a good part of that time she had been a reserve deputy. In
January of 1979, Kreps had been made a class I reserve, which indicated that she was permitted to work without supervision. As a reserve
deputy, she had done both patrol and detention duty. While she had
received no evaluations as a reserve deputy, Kreps's dispatcher evaluations were favorable.3 0 5
With her high test scores and superior background in police work,
Denise Kreps would have appeared to be an excellent candidate for the
position of deputy sheriff. But during a routine polygraph examination
given all recruits, Kreps answered truthfully that she had had same-sex
sexual relations, and in fact had had such relations the night before the
examination. Ten days later Kreps was informed by Sheriff Rainey
that he was disqualifying her because of her homosexuality.
Kreps appealed to the Civil Service Commission of Contra Costa
County. At a hearing before an administrative judge, Kreps testified
that all her sexual acts were in private and with consenting adults. She
also testified that she had never witnessed homosexual acts between
prisoners nor engaged in any such acts with prisoners. The sheriff testified that he had decided to disqualify Kreps without reviewing her personnel file. Moreover, he also admitted that he had made the decision
without knowledge of anything in her background that would indicate
that she would violate department rules. The sheriff's reasons for disqualification were that, if hired, Kreps might not report incidents of
homosexual behavior between prisoners, she might commit homosexual
acts with prisoners, and in a detention facility she would be in a "module" with female prisoners for whom she had a sexual preference. The
sheriff further justified his position by stating that he believed that prisoners had a right not to be guarded by a homosexual. However, the
sheriff admitted that potential problems existed when male police officers transported female prisoners, and that in the detention facilities
police officers who were not gay had gotten involved with prisoners." 6
Three of Kreps's former coworkers-a female deputy sheriff, a
male deputy sheriff, and a female detective-all testified that Kreps's
work was excellent and that they had never seen Kreps engage in any
"inappropriate behavior."3 0 7 Testimony relating to how deputies were
assigned in the detention facilities with regard to both male and female

305.
Cal. Mar.
306.
307.

In re Kreps, N-144221, slip op. at 2-3 (Civil Serv. Comm'n, Contra Coast County,
3, 1982).
Id., slip op. at 3-4.
Id. at 5.
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30 8
prisoners indicated that guards were seldom alone with prisoners.
The sheriff's department brought in a psychiatrist, Dr. Cooley,
who had had a long association with police departments and with various jails. His testimony is fascinating because, although he is a psychiatrist practicing in the year 1984, Dr. Cooley reflects almost every
classical and disproven stereotype about gays. Dr. Cooley testified that,
in his opinion, the use of homosexual guards was not advisable for a
number of reasons. First, Dr. Cooley maintained that a lesbian who
chose to be a prison guard would tend to be aggressive. This "aggressive" person, he stated, would then be placed in contact with "passive"
prisoners. Second, the prison guards have many visual, vocal, and tactile contacts with prisoners. Third, Dr. Cooley stated, being a prison
guard is a unique experience of being in a dictatorial, punitive role over
"disturbed people." Dr. Cooley had found that by the end of thirty
months, a sizeable portion of guards "act out" this role. Gay guards,
Dr. Cooley contended, would be more likely to act out "sexually" with
a prisoner than heterosexual guards, because no mature person would
Homosexuals, he testified, are
have sexual relations with a prisoner.
309
heterosexuals.
"less mature than
Dr. Cooley was also worried about possible psychological harm to
the prisoners, in that prisoners might experience "homosexual
panic."3 10 Cooley indicated that prisoners could usually identify gay
guards almost immediately. Moreover, Cooley stated that Kreps exhibited a number of "masculine" tendencies, such as body stance, short
haircut, casual manner of dress, and minimal use of makeup. Even
Kreps's truthful testimony was attacked by Dr. Cooley, who viewed her
admission of her sexual orientation as indicative of a self-defeating attitude. Most persons, he testified, would have lied about their sexual orientation and "hoped to get by with it." Moreover, the fact that Kreps
had had sex the night before the polygraph test indicated that she had
chosen to deal with the stress of the examination by having a homosexual experience. However, Dr. Cooley conceded that a heterosexual person's having sex the night before an examination would not be
abnormal.3 11
Among the most interesting features of Dr. Cooley's testimony is

308. Id. at 6-7.
309. However, it has been observed that "[in actual fact many homosexuals, both male and
female, function responsibly and honorably in positions of the highest trust and live emotionally
stable, mature, and well-adjusted lives that are indistinguishable from those of well-adjusted
heterosexuals, except for their different sexual preferences." Marmor, Homosexuality and the
Issue of Mental Illness, in HOMOSEXUAL BEHAVIOR 400 (J. Marmor ed. 1980).
310. See supra note 201 on homosexual panic.
311. Kreps, N-14221, slip op. at 7-9.
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the suggestion that the correct and normal conduct for Kreps would
have been to lie in the polygraph examination. There have been a number of cases where gay persons have lost their jobs for concealing their
sexual orientation on job applications and in interviews. When their
sexual orientation was discovered, they were fired, not for being gay,
but for fraud.3 12 Dr. Cooley's theory that being open about one's sexual
orientation reveals self-defeating behavior flies in the face of nearly
every major study which indicate that acceptance of one's homosexuality is the healthiest approach. 13
An openly lesbian sergeant of the San Francisco Sheriff's Department testified on Kreps's behalf. She had been on the force for five
years and had spent four years working in a detention facility. Her
testimony, based on her experience, rebutted almost every one of the
sheriff's speculations. 1 4 Kreps also introduced a psychologist who was
engaged in research on the mental health of lesbians. The psychologist,
Dr. Thomas, testified that research has shown no differences between
the mental health of heterosexual and homosexual women. Dr. Thomas
refuted Dr. Cooley's testimony, stating that lesbians are not easily
identifiable, are no more likely to act out than are heterosexuals, and
are no more likely to use their positions to coerce other persons into
315
sexual acts than are heterosexuals.
After all this testimony, the administrative law judge held in
Kreps's favor. The judge found that the sheriff's concerns were speculative and were not based on substantiated evidence, and thus the sheriff's actions violated Kreps's equal protection rights under the California Constitution."1 In a moment of extraordinary zeal, the judge had
found that gay persons were a "suspect class" under the California
Constitution, 1 7 and that the sheriff had shown no "compelling interest" to justify his actions. The judge also made a Norton-like31 8 rational nexus finding, and held that the sheriff had not shown that
Krep's sexual orientation rendered her unfit to be a deputy sheriff.

312. Acanfora, 359 F. Supp. 843, affid on other grounds, 491 F.2d 498, cert. denied, 419
U.S. 836.
313. See Freedman, Homosexuals May be Healthier Than Straights, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY,
Mar. 1975, at 31.
314. Kreps, N-14221, slip op. at 10- 1. The witness, Connie O'Connor, was recently promoted to the rank of lieutenant in San Francisco's Sheriff's Department. In her new job she will
supervise 75 courtroom deputies. The Advocate, Nov. 24, 1983, at 13.
315. Kreps, N-14221, slip op. at II.
316. Id. at 15.
317. Id. He cited to Morrison v. Board of Educ., I Cal. 3d 214, 461 P.2d 375, 82 Cal. Rptr.
175 (1968), and Gay Law Students, 24 Cal. 3d 458, 595 P.2d 592, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14. However,
these cases do not stand for this point.
318. Kreps, N-14221, slip op. at 15. See supra note 198 (discussion of the Norton test).
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Sheriff Rainey appealed to the Contra Costa Superior Court. 19 The
court said the proper test was not to look for "a compelling reason,"
but rather to see if the sheriff's actions were "unreasonable." 8 2 0 Thus,
the court rejected the suspect class finding and instead applied a "rational basis" test. Even under that standard, the court found that the
sheriff had denied Kreps the equal protection of the law by his "unreasonable" actions. In fact, the court found the sheriff's concerns "suffi32 1
ciently improbable.
The real life results bore out the court's decision in Kreps. Denise
Kreps graduated first in her class of thirty-nine from the state police
academy and won the award of "Outstanding Student." Ironically, the
man who had to hand her the award was none other than Sheriff
3 22
Rainey.
Not all California cases have had a happy result for the gay employee. Andrew Exler, who worked for the Orange County Human Services Agency as a clerk-typist, was dismissed for alleged "insubordination and poor work performance. "323 Exler was fired shortly after he
had lost one round in a highly publicized gay rights case against Disneyland, which had prohibited Exler from dancing with another
man. 32 4 He was also fired on the same day on which he wore a gay
rights button to work.32 5 The Orange County Employees Association
represented Exler and sought to have his discrimination complaint arbitrated under their collective bargaining agreement. The arbitrator held
that the issue was not subject to arbitration because the contract did
not cover discrimination based on sexual orientation.3 2 6 However, the
Human Services Agency did have a supplemental personnel procedure
which forbade discrimination not based on "merit." The county conceded that sexual orientation discrimination would fall within the am-

319. Rainey, No. 212332.
320. Id., slip op. at 2.
321. Id. While a judge in Contra Costa County, California, found the sheriff's fears "sufficiently improbable," a jury in San Diego, California, was taking an opposite stand. The San Diego
County Grand Jury found that County Sheriff John Duffy's policy of not hiring gay deputies is
"rational" and should be continued. The Advocate, June 26, 1984, at 28.
322. High Gear, July, 1981, at 3.
323. The Advocate, June 25, 1981, at 11.
324. Exler v. Disneyland, No. 25235 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 16, 1981). The court of appeals
remanded the case for a jury trial, which Exler won late in 1984. See MICHIGAN ORGANIZATION
FOR HUMAN RIGHrs NEWSLETTER, Sept.-Oct. 1984, at 4. This case will be reviewed in Part 1Iof
this article in the section on public accommodations.
325. The button said "You are being patronized by a Gay American." Exler refused to take
the button off while meeting the public. Summary of Evidence at Hearing and Findings and Recommendation, County of Orange v. Orange County Employees Ass'n, no. 72-30-0201-81 (Am.
Arb. Ass'n July 27, 1981).
326. County of Orange, No. 72-30-0201-81, slip op. at 11-13.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol10/iss3/3

1985]

SEXUAL ORIENTATION LAW

bit of that prohibition.3 1 7
Exler appeared before a hearing officer of the Judicial Arbitration
Service. The hearing officer found against Exler, holding that sexual
orientation was not the basis of Exler's termination. Allegedly his work
was poor, he played his radio too loud, he returned from lunch and
breaks late, and he smoked in a nonsmoking office. However, the hearing officer also listed as one of his misdeeds his refusal to take off his
gay rights button while meeting the public. 32 8 Certainly, such a reason
raises first amendment issues. The case was hardly a victory for Exler
himself. However, the admission by the county that a personnel action
based on sexual orientation was not permissible if personnel actions
could only be based on "merit," was an important legal victory for
329
other employees.
The case of Parsons v. Time, Inc.3 10 involved an employee of a
state university who was terminated, at least in part, because she was
rumored to be a lesbian. However, the litigation that ensued does not
fit neatly into our previous categories. Pam Parsons was the head coach
of the women's basketball team at the University of South Carolina.
She was a highly successful, winning coach who was simultaneously
known for her tough discipline of her players. Questions had arisen
concerning her recruiting practices in the past, including charges of
giving players money and violating other recruiting rules. 33 ' However,
her coaching position was not questioned until a player accused her of
being a lesbian. One of Parsons' players lied to her parents about
spending the night at a friends home when, in fact, she had spent the
night at Parson's home. Caught in the lie by her mother, the player
then proceeded to describe hugging and kissing which allegedly went
on between Parsons and her housemate, another player. The mother
reported these allegations to a university official who forced Parsons to
resign. However, Parsons did get a financial settlement from the university 332 and the situation seemed at a close.
Shortly afterwards, however, a local newspaper printed an article
alleging that Parsons was fired for having a lesbian affair with a player.
But this article was inconsequential compared to the next event. Sports
Illustrated printed an expose about Parsons in its annual swim suit is327. Letter from Kathleen Sage, attorney for Orange County Employees Association, Inc.,
to Rhonda R. Rivera (Oct. 23, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Sage letter].
328. County of Orange, No. 72-30-0201-81, slip op. at 1-2.
329. Id., slip op. at I. According to Sage, Exler's attorney, the county has consistently refused to add "sexual orientation" to the nondiscrimination clause in its contracts, even though the
union has sought such an addition in its bargaining. Sage letter, supra note 327.
330. No. 83 CP401315 (Ct. C.P. Columbia, S.C. Mar. 31, 1983).
331. The Advocate, June 26, 1984, at 16-18.
332. Id.

Published by eCommons, 1984

UNIVERSITY-OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 10:3

sue, an issue of especially high circulation.33 3 The article spoke of alleged recruiting violations, drug use, and the rumored lesbianism. Even
the most dispassionate observer could conclude that Parson's coaching
career was over. Throughout all these events, Parsons maintained that
she was not a lesbian and that her relationship with the live-in player,
Tina Buck, was merely a friendship.3 34 Parsons had accepted the South
Carolina firing until the Sports Illustrated article appeared. She sued
the magazine, owned by Time, Inc., for libel, invasion of privacy, and
intentional infliction of emotional harm.33 5
The case was heard in federal court before a jury. Lewis Cromer,
Parsons' lawyer, felt he was winning 338 until a surprise witness turned
the case into a lesbian soap opera. Volunteering herself to Time, Inc., a
lesbian bartender, Ms. DeLay, from Salt Lake City, Utah, testified
that she had seen Parsons and Buck many times after the suit was filed
in the bar where she worked. She further testified that the two women
danced together, hugged, and kissed. DeLay said she was motivated to
sy. DeLay
testify by what she saw as Parsons' dishonesty and hypocri
337
her.
with
dance
to
refused
had
Buck
that
did testify
Whatever the real facts, the jury chose to find for Time, Inc. 338
One could conclude the story was over. However, the judge who heard
the case called in the FBI sua sponte to check Parsons' -testimony to
see if she had lied when she said she had never been to the bar in Salt
Lake City. The FBI investigation apparently came to the conclusion
33 9
that Parsons had lied and perjury charges were filed against her. She
has recently pled guilty to those charges and currently faces a possible
jail term and fine.340 Parsons still steadfastly denies being a lesbian.
Questions fairly leap out. Would Sports Illustrated have published
such a sensational article about a heterosexual coach-player affair? Did
the magazine deliberately choose the article to sell the issue? Why after filing suit would the plaintiff risk going to gay bars? Lastly, what
would motivate one lesbian to turn on another so harshly?
D.

Teaching

Employment of gay persons as teachers in elementary schools and
high schools is still a very controversial issue. No other area of employ333.

See Lieber & Kirschenbaum, Stormy Weather at South Carolina, SPORTS ILLUS-

TRATED, Feb. 8, 1982, at 30-34, 37.

334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.

The Advocate, June 26, 1984, at 16-18.
Complaint at 1-2, Parsons, No. 83 CP401315.
Telephone interview with Lewis Cromer, Parsons' attorney (Dec. 6, 1984).
The Advocate, June 26, 1984, at 18-19.
Parsons, No. 83 CP4101315.
Letter from Lewis Cromer, Parson's attorney, to Rhonda R. Rivera (Dec. 10,, 1984).
Id.; see also Gay Community News, Jan. 5, 1985, at 2.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol10/iss3/3

1985]

SEXUAL ORIENTATION LAW

ment for gay people attracts such condemnation by the general public.
The reasons for such unease stem from common sterotypes and misconceptions. The stereotype of the lesbian or the gay man as a child molester has historically been used to ban gays from the teaching profession. However, statistics indicate that child molestation is not linked
with homosexuality and that heterosexual men are much more likely to
molest children than are gay men and lesbians combined.3 41 Another
reason often given for keeping gay persons out of the classroom is the
belief that a gay teacher could convert an otherwise heterosexual student into a gay student. But medical research has clearly demonstrated
that sexual orientation is well-established in an individual before he or
she reaches school age;3 42 thus, gay teachers simply cannot change the
sexual orientation of their students.
The final reason often given for the exclusion of gay persons from
teaching is that a gay person is an immoral role model. Such an approach labels all gays as immoral per se. Once so labeled, a gay person
becomes ineligible for teaching because teachers are supposed to be
positive role models for students. This final argument is based not on
conduct but on status: the gay person is excluded not for what he or she
does, but for who he or she is.
By definition, the exclusion of gay persons on the basis of "being
gay" depends upon the acquisition of knowledge that the teacher is
gay. Thus, the issue arises only when a teacher is discovered to be gay
or in some way reveals his or her homosexuality. When the teacher's
sexual orientation is not known, a presumption of heterosexuality ex-

341. "'[Scholarly data reveal that about eleven out of twelve pedophilic arrests involve
men with female minors--that is, are heterosexual crimes.' In all likelihood 'the adult heterosexual male constitutes a greater risk to the underage child than does the adult homosexual male.' "
Voeller, Society and the Gay Movement, in J. MARMOR, supra note 201, at 238 (citations
omitted).
342. [Piarents in our culture have fears with regard to their children becoming homosexual. These fears are easily stimulated by ignorant or malicious assertions that children
exposed to homosexual teachers (particularly if these teachers are popular and likeable)
are in danger of modeling themselves after such teachers and thus becoming homosexual
themselves. Yet there is not an iota of evidence for such assertions! As we have seen, the
etiology of homosexuality is affected by many factors, some possibly genetic or constitutional, others dependent on early familial relationships, still others deriving from sociocultural elements. People do not 'choose' to be homosexual any more than they 'choose' to be
heterosexual. In almost all instances, the basic factors that lead to a homosexual propensity
are established before the age of six, well before the school years even begin. That modeling is not a relevant factor, in any event, is indicated by the fact that all homosexuals come
from heterosexual families, and that the overwhelming majority of the 'models' they are
exposed to in our culture are heterosexual.
Overview: The Multiple Roots of Homosexual Behavior, in J. MARMOR, supra note 201, at 19-20
(citations omitted).
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ists. Being a "closet case," then, is acceptable. 4 3 A gay teacher who
keeps quiet and behaves clandestinely does not upset the presumption
of heterosexuality and is generally allowed to continue his or her career. But a gay teacher whose sexual orientation is either open or dis44
covered is regarded as an immoral role model and is discharged.
One could argue that such a system is inherently dysfunctional for
at least two reasons. First, persons who are forced to hide, and hence
live in fear of discovery, are not likely to be as healthy or productive as
persons who can be open about themselves.3 4 5 Second, the forced closeting of gay teachers ignores the fact that ten percent of students are
gay; 34 16 their sexual orientation was set long before school age and no
amount of heterosexual role modeling is going to change their basic
predisposition.34 Those students would benefit from positive gay role

343. One gay pattern common to all modern or 'emerging' nations is the closeting of
Gays into an underground *society. Apparently this shift from visibility to invisibility happens in the often centuries-long changeover from tribe to village to modern industrial state.
The compulsory hiddenness of Gay life is evident to Western Gay people. 'Being in the
closet,' that is, hidden, and 'coming out of the closet,' that is, being revealed, are expressions that have recently escaped from Gay slang into American pop culture as a result of
the impact that Gay writing, Gay mass demonstrations, and other Gay organizing endeavors have had on mass consciousness during the 1970's. At present the term 'closet' implies
a scandalous secret, or skeleton, in the family closet. In the case of a Gay person, it refers
more precisely to being the skeleton in the family's closet. That skeleton is the reality of
Gayness itself. The sometimes violent and always frightening suppression of Gay culture
often forces Gay people to live in the closet, in a secret world. And this suppression prevails
throughout the modern industrial world.
Living in the closet does not eliminate Gay sex or lifelong gay relationships, but it does
hide Gay culture from view, channeling it into a closely guarded and psychologically dangerous, though vital and lively, underground. Social suppression of Gay culture is reflected
in such statements as 'no one cares what you do in private, just don't flaunt it,' that is,
don't express it, make it public. But without flaunting there is no culture; there is only the
initiation of heterosexual culture and the illusion that only one culture exists. Closets exist
to maintain this illusion.
J. GRAHN, supra note 8, at 23.
344. See, e.g., Rowland v. Mad River Local School Dist., 730 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1373 (1985).
345. See B. BERZON & R. LEIGHTON, POSITIVELY GAY, 1-14, 88-100 (1979); Freedman,
supra note 313, at 31-32.
346. See supra note 5.
347. Thus the 'model' of a popular homosexual teacher can never 'cause' homosexuality
to develop in any child of either sex whose programming, both biologically and developmentally, is proceeding along heterosexual lines. The only effect that exposure to homosexual teachers can have on heterosexual children (assuming the teachers' sexual orientations
become known) is to create more tolerance and understanding toward homosexuals as people, and to dispel the wide-spread prejudicial myths about them, thus reducing potential
homophobia. As for that small percentage of children who for prior developmental reasons
are already struggling with homosexual feelings, with all the guilt and self-hatred attendant upon such feelings in our culture, a role-model with whom they can identify in a positive way can only help them to feel better about themselves and thus contribute to their
mental health. In both instances, the basic effect is a positive one rather than a negative
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models so that they can become healthy, productive citizens. However,
the idea of a healthy gay role model is anathema to persons who believe gay persons are per se immoral and conclude that no gay person
can ever be healthy. As long as this viewpoint controls the local school
systems, excellent teachers will be barred or ousted from the teaching
profession.34 8 The legal landscape is already cluttered with the names
of excellent teachers so discarded; Gaylord, 349 Burton, 350 and
Acanfora 351 are among the most famous.
In the early eighties, not many cases emerged involving gay teachers. Most teachers eschewed the gay limelight and remained firmly
closeted. However, the few cases that did arise presented important and
interesting issues. For example, the United States Supreme Court recently refused to hear the important case of Rowland v. Mad River
School District.3 52 The plaintiff, Marge Rowland, was a guidance
counselor in a southern Ohio school system. 53 Two gay students consulted Rowland in her capacity as counselor.3 54 Rowland informed a
secretary at the school of the nature of the students' concern. 5 5 In a
separate and unrelated private conversation, Rowland also told the secretary that she had fallen in love with a woman and characterized herself as a "bisexual. 3 56 These confidences turned out to be misplaced, as
Rowland's supervisors soon learned of both statements.3 57 When her

one.
J. MARMOR, supra note 201, at 20. See also A. FRICKE, REFLECTIONS OF A ROCK LOBSTER,

(1981), describing one young man's story about "growing up gay." Fricke sued to be allowed to
take a boyfriend to the prom. Fricke's case will be discussed in Part I1of this article in a section
on Public Forums.
348. R. RUBINSTEIN & P. FRY, OF A HOMOSEXUAL TEACHER, 88-92 (1981).
349. See Gaylord v. Tacoma School Dist. No. 10, 88 Wash. 2d 286, 559 P.2d 1340, cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977); Gaylord v. Tacoma School Dist. No. 10, 85 Wash. 2d 348, 535 P.2d
804 (1975). For a discussion of the Gaylord case, see Rivera 1, supra note I, at 871-73.
350. See Burton v. Cascade School Dist., 512 F.2d 850 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
839 (1975). For a discussion of the Burton case, see Rivera 1,supra note 1,at 870-71.
351. Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 359 F. Supp. 843 (D. Md. 1973), aid on other grounds,
491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974).
352. Rowland, 730 F.2d 444, cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1373.
353. Rowland, 730 F.2d at 446.
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. Ms. Rowland used the term "bisexual" meaning for her that she could "as easily fall
in love with a woman as a man." Record at 319, cited in Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 7, Rowland, 730 F.2d 444. Although Ms. Rowland characterized her sexual orientation as "bisexual," in
effect the issue was homosexuality. The U.S. District Court dismissed Rowland's suit sua sponte
because "[i]t is now clear ... that there is no constitutional right to engage in homosexual activity." Rowland v. Mad River School Dist., No. 77-3516, slip op. at 2 (S.D. Ohio 1977), vacated
and remanded, 615 F.2d 1362'(6th Cir. 1980).
357. Rowland, 730 F.2d at 446.
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58
supervisors called Rowland in and urged her to resign, she refused.
Subsequently, Rowland talked to fellow teachers, told them that she
was being forced to leave because she was bisexual, and asked them for
36 0
Testitheir support.35 9 Shortly thereafter, Rowland was suspended.
the
that
told
been
had
board
school
the
that
revealed
trial
mony at the
members
staff
some
told
had
Rowland
suspension came about because
of her sexual orientation. 3 1 At the time of the suspension, no school
official had any evidence that Rowland's revelations had any effect on
the functioning of the school. 36 Moreover, no student or parent knew
of her sexual predilictions. Lastly, no conduct on Rowland's part was of
concern or at issue. 63
Immediately after her suspension, Marge Rowland brought suit in
federal court against the school board and the school administrators,
alleging that her suspension violated the United States Constitution
and Ohio law. 364 The district court issued a preliminary injunction
36 5 Rowland was reagainst the school and ordered Rowland reinstated.
assigned to a newly created position without student contact and was
6 6 After her return to work,
ordered to create a special curriculum.
Rowland was formally evaluated by the principal and subsequently was
not recommended for renewal. 6 7 The school board unanimously
adopted the recommendation, and, without an independent recommen36 8
dation, did not renew Rowland's contract for the following year.
Rowland responded by filing a second suit, claiming that her transfer to
a nonguidance position and her nonrenewal on the basis of her sexual
orientation 6 9 violated the United States Constitution. The basis of her
suit, as was her earlier suit, was section 1983.370
In June of 1976, the district court granted partial summary judgment in the first lawsuit to the defendants, dismissing all of Rowland's
causes of action except one. 371 The one remaining issue was Rowland's
claim that she had been suspended solely because of her sexual orienta-

358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Record at 630, cited in Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 12, Rowland, 730 F.2d 444.
Id.
Id. at 13.
Rowland, 730 F.2d at 446.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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tion, in violation of her constitutional rights. 7 2 This claim was consolidated with the claims of the second suit. 73 Then, in August of 1977,
the district court sua sponte dismissed all of Rowland's remaining
claims. 37 4 The district court stated that sexual orientation was not constitutionally protected. 75
The dismissal was appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals,
which vacated the district court's order3. 7 The Sixth Circuit's action is
important because its reasoning indicates the state of the law in 1980,
at least from the Sixth Circuit's viewpoint. In an unpublished decision,
the court stated:
In view of the fact that neither the Supreme Court of the United States
nor this court has ruled on the precise issues raised in this case, related
to the reason for non-hiring, the court concluded that dismissal of this
action without development of any of the circumstances surrounding the
3 77
decision of the defendants was improper.

Thus, according to the Sixth Circuit, the issue of whether sexual orientation discrimination is unconstitutional is still open.
The case continued on a different route than most. Upon remand
to the district court, the case went to a federal magistrate who conducted a jury trial on the issues.37 8 Moreover, the magistrate submitted
to the jury a series of special verdict questions.3 79 The answers to these
questions were not what one might expect from a jury in southern
Ohio.3 80 The jury found that Rowland's statements with regard to her
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. Rowland v. Mad River Local School Dist., No. 77-3516, slip op. at 2 (S.D. Ohio
1977).
375. Id.
376. Rowland v. Mad River Local School Dist., 615 F.2d 1362, slip op. at 1-2 (6th Cir.
1980).
377. Id. at 2.
378. Rowland, 730 F.2d at 447.
379. See id. at 456-60.
380. Joan Black, one of Rowland's attorneys, described the jury strategy as follows:
This case is significant because it was won before a Dayton, Ohio jury drawn from
conservative counties, in an era of increasing repression, especially in the area of gay and
reproductive rights. Our trial strategy became a crucial factor in determining the outcome.
To begin with, we had a community attitude survey conducted by members of the Midwest
Office of the National Jury Project. This was funded by the National Education Association, which has been supporting Rowland's case from the beginning. This provided insight
into what to include in voir dire and what evidence to stress at trial. The assistance of
another Jury Project staffer, during voir dire and the first two days of trial, proved
invaluable.
Perhaps the most important factor was the voir dire. We are fortunate to live in a
district where most judges allow attorney conducted voir dire, and Magistrate Steinberg
followed this procedure. He also granted our motion for expanded small-group voir dire,
due to the sensitive nature of the subject matter involved.
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bisexuality did not "in any way interfere with the proper performance
of. . . [her] duties or with the regular operation of the school generally."' 8 1 The jury further found that her suspension, transfer, and non3 82 and that none of these actions
renewal were caused by her speech
would have occurred "if Ms. Rowland had not been bisexual and if she
38 3 However, the
had not told . . . [others] of her sexual preference.
jury also found that Rowland had acted improperly3 84in telling the secretary of the sexual orientation of the two students.
Based on the jury's findings, the magistrate entered a judgment
8
with damages in favor of Rowland. ' In holding that Rowland should
not have been treated differently than heterosexual employees solely
because she was homosexual or bisexual, the magistrate recognized
3 86
that there is a right to equal protection based on sexual orientation.
Moreover, the magistrate found that the school system had abridged
Rowland's first amendment right to freedom of speech without showing
3 8 7 According to the
a compelling state interest to justify its actions.
magistrate's opinion, Rowland was suspended, transferred, and
nonrenewed solely because of her speech, and the school system failed
38 8
At
to demonstrate how that speech interfered with school operations.
the end of his opinion, the magistrate waxed poetic, stating that "Apparently the jury felt, as does the Court, that in our public educational
there is room for the 'free spirit,' the unconventional persystem .
son who marches to the beat of 'a different drummer.' "1389 The magistrate concluded that a person "has a constitutional right to be
different."3 90
The Sixth Circuit apparently disagreed, and in a two-to-one deci3 91 The court held that Rowsion reversed the lower court's holding.

In addition, our client was very straight-forward. The insinuations and innuendos of
were met by Rowland's honest, candid replies. The defense provided no
defendants
the
students or co-workers to refute witnesses' testimony that Rowland had been a good counselor whom students trusted.
Black, Trial Strategy, II GUILD NOTES 19 (Jan./Feb. 1982).
381. Rowland, 730 F.2d at 456.
382. Id. at 457-58.
383. Id. at 460.
384. Id. See also id. at 450.
385. Rowland v. Mad River Local School Dist., No. c-3-75-125 (S.D. Ohio judgment entry
Oct. 19, 1981).
386. Rowland v. Mad River Local School Dist., No. c-3-75-125, slip. op. at 4-5 (S.D. Ohio
filed Oct. 22, 1981).
387. Id. at 5-7.
388. Id.
389. Id. at 12-13.
390. Id. at 13.
391. Rowland, 730 F.2d 444.
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land's statements were not protected speech.3 92 The statements, the
court concluded were not "matters of public concern;" instead, Rowland was speaking only "as an employee upon matters of personal interest. '393 The court also easily disposed of the equal protection claim,
holding that the jury verdict and the magistrate's decision left an ambiguous area.3 91 According to the court, the school board had a "permissible" reason to discharge Rowland, namely her improper revelation
of the students' sexual orientation.39 The school board, the court continued, could have violated the constitution only if Rowland's nonrenewal was motivated by a constitutionally impermissible reason.396 The
Sixth Circuit found that that jury's special verdict did not really answer the question of the reason for Rowland's nonrenewal clearly, but
rather than remand the case, the court settled the issue itself.3 9 7 The
court concluded that the equal protection issue was not properly submitted to the jury39 8 because Rowland had presented no evidence of
how similarly situated heterosexual persons had been treated. 99
Judge Edwards issued a strongly worded dissent: "I find no language in the Constitution of the United States which excludes citizens
who are bisexual or homosexual from its protection, and particularly of
the protection of the first and fourteenth amendments thereto."4 "
Judge Edwards found that Rowland's speech was protected speech in
that what she said became a matter of "public concern" and part of the
national "debate on homosexuality and the rights or lack thereof of
homosexuals."4 1 He further determined that Rowland had presented a
genuine equal protection claim, offering the following analogy:
[A]ssume . . . the disclosure had been by a teacher whose appearance
was consistent with the majority race status, but who revealed she had a
black parent. If community protest in this rural southwestern Ohio
county had convinced the principal and school board to non-renew that
teacher, would there be any doubt about whether or not this was . . . a
case for federal constitutional remedy.' 02
Judge Edwards dismissed the majority's lack of evidence argument by
pointing out that the jury had found that but for her bisexuality Row392.
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.

Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id.

449.
449-50.
450.

452.
453.
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0
land would not have been suspended, transferred, or nonrenewed.'
The jury,4 according to Judge Edwards, had ample evidence for its
40
finding.
In Judge Edwards' estimation, the majority opinion treated the
case "sub silentio, as if it involved only a single person and a sick one
at that-in short, that plaintiff's admission of homosexual status was
sufficient in itself to justify her termination." 40 5 The judge then urged
the court to take judicial notice of two facts. The first is that "homosexuality is not a mental disease . . .[and] the second is the extent of
6
homosexuality in the United States."'40 While Judge Edwards' words
may warm the hearts of gay legal experts, it must be remembered that
they are only the words of a dissenting judge.
The Rowland case is important for a'number of reasons. First,
community disapproval of gay teachers is a widespread assumption, one
which may underlie the actions of school boards. Yet in Rowland, a
jury in a rather rural section of Ohio found in favor of a bisexual
teacher. Perhaps communities are more tolerant than their officials
know. Second, the Sixth Circuit's decision in Rowland carefully
avoided addressing the issue of whether discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation is constitutionally permissible. By some fast and
fancy legal footwork, the court found other reasons to deny Margy
Rowland relief.'0 7 This approach was particularly unwarranted in light
of the magistrate's decision, which squarely faced the sexual orientation issue. 0 8 Perhaps judges in the 1980's cannot rationally endorse
discrimination against gay persons, but are nonetheless unable to put
aside their personal feelings and tolerate a gay person's victory. Third,
Rowland is interesting because, when the Sixth Circuit sent the case
back to the district court, the court of appeals stated that the issue of
the constitutionality of sexual orientation discrimination had not been
decided.'0 9 After seven years in the court system and a plethora of decisions, the issue remains undecided.'1

403. Id. at 454.
404. Id.
405. Id.
406. Id. at 454-56.
407. See id. at 449-52.
408. Id. at 448.
409. See Rowland v. Mad River Local School Dist., 105 S. Ct. 1373 (1985). Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall dissented to the denial of certiorari noting that the case "raises
important constitutional questions regarding the rights of public employees to maintain and exdissenting). He concluded that,
press their private sexual preferences." Id. at 1373 (Brennan, J.,
"[b]ecause determination of the appropriate constitutional analysis to apply in such a case continues to puzzle lower courts," certiorari should be granted. Id.
410. The saga of Marge Rowland since she was nonrenewed is an interesting one. During
the time period when she was awaiting a final decision, Marge Rowland went to law school, grad-
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The Rowland case is significant in yet another respect. The great
bulk of Rowland's counsel fees were paid by the National Educational
Association," which has taken a very strong position supporting the
right of gay persons to teach.4 2 This support was demonstrated in the
following two cases, in which the local teaching association provided
legal counsel to the gay teacher.4 1 3

uated and became a member of the Ohio Bar in February, 1981. The day after she received her
damage award from Magistrate Steinberg she was indicted for welfare fraud. She is defending on
the basis of selective enforcement. Black, supra note 380, at 19.
411. See Rowland, 730 F.2d at 445.
412. Resolutions of the National Education Association are as follows:
H-14 Civil Rights
The National Education Association is committed to the achievement of a totally integrated society and calls upon Americans to eliminate by statute and practice barriers of
race, color, national origin, religion, sex, sexual orientation, age, handicap, marital status,
and economic status that prevent some individuals, adult or juvenile, from exercising rights
enjoyed by others, including liberties decreed in common law, the Constitution, and statutes of the United States. Civil order and obedience to the law must be ensured without
abridgement of human and civil rights. Individuals, adult or juvenile, must be assured a
speedy and fair judicial process with free legal counsel for those in need. To be effective
citizens, individuals must be trained and aided in developing strategies and expertise that
will enable them to operate effectively in a democratic society.
E-23 Nondiscriminatory Personnel Policies/Affirmative Action
The National Education Association believes that personnel policies and practices
must guarantee that no person be employed, retained, paid, dismissed, suspended, removed,
transferred, or retired because of race, color, national origin, religious beliefs, residence,
physical disability, -political activities, professional association activity, age, marital- status,
family relationship, sex, or sexual orientation.
The Association urges the development and implementation of affirmative action plans
and procedures that will encourage employment of women in administrative positions, minorities at all levels, and men in the classroom at the elementary and preschool levels.
It may be necessary to give preference in recruitment, hiring, retention, and promotion
policies to certain racial groups or women or men to overcome past discrimination. (citations omitted).
Letter from Michael D. Simpson, staff counsel, National Education Association, to Rhonda R.
Rivera (Jan. 7, 1985) (discussing NEA policy).
413. See also Ferndale Educ. Ass'n v. School Dist., 67 Mich. App. 645, 242 N.W.2d 481
(1976), a case in which a local education association represented a teacher who might have been
gay. The teacher, who was hired for the first time by the school board, was required to submit to a
"pre-employment" physical before beginning work. In the doctor's report were
the following
words: "'4F Army for (?) & homosexuality details not known .... History nervousness and
psychiatric Rx due to homosexuality.'" Id. at 647, 242 N.W.2d at 483. As a consequence of this
report, the teacher was terminated. Id. The teacher and the Ferndale Education Association
(FEA) filed a grievance; the school board maintained that the teacher had never become an employee because successfully passing the exam was a prerequisite to employment. Id. The arbitrator
found that the teacher was an employee and was entitled to a hearing on the matter of his dismissal. Id. The school board ignored the arbitrator's decision, and the teacher and the FEA sought
mandamus from the court. Id. The lower court denied the writ and an appeal was taken to the
court of appeals. Id. at 648, 242 N.W.2d at 483. The Court of Appeals remanded to the trial
court because the trial court had made its decision without any record. However, the court of
appeals said that the teacher deserved a hearing whether he was an employee or not because
"allegations of homosexuality and resultant dismissal" could seriously jeopardize
the teacher's
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In re C."4 involved a teacher who was represented by the Washington Education Association. The case is set in an interesting context
because Washington's state supreme court had earlier upheld the dismissal of a gay teacher, James Gaylord.' 1 5 As a result of the Gaylord
case, many teachers' unions in Washington have bargained for a "privacy clause" in their contracts. The Evergreen School District had
adopted a clause which read: "The private and personal life of any employee is not within the appropriate concern or attention of the
Board."' 1 6 In a hearing to determine whether the firing of a gay
teacher had violated the contract, the hearing officer held that, by
agreeing to the privacy clause, the school board had contracted away
any right to fire employees merely because of their gay status. 1 "
If the school board had so restricted itself, how did the issue even
arise? The teacher in question, a female physical education teacher,
had been rumored to be a lesbian long before her dismissal. These rumors were exacerbated by a new policy requiring that female students
strip before taking their mandatory shower. 41 8 The showering policy
was highly unpopular. A number of students claimed that having to be
undressed before the teacher in question made them uncomfortable because she was rumored to be gay.
Because of these rumors, the school administrators met with the
teacher and strongly suggested that her female roommate not visit the
campus in the future. The roommate had previously attended games
and dropped in at the teacher's office. The issue came to a head when
another teacher claimed to have seen the teacher and her roommate in
an affectionate embrace of twenty to thirty seconds duration at 7:30
a.m. in a parked car in the school parking lot. Shortly thereafter, several parents wrote letters that referred to the teacher in the context of
between the students. The Evergreen School Board dishomosexuality
4 9
C.
missed
C., represented by her union, protested and the matter was heard

employment prospects. Id. at 652, 242 N.W.2d at 485.
414. (Jan. 31, 1984) (Bratt, arb.). The name of the teacher was revealed in a newspaper
article in The Advocate, April 17, 1984, at 73, and is used in the opinions which are on file with
the author. However, the teacher's attorney asked that privacy be maintained because of the students and teacher involved. Lambda LDEF, which is providing consultation services to the Washington Education Association, titles the case as it appears in this text.
415. See Gaylord, 85 Wash. 2d 248, 535 P.2d 804; Rivera 1, supra note 1, at 871-73;
Rivera II, supra note I, at 319 n.63.
416. In re C., slip. op. at 22 (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law by Hearing Officer
entered Jan. 31, 1984).
417. Id. at 23.
418. Id. at 7-9.
419. Id. at 8-9, 14-16.
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by an administrative law judge. Although the judge held against the
teacher, he made a number of interesting findings. With regard to the
showering situation, which the school board made central to its case,
the judge found that "the allegations of the impropriety of a locker
room being supervised by an alleged homosexual do not meet a level

which support a discharge of a teacher ..

"..
,20

The judge indicated

that this finding was based in part on the testimony about homosexuality presented by expert witnesses on behalf of the teacher.42 1
At the hearing, evidence was introduced which showed that three
students of the teacher had been engaged in homosexual affairs with
other students. However, evidence also showed that the teacher neither
knew about nor was involved with the affairs in any way. The judge
found that the role of C. in the lives of these students was not such that
her absence "would have 'tipped the balance' and prevented either...
4 22
from engaging in homosexual acts.
Nonetheless, the judge did find the presence of C. had "some influence on the creation of a climate that might have made the homosexual
relationship of the students . . .more acceptable." 23 In addition, the
judge held that the school district had a "significant interest in and
responsibility for the atmosphere created by the acts and statements of
its teaching staff. '4 24 How did this justify the dismissal of the teacher?
According to the evidence, C. had told one student that she was a lesbian, mentioned to another student how difficult it was to get out of
bed while her roommate was still in bed, and lastly, told at least two
students that she did not believe that anyone could get fired because of
their sexual preference. The teacher flatly denied making these statements, yet the judge held that not only had she made the statements,
but also that such statements were unacceptable and unprofessional.
The judge found that the statements affected her ability to teach because they created "a climate of acceptability or condonation of sexual
practices by students who might look to staff members for confirmation
of their own sexual identities and/or orientation, and for approval of
their sexual behavior. 4 25 The judge found that two of the three students had had significant homosexual experiences before the incidents
described in the hearing, that they continued to have such experiences
after the hearing, and that they were "prone towards a significant ho-

420.
421.
422.
423.
424.
425.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

10.
10.
18.
19.
18.
19.

Published by eCommons, 1984

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 10:3

mosexual orientation. 4 26 Yet, somehow, C. was held responsible for
the sexual behavior of these students. Her alleged statements, coupled
with the alleged embrace, were sufficient cause in the judge's mind to
justify the discharge. 4 27 The privacy clause in the contract did not pro428
tect the teacher because it did not protect acts on campus.
During the hearing, C. labeled herself as bisexual. The judge
found that the school district had failed to demonstrate that the
teacher's sexual orientation "in and of itself constitutes sufficient cause
[for] discharge. '"429 This favorable statement was heavily influenced by
430
However, the judge also
the expert testimony given on behalf of C.
and a university setting,
Seattle
from
came
experts
noted that all the
and commented that perhaps homosexuality was more accepted in that
431 The
area than it was in Evergreen,' which was a more rural area.
judge agreed that a local school board had a right to set its own standards for its employees, and opined that one of the drawbacks of work4 32 The teacher aping for Evergreen was its conservative standards.
pealed the administrative decision to a trial court and also instituted a
separate suit against the school district for violation of her civil
4 33
rights.
The Evergreen case raised the role model issue rather clearly, but
failed to consider that a homosexual person might be a positive role
model. Also clearly ignored is the question of whether heterosexual
create an "atmosphere" that encourages students'
teachers 43may
4
sexuality.
Another case involving representation by the teachers' association
raised much more delicate issues. Gay rights litigators are always looking for the perfect case with the perfect client, one whose behavior is so
exemplary that bigots cannot successfully raise a pretext to justify discriminatory action.435 Unfortunately, Ross v. Springfield School Dis-

426. Id. at 18.
427. Id. at 16.
428. Id. at 16.
429. Id. at I1.
430. In re C., slip op. at 3-4 (Memorandum Opinion of Hearing Officer entered Jan. 31,
1984).
431. Id.
432. Id.
433. Telephone interview with Ms. C's attorney, Faith Hanna, of the Washington Education Association (Jan. 24, 1985).
434. For example, would teachers who were "avowed" heterosexuals be responsible for an
atmosphere in which teenage pregnancies occurred?
435. Compare Matlovich v. Secretary of the Air Force, 591 F.2d 852, 854 n.4 (D.C. Cir.
1978) (where the plaintiff was a perfect client), with Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (where a less than perfect client committed sexual acts in the barracks).
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trict... is far from the perfect case because of the behavior involved.
Frank Ross was a librarian in two elementary schools in the Springfield
School District.4 " He went to Eugene, Oregon, the closest large city.43 8
While there, he went to an adult bookstore, entered a cubicle with another man, locked the door, and engaged in sexual conduct with his
companion.4 9 The bookstore, which was being set up for a raid, was
under surveillance by police officers.4 40 One officer stood on the shoulders of another police officer, peered over the seven-foot walls of the
cubicle and observed Ross.441 In the abatement and nuisance suit
brought against the bookstore, Ross was subpoenaed, 44 although, as it
turned out, he never had to testify, nor was he ever prosecuted.4 43 The
district attorney determined that Ross had committed no crime because, under the statute, the bookstore was not a "public" place. 44 '
Ross's mistake came about when he honestly told his principal why he
needed the morning off to answer the subpoena. 4 5 Word of Ross's involvement in the nuisance suit spread quickly among school officials
and eventually reached parents, although Ross's name was not published in newspaper accounts of the incident. Parents phoned the
school, expressing their objections to Ross's life-style, that is, his
446
homosexuality.
On March 27, 1979, the Springfield school district superintendent
filed a complaint with the Teachers Standards and Practices Commission, seeking to have Ross's teaching license revoked on the grounds of
"gross unfitness.""' 44 The commission refused to revoke Ross's license,
finding a lack of probable cause.44 8 Then, on January 14, 1980, the
school board dismissed Ross for "inefficiency, immorality, and gross
unfitness.' 4 9 Ross appealed to the Fair Dismissal Appeals Board, as
was required under the Oregon statute.450 The board dismissed the

436. Ross v. Springfield School Dist. No. 19, 56 Or. App. 197, 641 P.2d 600 (1982), rev'd,
294 Or. 357, 657 P.2d 188 (1982), on remand, 71 Or. App. 111, 691 P.2d 509 (1984).
437. Ross, 56 Or. App. at -,
641 P.2d at 502.
438.
439.
440.

Id.
Id.
Id.

441.

Id.

442.
443.
444.
445.
446.
447.

Id. at -,
Id.
Ross, 71
Ross, 56
Ross, 71
Ross, 56

448.

Id.

449.
450.

Id.
Id. at 202, 641 P.2d at 604.

641 P.2d at 603.
Or.
Or.
Or.
Or.

App. -, 691 P.2d at
App. at 200, 641 P.2d
App. at -,
691 P.2d
App. at 200, 641 P.2d
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charge of inefficiency for lack of evidence, 4 5' but upheld Ross's dismissal for gross unfitness and immorality. 52
Ross appealed the board's decision to the Oregon Court of Appeals, which upheld the board's decision.4 53 On appeal to the Oregon
54
Supreme Court, however, the appeal's court's ruling was reversed.
The Oregon Supreme Court held that the Fair Dismissal Appeals
Board was bound by the holding of the Teacher Standards and Practices Commission that Ross was not "grossly unfit. '4 55 On the issue of
"immorality," the court remanded the issue back to the Fair Dismissal
Appeals Board, because the board had not articulated a standard
against which to judge Ross's behavior. " "
On remand, the Fair Dismissal Appeals Board had little trouble
finding a standard that justified Ross's termination. 5 7 In the rehearing,
the board found that Ross was indeed "immoral," enunciating a new
standard for immorality: "to constitute immorality . . . [the sexual
conduct] must violate either the moral standards of the school commu'
nity or the moral standards of the people of the State of Oregon. "458
The board also said that a teacher must have actual or constructive
notice that the behavior is immoral, and that constructive notice can be
inferred when the conduct is universally condemned.4 59 The board
in sexual intercourse pubfound that Ross's behavior-"engaging
46 0
licly"-was universally condemned.
Ross appealed the board's decision to the Oregon Court of Appeals. 4 6 The main issue on appeal was whether the conduct in question
was in "public." The court of appeals upheld the board, employing a
dictionary definition of "public": " 'inpublic; in a manner observable
by or a place accessible to the public.' "462 The court reasoned that "a
person in an adjoining booth could readily look under the walls and,
with some assistance, could look over them. '463 Moreover, the person 4in
4
the next booth, the court stated, could see through the "glory hole.
Ross, according to the majority, involuntarily took the risk of being

451.
452.
453.
454.
455.
456.
457.
458.
459.
460.
461.
462.
463.
464.

Id.
Id.
Ross, 56 Or. App. 197, 641 P.2d 600 (1982).
Ross, 294 Or. 357, 657 P.2d 188 (1982).
Id. at 362, 657 P.2d at 193.
id. at 363, 657 P.2d at 194.
Ross, 71 Or. App. at -_,691 P.2d at 511.
Id.
Gay Community News, Feb. 2, 1983, at 12.
Ross, 71 Or. App. at -, 691 P.2d at 511 (emphasis added).
Ross, 71 Or. App. at -, 691 P.2d 509 (1984).
Id. at -, 691 P.2d at 512.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
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observed "in a place where he either knew or should have known that
he could not expect complete privacy."4 65 In a footnote, the court
stated categorically that the fact that the sexual activity in question
was homosexual rather than heterosexual "plays no role in our
analysis.' 66
Judy Gillette dissented, calling the case "the stuff of which personal tragedies are made. '467 Judge Gillette found that Ross's activities
were not public, for the reality was that the bookstore was totally
adapted for sexual use; it was "a place for private viewing of sexually
explicit films and for private sexual activity.' 6 8 Gillette noted that the
Oregon Supreme Court had found an expectation of privacy in a toilet
stall and reasoned that one should have a far greater expectation of
privacy in the book store cubicle. 4' 9 Gillette concluded that Ross was
"being punished not for having engaged in sexual activity publicly, but
for having engaged in homosexual activity that eventually became public.' 7 0 The judge stated that, in his personal opinion, neither
the Fair
Dismissal Appeals Board nor the court were willing to say that homosexuality per se is immoral. However, they were willing to "strain" the
language of the statute to justify the dismissal of a teacher whose homosexuality became public. 4 71 This behavior resembles the majority
opinion in Rowland; Judge Gillette, like Judge Edwards, tried to deal
directly with the issue. 7 2
The Oregon Teachers Association represented Ross through its
general counsel. The latest opinion of the Oregon Court of Appeals will
be appealed to the Oregon Supreme Court with the hope that the highest court will find Judge Gillette's dissent persuasive. 7 3
Gay rights cases have not, however, fared well before courts of last
resort. One of the most striking examples of the reluctance of the judiciary to determine substantive gay rights issues is the recent decision of
the United States Supreme Court in National Gay Task Force v.
Board of Education.47 This case was the first case involving gay rights

465.
466.
467.
468.

Id.
Id. at -, n.6, 691 P.2d at 513 n.6.
Id. at -, 691 P.2d at 513 (Gillette, J., dissenting).
Id. at -, 691 P.2d at 513 (Gillette, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
469. Id.
470. Id.
471. Id. at __,691 P.2d at 514.
472. See Rowland, 730 F.2d at 452 (Edwards, J., dissenting); supra notes 351-55 and accompanying text.
473. Letter from Robert D. Durham, Ross's attorney, to Rhonda R. Rivera (Dec. 4, 1984).
474. National Gay Task Force v. Board of Educ., 729 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1984), affid
mere. by an equally divided Court, 105 S. Ct. 1858 (1985).
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47 6
to reach the Supreme Court on its merits 475 since Boutilier in 1967.
The case arose as a consequence of a law enacted by the Oklahoma
The law was modeled after the Briggs initiative
legislature in 1978.
was on the California ballot in 1978.478 The
which
6),
(Proposition
Briggs initiative was defeated by the voters of California after an intensive campaign.47 9 The general purpose of both the California initiative
persons and supportand the Oklahoma legislation was to exclude gay
480
profession.
teaching
the
from
rights
gay
of
ers
The Oklahoma statute used two key definitions. The first, "public
homosexual activity," was defined as "the commission of an act defined
in Section 886 of Title 21 of the Oklahoma Statutes, if such act is: a)
committed with a person of the same sex, and b) indiscreet and not
practiced in private. '48 1 Section 886 set out Oklahoma's version of "the
detestable and abominable crime against nature. "482
The second key definition, "Public homosexual conduct, (as distinguished from activity) was defined as "advocating, soliciting, imposing,
encouraging or promoting public or private homosexual activity in a
manner that creates a substantial risk that such conduct will come to
"483 The statthe attention of school children or school employees ....

475. See Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd
mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976); People v. Uplinger, 58 N.Y.2d 936, 447 N.E.2d 62, 460 N.Y.S.2d
514 (1983), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 104 S. Ct 2332 (1984).
476. Boutilier v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 363 F.2d 488 (2d Cir. 1966), aff'd,
387 U.S. 118 (1967) (holding that by using the term "psychopathic personality" the Congress
intended to exclude homosexual persons from entry into the United States).
477. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 6-103.15 (Supp. 1978); see also National Gay Task Force,
729 F.2d at 1272.
478. L. CANNON, REAGAN 132-33 (1982) (noted in The Advocate, Oct. 14, 1982, at 10.)
479. Id. Larry Berner won a $10,000 settlement from Senator Briggs, the author of the
initiative (Proposition 6) in a suit charging libel, slander, and invasion of privacy. Berner, a second
grade teacher, infiltrated the Briggs campaign and wrote an expose for a gay newspaper. Subsequently, Senator Briggs in his campaign speeches referred to Berner as the kind of person who
should not be allowed to teach and insinuated that Berner had sex with his students. See The
Advocate, October 28, 1982, at 7.
480. See The After Hours Question, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 21, 1985, at 68.
481. OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 6-103.15(A)(1)(a), (b). See National Gay Task Force, 729
F.2d at 1272.
482. The Oklahoma statute states that: "every person who is guilty of the detestable and
abominable crime against nature, committed with mankind or with beast, is punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary not exceeding ten (10) years." OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 886 (1971). See
National Gay Task Force, 729 F.2d at 1273. It should be noted that this statute makes private
homosexual or heterosexual sodomy criminal. Sodomy in Oklahoma includes copulation between
two females, see Warner v. State, 489 P.2d 526 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971), heterosexual acts, see
LeFavour v. State, 77 Okla.Crim. 383, 142 P.2d 132 (1943), and oral sex, see Ex parte De Ford,
14 Okla. Crim. 133, 168 P. 58 (1917). In Oklahoma, the consenting partner is an accomplice. See
Hopper v. State, 302 P.2d 162 (Okla. Crim. App. 1956).
483. OKLA. STAT. tit 70, § 6-103.15(A)(2) (Supp. 1978). See National Gay Task Force,
729 F.2d at 1272.
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ute provided that a teacher could be refused employment or discharged
if "the teacher. . . has engaged in public homosexual conduct or activity; and [h]as been rendered unfit, because of such conduct or activity,
to hold a position as a teacher . .
84 Unfitness was determined by
considering the following factors: "[t]he likelihood that the activity or
conduct may adversely affect students or school employees; [t]he proximity in time or place of the activity or conduct to the teacher's . . .
official duties; [a]ny extenuating or aggravating circumstances; and
[w]hether the conduct or activity is of a repeated or continuing nature
which tends to encourage or dispose school children toward similar conduct or activity."' 85
The statute was challenged in federal district court by the National Gay Task Force (NGTF). The effect of the statute was so initially "chilling" that no gay teachers in Oklahoma were willing to be
the plaintiff. 486 Hence, NGTF challenged the statute, representing its
members in Oklahoma who were teachers.4 8 7 At the trial court level,
the court found that although the statute did reach protected speech, it
was nevertheless constitutional. 488 The court read into the statute a
"material and substantial disruption test. 4 89
At the appellate level, the Tenth Circuit found the section of the
law which dealt with public homosexual activity to be constitutional;
however, the section of the law which allowed teachers to be dismissed
for public homosexual conduct was found unconstitutional. 490 The court
found that no "constitutional problem" existed in firing a teacher who
engaged in "public homosexual activity," 49 1 however, the dismissal of a
teacher on the grounds of public homosexual conduct did present a
constitutional problem. 492 The court held that mere advocacy, even of

484. OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 6-103.15(B)(1), (2) (Supp. 1978) (emphasis added). See National Gay Task Force, 729 F.2d at 1272.
485. OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 6-103.15(C)(1),(2),(3),(4) (Supp. 1978). See National Gay
Task Force, 729 F.2d at 1272.
486. The Advocate, March 30, 1981, at 9. The Advocate reported that the NGTF was
seeking an employee of the Oklahoma City School District to test the law. Id. At the trial court
level, a teacher was for a short time a coplaintiff. Id.
487. Id.
488. National Gay Task Force, 729 F.2d at 1272.
489. Id.
490. Id. at 1273-75.
491. Id. at 1273. The court rejected the plaintiff's privacy arguments as irrelevant since the
statute did not punish private acts. Id. The court also rejected the equal protection argument
made by the plaintiff on the basis that sexual orientation was not a suspect class. Id. Therefore,
using something less than a strict scrutiny test, the court stated that "[slurely a school may fire a
teacher for engaging in an indiscreet public act of oral or anal intercourse." Id. (citations
omitted).
492. Id. at 1273-75.
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illegal conduct, was protected by the first amendment. 43 The court also
found that the words "encouraging and promoting" were similar to
"advocating," and thus, were also protected speech. 4 The court recognized that the state may limit the speech of teachers to a greater extent
than the speech of average citizens, but held that according to the test
set out in Tinker, 98 the state had not shown that the restriction was
necessary to prevent the disruption of official functions or to insure effective performance by the employee. 96
The court found further that the statute was not saved by the list
of factors to be considered in finding a teacher unfit and pointed out
that an "adverse effect" (one of the factors) might not result in a "substantial and material" disruption.49 7 The conduct part of the statute
was, in the court's eyes, simply too broad and incapable of a narrow
construction.'9 8
The board of education appealed that portion of the Tenth Circuit's opinion which struck down part of the statute; the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari . 9 9 The case commanded great attention not only because of the subject matter, but because Professor Lawrence Tribe, a noted constitutional scholar, argued the case for the gay
rights organization 0 0 The statute presented a difficult issue to the
Court because the drafters very carefully pulled language from the
Morrison"1 case to describe the factors relevant to unfitness, and because the school board's brief to the Supreme Court used the magic
word "nexus," from Norton,50 2 to describe how the factors should be
used to create a "nexus" between the proscribed speech and the occupational performance.50 3 Many observers believed that the Supreme
Court would again avoid deciding a gay case on the merits by employ-

493. Id. at 1274 (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)).
494. National Gay Task Force, 729 F.2d at 1274.
495. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (holding
that a state's interest outweighs a teacher's right to free speech only when the expression results in
a material or substantial disruption in the normal activities of the school).
496. National Gay Task Force, 729 F.2d at 1274.
497. Id. at 1274-75.
498. Id. The court was apparently miffed at the legislature, chiding that "[tihe Oklahoma
legislature chose the word 'advocacy' despite the Supreme Court's interpretation of that word in
Brandenburg." Id. at 1274.
499. National Gay Task Force, 105 S. Ct. 76 (1985).
500. See Gay Community News, Oct. 13, 1984, at 1; Arguments before the Court, 53
U.S.L.W. 3521 (1985).
501. Morrison v. State Bd. of Educ., I Cal. 3d 214, 461 P.2d 375, 82 Cal. Rptr. 175
(1969). See Rivera I, supra note 1, at 862-67.
502. Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d H161 (D.C. Cir. 1969). See Rivera 1, supra note 1, 818-19.
503. Petitioner's Brief at 4, National Gas Task Force v. Board of Educ., 729 F.2d 1270
(10th Cir. 1984), aff'd mem. by an equally divided Court, 105 S. Ct. 1858 (1985).
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ing the Pullman5° 4 doctrine of abstention; sending the case off to the
Oklahoma Supreme Court for a try at a restrictive interpretation that
would pass constitutional muster.
When the Supreme Court decided the NGTF case on March 26,
1985, the Court did not resort to the Pullman device to avoid the issue.
Nevertheless, the actual result was disconcerting to both sides. In a
four-to-four per curiam decision, 50 5 the Court affirmed the Tenth Circuit's decision that struck down part of Oklahoma's antigay statute.
Because of the nature of the decision, how the various justices voted is
technically unknown. One vote is clear: Justice Powell took no part in
the decision as he was hospitalized during the argument.5 00 Legal scuttlebutt has Stevens, Blackmun, Marshall, and Brennan affirming the
decision and Burger, O'Connor, White, and Rehnquist dissenting. Because of the tie vote no national precedent was set. The decision only
technically affects the states included in the Tenth Circuit. Both gay
advocates and the Oklahoma City Board of Education publically
claimed victory. 507 However, most gay rights litigators breathed a sigh
of relief that another decision survived the Supreme Court.
One lesson of the teacher cases is that teaching is a dangerous
employment arena for gay persons. Prior to the Gaylord50 8 decision,
one could say that homosexuality per se was not a reason for dismissal,
that "immorality" alone was too vague a concept to cause the dismissal
of gay teachers, and that the real key was a nexus between the teachers' sexual orientation and his or her job performance. This latter criterion would be judged by the standards enunciated in Morrison,50 0 a
case cited nationwide. However, Gaylord, in which the Supreme Court
denied certiorari, allowed a dismissal based on the teacher's status as a
gay person on a finding that such a status was immoral per se. 51 0 Thus,
after Gaylord, the law as applied to both "avowed" gay persons and
persons who had merely engaged in same-sex acts was idiosyncratic to
the state where the case originated. However, even after Gaylord, no
case law suggested that teachers could lose their jobs merely because

504. Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). For an explanation of the
doctrine of abstention, see J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 99-109
(2d ed. 1983).
505. National Gay Task Force, 105 S. Ct. 1858 (mem.).
506. The same week the Supreme Court ordered reargument in three other cases that Powell had also missed. It is unclear why the Supreme Court did not take the same avenue in NGTF.
The N.Y. Times speculated that Justice Powell did not want to participate in the case. N.Y.
Times, Mar. 27, 1985, § I, at 10.
507. Wash. Blade, Mar. 29, 1985, at 1.
508. Gaylord, 85 Wash. 2d 348, 535 P.2d 804. See Rivera 1, supra note 1, at 871-73.
509. Morrison, I Cal. 3d 214, 461 P.2d 375, 82 Cal. Rptr. 175.
510. Gaylord, 85 Wash. 2d at 296, 559 P.2d at 1346.
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someone believed them to be gay. However, an opinion of the West
Virginia Attorney General has espoused just that position.5 11 The opinion was written in response to a request from the superintendent of the
Hampshire County Schools located in Romney, West Virginia. The superintendent wanted to fire one of his teachers. 512 The teacher was a
woman who apparently often wore trousers to school, worked part-time
at a service station to supplement her teaching income, and had a female roommate. 513 Apparently, the teacher also had some facial
hair. 514 What was often not mentioned in news reports was that the
teacher suffered from a form of cancer, and as a consequence, took
steroids which caused both weight and hair problems. 1 5 She was a kin51 6
dergarten teacher.
The opinion, issued February 24, 1983, was seemingly motivated
in part by the then upcoming political campaign for attorney general;
however, the man who wrote the opinion lost in the primary and is no
longer in office. 51 7 Nonetheless, the opinion is on the books. Moreover,
the school board in Romney has acted in reliance upon the opinion, and
has fired the teacher, Linda Conway.51 8 The teacher, who has steadfastly maintained that she is not gay, has commented on the situation:
"It was like waking up in the twilight zone. People treated me as if I
had some kind of disease that they would catch or something. I'm really beginning to sympathize with gays."'5 19 The opinion states three
main conclusions: "teachers may be dismissed for immorality if it affects their fitness to teach; lesbianism and homosexuality are forms of
immorality in most West Virginia communities; and, reputation may be
adduced to show homosexuality, lesbianism, and other forms of morality."' 520 The most problematic statement in the opinion is: "if a person
under consideration has not been observed in an overt homosexual or
lesbian act, but by his other behavior has acquired a community reputation as a homosexual or lesbian, there is precedent under West Vir-

511. See Opinion of the Attorney General of the State of West Virginia, slip op. at 2 (Feb.
24, 1983); Gay Community News, March 19, 1984, at 1.
512. The Advocate, May 12, 1983, at 8. See also Charleston Gazette, Dec. 9, 1984; Telephone interview with William McGinley, West Virginia Education Association attorney who represents Linda Conway (Jan. 8, 1985) [hereinafter cited as McGinley interview].
513. McGinley interview, supra note 512.
514. Id.
515. Id.
516. Id.
517. The new attorney general has pledged tosomehow remove or change the opinion. Telephone interviews with various West Virginia politicians (Jan. 8, 1985).
518. Gay Community News, Jan. 12, 1985, at 2.
519. Id.
520. Opinion of the Attorney General of the State of West Virginia, slip op. at 4 (Feb. 24,
1984).
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ginia and federal laws for admitting such reputation as evidence in any
proceeding involving such persons's future employment as a
teacher." 5 2 ' The opinion is fraught with tortured readings of wellknown cases. The writer of the opinion admits that in West Virginia
homosexual acts are not illegal, yet he then states that, as a matter of
law, homosexuality is immoral in most West Virginia counties.5 2 Citing to Wigmore on Evidence, he concludes that proof of reputation as a
gay person may be used as evidence in a fitness hearing. 523 He admits
no West Virginia case on point exists.5 24 His analysis of cases from
other jurisdictions is superficial and incomplete. 2 5 In fact, when the
opinion was first issued, an attorney for the West Virginia Education
Association called the opinion "pretty funny" and "legally absurd. '526
The opinion is not very funny now, because the school board, using the
opinion as a lever, forced Linda Conway to resign. 52 7 The school board
claims the resignation was voluntary.528 The West Virginia Education
Association (WVEA) filed suit on her behalf.529 Before getting to the
substantive issue raised by the attorney general's opinion, namely the
ability of a school board to fire a teacher on the basis of rumored homosexuality, the WVEA and Conway had to convince the court that
she had been coerced into resignation, rather than having made a voluntary resignation. 5 0 This issue, coercion, was tried to a local jury and
Conway lost. 53 ' The coercion issue is on direct appeal to the West Virginia Supreme Court. 532 Time will tell whether the substantive issue
will be reached. Meanwhile, West Virginia teachers who may be gay or
who may dress like gay persons are keeping a low profile.

521. Id. at 4.
522. Id. at 3.
523. Id. at 2.
524. Id. at 1.
525. For example, Singer v. United States Civil Service Comm'n, 530 F.2d 247 (9th Cir.
1976), vacated, 429 U.S. 1034 (1977), is cited, but the opinion does not deal with the final conclusions of the case; see Rivera I, supra note i, at 824-25; Rivera II, supra note 1, at 317-18; a
second example is an incorrect reading of Morrison v. State Bd. of Educ., I Cal. 3d 214, 461 P.2d
375, 82 Cal. Rptr. 175 (requiring a rational nexus between conduct and teaching fitness). See
Opinion of The Attorney General of the State of West Virginia, slip. op. at 3, 8 (Feb. 24, 1983).
526. Gay Community News, Mar. 19, 1984, at 1.
527. Id.
528. Motion to Dismiss, Conway v. Hampshire County Bd. of Educ., No. CA-83-C-143
(Cir. Ct. of Hampshire County, W. Va. Dec. 6, 1983).
529. McGinley interview, supra note 512.
530. Id.
531. Id.
532. Conway v. Hampshire County Bd. of Educ., No. 83-2030 (W. Va. Sup. Ct. of Appeals
Mar. 26, 1985).
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Professional and Occupational Licensing

Almost all states license a wide variety of occupations and professions. Many of the statutes setting the criteria for licensure require that
the applicant have "good moral character." Since homosexuality is oftimes condemned as "immoral," the "morals" requirement can be used
against gay persons who seek licensure. Most licensure decisions are
made by administrative bodies which either do not formally publish
their decisions or whose decisions are so obscure that they seldom come
to the attention of the legal researcher. An administrative decision can,
of course, in most situations, be appealed to a court and thereby come
to the attention of the researcher.
The two professions most directly affected by such a requirement
are law 53n and medicine.534 Almost all of the few cases which involve
gay persons are in those two areas. One possible conclusion is that
there are no gay lawyers or doctors. The vast number of gay legal and
medical organizations belie this. 535 The second possible reason for the
paucity of cases is that the professions seldom really inquire into the
private lives of their members unless forced to do so. A third possibility
is that many gay lawyers and doctors are refused licensure, but do not
appeal. Probably, such a course of action was likely 20 years ago, but
not now. Assumption two seems most likely.
The one published case concerning licensure comes from Florida.
It is the fourth in a series of Florida decisions, each decision more sup533. Annot., 21 A.L.R. 4th 1109 (1983); Annot., 36 A.L.R. 3d 735 (1971): The American
Bar Association House Delegates rejected by a 158-134 vote a resolution that would encourage
federal, state, and local governments to adopt legislation prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation in employment, housing, and public accommodations. 52 U.S.L.W. 2079
(1983).
534. McLaughlin v. Board of Medical Examiners, 35 Cal. App. 3d 1010, 111 Cal. Rptr.
353 (1973); Lorenz v. Board of Medical Examiners, 290 P.2d 79 (Cal. Ct. App. 1955), rev'd, 46
Cal. 2d 684, 298 P.2d 537 (1956). Teachers are also licensed. See R. RUBINSTEIN & P. FRY, OF A
HOMOSEXUAL TEACHER 6 n.29 (1981), for a list of each state's licensing statutes.
535. Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders, Inc., (GLAD), 2 Park Square, Boston,
Massachusetts 02116; Lawyers for Human Rights, Box 480318, Los Angeles, California 90048;
Gay Law Students Association, P.O. Box 872, Chicago, Illinois 60690; American Association of
Physicians for Human Rights, Box 14366, San Francisco, California 94114; American Medical
Student Association, Lesbian and Gay People in Medicine Task Force, 300 Riverside Drive, 311E, New York, New York 10025; Association of Lesbian and Gay Psychologists, 210 Fifth Ave.,
New York, New York 10010; Caucus of Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Members of the American
Psychiatric Association, 245 East 17th St., New York, New York 10003; National Coalition of
Black Gays, Black Health Professionals of NCBG, 1131 West Pratt Blvd., Chicago, Illinois
60626; Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., 132 West 43rd St., New York, New
York 10036; Committee on the Rights of Gay People, American Bar Association, c/o Independent Rights and Responsibilities Section, 1200 Elm St., Washington, D.C. 20036; Lesbian and
Gay Legal Workers Group, 1535 Grant St., Suite 180, Denver, Colorado 80203; National Lawyers Guild Gay Caucus, 23 Day St., San Francisco, CA 94131; New York Law Group, Box 1899
Grand Central Station, New York, New York 10163.
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portive of gay lawyers than the previous one. In 1957, the Supreme
Court of Florida upheld the disbarment of a gay lawyer."3 6 In 1970, the
Florida Supreme Court upheld a second disbarment;5 3 however, the
chief justice expressed reservations that a "nexus" had not been shown
between the lawyer's conduct and his ability to practice law. 5 8 Then,
in 1978, the Florida Supreme Court was asked by the Florida Board of
Bar Examiners for "guidance" with regard to the admission of Robert
Eimers5 3 9 Eimers, unlike the previous persons, had no convictions for
homosexual conduct and admitted only to his "status" as a gay person. 540 The supreme court ordered Eimers admitted and specifically
used a rational nexus test in its considerations. Foreshadowing its most
recent decision, the court in Eimers said that "governmental regulation
in the area of private morality is generally considered anachronistic
without a showing or a rational nexus between private behavior and
public welfare."5 41 In 1981, the issue again faced the Florida Supreme
Court in Florida Board of Bar Examiners v. N.R.S.5 2 However, in
this case, the lawyer who was denied admission to the bar by the board
petitioned for admission.5 43 N.R.S. had been previously admitted in
New York 544 and had passed all parts of the Florida bar examination.
His selective service classification as 4-F 545 caused the bar examiners
to inquire into his sexual conduct at an informal hearing. N.R.S. admitted a continuing sexual preference for men. He refused to answer
questions about past sexual conduct and said he had "no present intention regarding future homosexual acts."' S He did state he would obey
all the laws of Florida. 547 The court decision is extremely short and
536. State ex rel. Florida Bar v. Kimball, 96 So. 825 (Fla. 1957). The lawyer in question
had been convicted of sodomy, a felony under Florida law. However, he was subsequently (16
years later) admitted in New York. In re Kimball, 40 A.D.2d 252, 339 N.Y.S.2d 302, rev'd per
curiam, 33 N.Y.2d 586, 301 N.E.2d 436, 347 N.Y.S.2d 453 (1973).
537. Florida Bar Ass'n v. Kay, 232 So. 2d 378. (Fla.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 956 (1970).
538. Id. at 380.
539. In re Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners (Eimers), 358 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1978).
540. Remember, status was sufficient for dismissal in the case of the teacher in Gaylord v.
Tacoma School. Dist. No. 10, 88 Wash. 2d 286, 559 P. 2d 1340, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879
(1977).
541. Eimers, 358 So. 2d at 10. See Rivera I. supra note 1, at 857-58.
542. 403 So. 2d 1315 (Fla. 1981). See also Note, Private Homosexual Activity and Fitness
to Practice Law, 6 NOVA L.J. 519 (1982).
543. Id. 1316. Note that the lawyer who represented N.R.S. was Robert E. Eimers.
544. This case is the reverse geographical situation of that in Kimball, when the plaintiff
went to New York after Florida.
545. Through its discharge system, the military service often stigmatizes gay men, sometimes for life. "The armed forced are well aware of the stigma attached to any discharge other
than honorable." Rivera 1, supra note 1,at 839.
546. N.R.S., 403 So. 2d at 1316.
547. Id. The sodomy statute of Florida was repealed. However, the dissenting judge alleged
that the Florida statute, which forbids unnatural and lascivious acts, also prohibits homosexual
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does not include much reasoning. The court held that the bar examiners could only ask questions that were rationally relevant to fitness to
practice law. Therefore, "private noncommercial sex acts between consenting adults are not relevant to prove fitness to practice law." 548 Two
of the justices dissented at length. One judge argued that homosexual
acts are illegal under the Florida lewd and lascivious statute; 5 9 both
judges felt homosexuality was inconsistent with good moral character.550 One commentator has speculated that the basis of the decision
really rests on the new constitutional amendment to the Florida constitution which gives citizens of Florida a right to privacy.55 1 Whatever
the reason, gay lawyers in Florida seem protected by the latest
decision.
The second case to be considered in this section presents a more
difficult issue. Most persons who support gay rights find themselves in a
moral quandary when a gay person is prosecuted or punished for certain sexual acts. For the supporter, the issue is not that one approves or
condones a certain behavior, but rather whether one suspects that the
punishment is not equal because the accused is gay. Essentially, cases
like In re Winton55" hinge on the equal protection of the law and ques-

tions of selective prosecution. Crane Winton was the judge of the District Court of Hennepin County, Minnesota. In February 1982, a series
of investigative reports on the sexual abuse of children was televised.
Included were allegations that Judge Winton had engaged in prostitution with young men. A grand jury subsequently indicated the judge
for both felony and misdemeanor prostitution. The Board of Judicial
Standards instituted its own investigation, but withheld its decision
pending the resolution of the criminal charges. The felony charges were
dropped and the judge pled guilty to two counts of misdemeanor prostitution. The board, after completion of its investigation (including a
hearing which produced a transcript 1,247 pages in length), recommended removal, the strongest possible sanction. Winton appealed to
the Supreme Court of Minnesota, essentially arguing that the sanction
was inappropriate.553 Lambda LDEF, in its supporting brief, pointed
out cases of heterosexual judges who committed misdemeanor prostitution with females and who had received public censure, rather than
acts. Id. at 1317 (Boyd, J., dissenting). The petitioner's claim that the application of that statute
to private homosexual acts was unconstitutional was summarily denied by the court in a footnote.
Id. at 1316 n.*.
548. Id. at 1317.
549. Id. at 1319 (Alderman, J., dissenting).
550. Id. at 1317-18.

551. Note, supra note 542, at 525-26.
552. 350 N.W.2d 337 (Minn. 1984).
553.

Id. at 343.
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removal, as their penalty. 55 4 However, the supreme court upheld Winton's removal and assessed the ex-judge $43,000 in costs. 556
The hearing revealed that over the period of seven or eight years,
Judge Winton had had sexual relationships for money with five to
twenty young males. Originally, the charges seemed to involve sexual
relations with minors, but, as the facts developed, that was not at issue.
The facts did show that the judge had revealed his identity and his
status as a judge to a number of these young men. Moreover, his relationships often involved sodomy, conduct which is still criminalized in
Minnesota. 556 Lastly, the judge apparently did not, at first, admit the
monetary nature of these relationships. However, in his last deposition,
he admitted that he paid for these services and promised that he would
never indulge in prostitution again. The court commented unfavorably
on the truthfulness issue; however, the court held that his prostitution
acts were sufficient in and of themselves to justify removal. The court
stressed the public nature of his acts (he solicited in a public park) and
his indiscretion in revealing to his sexual partners his status as a judge.
The court found however, that "the most crucial aspect of this sordid
affair is that respondent sought out and exploited young persons. '557 In
its opinion, the court did not once use the word homosexual nor did it
discuss Winton's actions as homosexuality. The court did distinguish
Winton's case from that of a heterosexual judge who admitted using a
female prostitute. The court emphasized the private nature of the heterosexual judge's actions as opposed to Winton's. 558 Whether the court
would have decided the case differently if it had involved heterosexual
prostitution is an obviously unanswerable question, however, the
homophobia of the judicial board was evident. In its brief, the board
said:
We do not contend that a judge's homosexual preference alone is a basis
for discipline. A homosexual may be a judge if he or she is a celibate. A
judge who practices homosexuality, and thereby violates the sodomy law
should be disciplined as should a heterosexual judge who engages in for55 9
nication or adultery.
The quotation reveals the equal protection argument. The board's position essentially maintains that marriage is the status to be protected,
thus relations outside of marriage (fornication or adultery) are punish-

554.
555.
556.
557.
558.
559.

Brief of amicus curiae Lambda LDEF at 24-27, Winton, 350 N.W.2d 337.
Winton, 350 N.W.2d at 344.
Id. at 343.
Id.
Id.
Brief of amicus curiae Lambda LDEF at 6, Winton, 350 N.W.2d 337.
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able for heterosexual persons. Gay persons, however, are denied marital
status, so the commensurate position advocated by the board for the
homosexual person is celibacy. By making private, consensual, homosexual acts criminal and foibidding any kind of legal recognition of
even monogamous unions of gay persons, the law takes from gay people
one of life's strongest needs: intimate companionship.110 We will never
know whether Crane Winton would have sought prostitutes if he could
have had a legally recognized relationship. Both these cases arose in
states where homosexual acts between consenting adults in private are
still criminally penalized. In twenty-six other states, private, consensual, adult homosexual acts are not criminalized. The presence of the
criminal penalty in a state casts a shadow over other areas, (e.g., custody, immigration, and licensure) and contributes to the patchwork of
results. Those who become impatient with the state-by-state approach
should remember that one of the purposes attributed to states was to be
experimental outposts for subsequent national action. If the results of
decriminalization of homosexuality are not dysfunctional in those states
where decriminalization has occurred, then perhaps, eventually gay
persons can enjoy equal protection of the law all over the nation.

560.

See generally Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624 (1980).
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